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 There can be  little doubt that global sentiment around sub- Saharan 
Africa has changed signifi cantly over the last de cade. From being viewed 
as a continent rife with po liti cal and economic uncertainty, together with 
a tendency  toward economic and social collapse, the current dominant 
view is that sub- Saharan Africa remains the last of the  great untapped 
markets, ripe for rapid growth and development. While research on 
many of the key themes in African development has increased,  there is 
very  little research around trying to understand the relationship be-
tween economic growth and employment outcomes at the detailed 
country level. This book, including its six country case studies of Ethio-
pia, Ghana,  Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa, together 
with the editors’ introduction, is a successful collaboration of the Brook-
ings Institution, the Development Policy Research Unit of the Univer-
sity of Cape Town, and the United Nations University World Institute 
for Development Economics Research (UNU- WIDER) to help fi ll this 
gap and to stimulate further analytical work in this impor tant area.
The growth of the global working- age population to 2030  will be 
driven primarily by Africa, so the relationship between population and 
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The Pursuit of Long- Run 
Economic Growth in Africa
An Overview of Key Challenges
Haroon Bhorat and Finn Tarp
Historically, the African continent has been largely dismissed as a 
case of regional economic delinquency, with the levels of growth nec-
essary to reduce poverty and in equality deemed to be consistently unat-
tainable. In the last de cade, however, signifi cantly higher levels of 
economic growth have ushered in a new era to the region, suggesting it 
may, potentially, serve “as the fi nal growth frontier with the last of 
the  great untapped markets, ripe for rapid growth and development” 
(Bhorat and  others 2015a). Data from The Economist and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (2011) support  these assertions, as six of the fast-
est growing economies globally over the period 2001 to 2010  were in 
Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA hereafter): Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, 
Mozambique, and Rwanda. This volume specifi cally refers to the fol-
lowing six economics as the African Lions: Ethiopia, Ghana,  Kenya, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa.
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The 1980s is often referred to as the continent’s lost de cade. The 
combination of massive external economic shocks; governance failures; 
 under- investment in vital social ser vices; signifi cant macroeconomic 
imbalances; poor infrastructure; and structural trade defi cits (Devara-
jan and Fengler 2012; Collier and Gunning 1999) undermined the 
early pro gress achieved  after in de pen dence from Africa’s colonial mas-
ters. Orthodox stabilization and structural adjustment programs domi-
nated the policy agenda (Tarp 1993, 2001) and stagnation continued 
well into the 1990s. The post-2000 African economic boom, in contrast, 
has been built around a composite of  factors, including improved macro-
economic policy; high commodity prices; signifi cant improvement in 
the quality of governance and institutions; technology (mobile phones 
in par tic u lar); demographic growth; urbanization and the rise of new, 
dynamic African cities; and, in some cases, better targeted social pol-
icy. In turn,  these  factors, regularly supported by substantial infl ows of 
foreign aid (Tarp 2015), have enabled the growth momentum on the 
continent to be maintained.
Not surprising given where African countries found themselves in 
the mid-1990s, socioeconomic indicators— poverty, in equality, access 
to social ser vices, institution development, and infrastructure levels— 
remain weak in Africa (see Arndt, McKay, and Tarp 2016) and typically 
lag  behind developing nations in other regions of the world.  There are 
also concerns related to the sustainability of recent economic per for-
mance and socioeconomic advance for vari ous reasons. First, an impor-
tant part of this growth has been driven by dependence on extractive 
resources, which are volatile and subject to exogenous  factors. Further, 
being a capital- intensive sector,  there remains limited scope to address 
the rapidly increasing supply of  labor through resource- based develop-
ment. Second, emerging  labor trends indicate that agriculture’s share 
of employment is diminishing, with the ser vices sector absorbing a 
signifi cant share of the  labor force (Newman and  others 2016a). How-
ever, due to low  human capital levels, the majority of  these workers are 
employed on the fringes of the economy, working mainly in informal 
low wage and low productivity jobs. The manufacturing sector in most 
of  these countries is shrinking following a considerable decline in man-
ufacturing value added between 1990 and 2000. Third, while in equality 
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is notoriously diffi cult to capture, it does appear as if in equality indica-
tors are widening through the continent, driven by wage differentials 
across sectors, differences in  human capital levels, and urban and rural 
splits. Fi nally, many African countries are at dif fer ent stages of demo-
graphic transition— shifts from a high fertility, high mortality phase to 
a low fertility, low mortality state— a state associated with dividends that 
should, ideally, contribute to economic growth and development, which 
does not, however, seem to be materializing (Oosthuizen 2015).
A BRIEF MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Africa’s postcolonial growth history may be divided into two distinct 
phases. The fi rst, between 1965 and 1990, was characterized fi rst by pro-
gress and then by dismal growth in the 1980s. More recently, growth has 
surged. This chapter pres ents a brief overview of key macroeconomic 
indicators for Africa broadly, and specifi cally for our sample of six Afri-
can  economies.
 Table 1-1 pres ents an overview of infl ation, exchange rates, and cur-
rent and fi scal accounts, as well as external debt, for the vari ous African 
subregions. It is evident that macroeconomic per for mance has signifi -
cantly improved across SSA, as demonstrated by infl ation, which dropped 
from exceptionally high rates in 1990–94 to single- digit values in the 
two subsequent periods.
Over this period,  these economic regions experienced slight ex-
change rate depreciation against the US$, but since then, the exchange 
rates have stabilized closer, possibly, to their equilibrium value. Despite 
signifi cant currency depreciations, exports have not increased suffi -
ciently to improve the current account balances. For example,  Kenya 
experienced what has been termed a clogged “exports engine” (World 
Bank 2014) as the exports of goods as a  percent of GDP declined in the 
period between the mid-2000s and 2014, while imports of goods con-
tinued to increase. However, over this period, Kimenyi and  others (2015) 
note that  Kenyan ser vices exports continued to expand, although not suf-
fi ciently to offset the widening gap between exports and imports. Over-
all, however, current account defi cits within the context of a developing 
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nation do not indicate fi scal imprudence, as external funds (that is, es-
pecially aid) often supplement domestic resources.
Although the majority of the current fi scal accounts remain nega-
tive, they are within a narrow and sustainable range for the dif fer ent 
regions. It is also apparent that external debt has been relatively well 
managed, as debt to Gross National Income (GNI) levels has fallen 
steadily since 1990 for all regions of the continent. This is in part due to 
debt relief, but is also partially a result of vari ous African economies 
diversifying their output, resulting in a signifi cant proportion of  these 
states fi nancing investment through (fast- expanding) domestic credit 
markets rather than through external debt.














Infl ation (%) 1990–94 923.05 17.58 11.21 78.5 11.43
2000–04 28.59 4.43 2.04 21.55 4.77
2010–13 3.15 4.57 4.94 7.25 5.44
Offi cial exchange rate (LCU 
per US$, period average)c
1990–94 284.13 174.13 22.22 3.83 253.35
2000–04 596.83 411.55 36.6 22.06 648.79
2010–13 553.94 552.12 61.17 243.12 933.39
Current account balance 
(% of GDP)d
2005–09 22.5 −6.67 7.95 −5.55 −7.21
2010–12 −1.55 −7.86 0.78 −9.5 −11
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) 1990–94 −3.82 −3.29 2.78 −3.5 −0.66
2000–04 1.98 −3.88 5.25 −2.02 −2.66
2010–12 4.46 −2.55 2.74 −0.7 −2.65
External debt stocks 
(% of GNI)
1990–94 113.36 86.51 92.58 111.12 116.91
2000–04 129.74 79.06 67.16 72.69 166.08
2010–13 24.02 45.75 36.87 32.48 43.51
Source: Bhorat and  others (2015a) based on data obtained from World Bank Development 
Indicators, 2014, and International Money Fund Government Finance Statistics, 2014.
a. Somalia is excluded from East Africa for lack of data.
b. Zimbabwe is excluded from Southern Africa  because of episodes of hyperinfl ation and 
economic crisis.
c. LCU = Local currency units relative to the US$. Sao Tome and Principe and Madagascar are 
excluded from the exchange rate data due to rapidly depreciating currencies, which  will result in 
distortions for the Southern Africa results.
d.  There is no current account data for Africa before  2005.
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Growth within the African Lion states was often accompanied 
with signifi cant welfare gains. In South Africa and Ethiopia, signifi cant 
welfare gains  were observed, as mea sured by increasing access to social 
ser vices, improved housing and basic infrastructure, and a reduction 
in poverty levels. Overall, while  table 1-1 paints a positive picture of 
the state of Africa’s macroeconomic environment, risks arise from 
po liti cal instability, war and confl ict, and external shocks such as 
changes to commodity prices, as well as the spread of disease (Bhorat 
and  others 2015a).
STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Along with the rapid economic expansion across Africa in the post-2000 
period, the continent experienced quickly rising average income levels, 
as well as shifts in the composition of output of the vari ous economies. 
 Tables 1-2 and 1-3 provide additional insight into  these fundamental 
 changes.
 Table 1-2 demonstrates that most regions experienced real annual 
GDP growth exceeding 4  percent over the 2000 to 2014 period, with 
the exception of Southern Africa, where growth dipped slightly below 
this threshold. South Africa, the most dominant economy, experienced 
contractions in overall growth. As already alluded to, growth accelerated 
relative to the previous de cade in all regions, including countries such 
as Ghana and Mozambique. Lastly, we note an increasing trend in real 
per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), except in the North Africa 
region, which experienced economic and po liti cal turmoil following 
the social upheaval wrought by the Arab Spring.
While  these economic indicators are promising, it is necessary to take 
a closer look to discuss the overall sustainability of Africa’s economic 
expansion and assess  whether this growth translates into the achieve-
ment of Africa’s development objectives of equitable growth and is also 
reducing poverty. To understand  whether growth is sustainable, it is 
impor tant to come to grips with the  drivers of growth. Economic the-
ory and cross- country evidence suggest that a more diverse economic 
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base— achieved through structural transformation— increases the like-
lihood of sustained economic per for mance and growth. Such struc-
tural transformation involves the reallocation of  labor from low- to 
high- productivity sectors, and the rate of such structural change can 
encourage growth signifi cantly. Rodrik (2014) posits that rapid indus-
trialization or structural change  toward high- productivity sectors can 
 TABLE 1-2.  Real GDP and GDP per Capita in Africa for 1990, 2000, and 2014
Annual average 
% change
Region Indicator 1990 2000 2014 1990–2000 2000–14
North Africa Total GDP 
(US$million)




1,470 2,576 2,588 5.8 0.00
West Africa Total GDP 
(US$million)




481 545 713 1.3 1.9
East Africa Total GDP 
(US$million)




453 367 1,933 −2.1 12.6
Central Africa Total GDP 
(US$million)




1,731 2,070 3,233 1.8 3.2
Southern Africa Total GDP 
(US$million)




2,230 2,653 2,387 1.8 −0.8
Source: Word Development Indicators, 2014, and based on updated fi gures from Bhorat and  others 
(2015a).
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help shift countries into  middle or upper income status; this follows the 
notion that modern manufacturing industries exhibit unconditional 
convergence to the global productivity  frontier.
 Table 1-3 pres ents the contribution of the vari ous sectors to GDP 
between 1990 and 2012. We see that the agricultural sector remains a 
dominant contributor to GDP, particularly in West, East, and Central 
Africa, although  there has been an observable downward trend in agri-
culture in most regions. In the African case, where industrialization 
has taken place, it has generally been dominated by mining rather than 
manufacturing activities. In fact, in most regions and periods since the 
1990s, manufacturing has declined substantially. This weakness in 
manufacturing represents a key indicator alluding to the vulnerability 
of the growth and development trajectory of many of Africa’s econo-
mies. In contrast, the tertiary ser vices sector has grown to be the largest 
contributor to GDP for most SSA nations.
Africa’s growth dynamic thus far has been characterized, on aver-
age, by a move into resource- based production, with small gains spill-
ing over into manufacturing output. Indeed, some of the highest growth 
has been recorded in low- skilled, low productivity jobs in the urban 
ser vices sectors of  these economies (see Newman and  others 2016a). 
Africa’s transition away from primary sector activities  toward tertiary 
sector activities has, in other words, not resulted in a discernable shift 
 toward a more sustainable growth path. Attempting to quantify the ef-
fect of this structural change, McMillan and  others (2014) estimate that 
this restructuring made a sizeable negative contribution to overall eco-
nomic growth between 1990 and 2005, by as much as 1.3  percent per 
annum on average.1 In this sense, their estimates show that  labor moved 
in the wrong direction, becoming less productive. In Nigeria, Ajakaiye 
and  others (2015) also fi nd that the manufacturing sector has become 
more capital- intensive over time, hampering the capacity of this sector 
to absorb signifi cant volumes of  labor. Rodrik (2014) characterizes this 
phenomenon as premature deindustrialization, where a signifi cant pro-
portion of the population is absorbed into low- productive, informal sec-
tor work. This begs the question  whether Africa  will be able to skip a 
stage of economic development that all other developing nations have 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10 Bhorat and Tarp
 toward growth) and effectively reap the benefi ts of a mining- and services- 
led growth path in the pursuit of long- run growth and employment 
creation. On current evidence, it would appear that a “manufacturing- 
absent” growth and development path is not a sustainable path to pros-
perity for the African continent.
Growth, Poverty, and In e qual ity Interactions in Africa
It is widely acknowledged that economic growth is essential for poverty 
reduction. Evidence suggests that the absolute value of the elasticity 
of poverty with re spect to economic growth ranges between 1 and 5 
(Ravallion and Chen 1997), meaning that a 1  percent increase in GDP 
 will have the effect of lowering poverty by between 1 and 5 percentage 
points. This range suggests that economies differ in their ability to trans-
late growth into poverty reduction, implying that economic growth is a 
necessary but insuffi cient condition for rapid poverty alleviation. As  will 
be shown, African elasticity estimates tend to be lower than globally 
comparable averages in line with Arndt and  others (2012), who compare 
Mozambique and Vietnam and point to the impact of initial structural 
characteristics.
Another major contributor to less poverty reduction following rapid 
economic growth is the level of in equality. High and increasing in-
equality weakens the effect of growth on poverty (Ravallion 1997; Fosu 
2009). Evidence also suggests that the initial level of income in equality 
within an economy is impor tant in predicting the overall impact 
of growth on poverty (Ravallion 1997, 2001), where, all  else constant, 
higher levels of initial income in equality are associated with a lower im-
pact of growth on poverty. Gini coeffi cients, which mea sure in equality 
and poverty, recorded for the African continent are high relative to the 
rest of the world, thus the distribution of income is of par tic u lar impor-
tance in our context. Fi nally, the structure and nature of an economy’s 
growth path  will further infl uence poverty and in equality outcomes. 
Evidence suggests, for example, that growth built on  labor- intensive 
manufacturing is more poverty- reducing and less in equality- inducing 
than growth in capital- intensive sectors such as mining and fi nancial 
ser vices (Ravallion and Datt 1996; Khan 1999; Ravallion and Chen 2007). 
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This relationship is a cause for concern for the many African econo-
mies where “manufacturing- absent” growth, together with a signifi cant 
emphasis on the natu ral resource sector, characterizes their growth 
trajectories.
The Growth– Poverty– In equality Nexus in Africa
It follows from the previous section that Africa’s improvement in mac-
roeconomic per for mance has not translated into equally high- impact 
outcomes in poverty reduction levels. Figure 1-1 shows that, while ex-
treme poverty has fallen in the region since the 1990s, almost 50  percent 
of SSA’s population continues to live below the poverty line. Figure 1-1 
also confi rms that poverty in Africa is not falling as rapidly as in South 
and East Asia.
Figure 1-1 indicates that the proportion of the population living in 
extreme poverty in the African region, except for North Africa, is approxi-
mately 39 to 46  percent, which is noticeably higher than the poverty rates 
of all other developing regions of the world. Further, the depth of poverty 
in Africa is also more extreme than in other developing regions. For  those 
living below the poverty line in Africa, the average consumption level is 
just 70 US cents a day, considerably below that of other regions, which are 
all close to attaining the US$1 a day level (Africa Pro gress Panel 2014). 
Hence, excluding North Africa, about two thirds of the population living 
below the poverty line in Africa are living in extreme poverty.
The estimated growth elasticity of poverty, indicating the percentage 
change in poverty following a percentage change in growth, provides an 
indication of the poverty- reducing impact of Africa’s growth. Figure 1-2 
pres ents Africa’s growth elasticity of poverty for the two de cades since 
1990. SSA had an elasticity of −0.7, indicating that growth of 1  percent 
was estimated to have reduced poverty by only 0.7  percent, as compared 
with an elasticity of approximately −2 in the rest of the  world.
Several key  factors help explain this difference in elasticity. In addi-
tion to higher population growth and the structural features referred to 
in Arndt and  others (2012), three  factors can be noted. First, the higher 
poverty levels and lower incomes in SSA mean that equal absolute 
changes in both  these indicators translate into smaller and larger 
changes, respectively, which then arithmetically reduces the growth 
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elasticity of poverty for SSA (World Bank 2013). Second, it has been 
shown that higher initial in equality hampers the poverty reducing 
power of growth. Fosu (2009) calculates the income– growth elasticities 
for thirty countries in SSA over the 1977 to 2004 period and reveals sub-
stantial variation in the estimates, from 0.63 in Namibia to 1.4 in Ethio-
pia. Many African countries exhibit high and increasing levels of 
in equality. In addition, aggregate evidence indicates that the average 
Gini coeffi cient for the African continent is 0.44, a value that is higher 
than that of the developing country average of 0.416 (Bhorat and  others 
2015a). Ultimately, then, the high initial levels of income in equality in 
many African economies  will serve to reduce the estimated growth– 
poverty elasticities derived for the region.
Last, it is not only growth that  matters, but also the pattern and struc-
ture of economic growth within individual economies. Cross- country 
FIGURE 1-1.  Poverty Headcount Changes from 1981–2008
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evidence makes it clear that growth in  labor- intensive sectors such as 
agriculture or manufacturing are typically more poverty- reducing than 
growth in capital- intensive sectors such as mining (Khan 1999; Ravallion 
and Chen 2007; Loayza and Raddatz 2010). From the previous data 
analy sis, it is evident that growth for a signifi cant proportion of Afri-
can economies is centered around capital- intensive sectors and many 
countries tend to exhibit a pattern of development where the largest con-
tributions to GDP have moved from agriculture to activities in mining, 
construction, and ser vices, with the notable absence of a manufacturing 
sector.
 Labor Market Characteristics
In examining the in equality– growth relationship,  labor demand re-
sponses during growth episodes within an economy  will often shape 
and infl uence the private distributional impacts of growth. An example 
of this has been the shift  toward the demand for highly skilled  labor 
during periods of economic growth. This asymmetric response in occu-
pational demand to growth is critical to understanding how economic 
growth can have distributional and poverty reduction effects. Bhorat and 
 others (2015a) conclude that, in South Africa, for example, the secondary 
FIGURE 1-2.  Growth Elasticity of Poverty by Regiona
Source: Bhorat and  others (2015a).
a. Controls include initial consumption, in equality, and an indicator for a natu ral resource share 
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and tertiary sectors witnessed a rise in the proportion of high- skilled 
 labor force between 2001 and 2012. At the same time, the primary and 
tertiary sectors saw declining proportions of unskilled  labor, overall 
suggesting that fi rms in South Africa are investing in capital and skills, 
causing the shift away from unskilled  labor.
The greatest degree of pressure within the  labor market is likely to 
stem from the entry of young workers into the  labor market. Figure 1-2 
pres ents the projected increase in the size of the working- age popula-
tion between 2010 and 2030. The magnitude of the expected growth to 
2030 in Africa’s youth population (15–24 years of age) is estimated at 2.5 
times the growth in the youth population of Latin Amer i ca, and over 
three times the growth in Asia. Lam and Leibbrandt (2013) provide an 
example from Africa’s most highly populated country, Nigeria, to illus-
trate the extent of the youth bulge in Africa. They show that, while 
growth in the 15–24 age group in Nigeria has fallen from its mid-1990s 
peak, it is expected to remain above 2  percent  until 2030, resulting in 
Nigerian youth continuing to make up a third of the  labor force for the 
entire period (Bhorat and others 2015a).
The fact that Africa’s working- age population is expected to grow so 
quickly, and particularly the working-age youth, highlights the fact that 
the continent is not as far along in its demographic transition as many 
other regions of the world, alluding to the increasing challenge of job 
creation for the continent (Bhorat and  others 2015a).
Regarding the structure of the  labor market,  table 1-4 summarizes 
the global  labor market, including Sub- Saharan Africa. A key defi n-
ing feature of the African  labor market is that an exceptionally high 
proportion— approximately 74  percent—of the SSA  labor force is self- 
employed, as opposed to being engaged in wage employment.2 Income 
from self- employment, which is directly dependent on the profi ts of 
the enterprise/surplus of  house hold activities, is historically more variable 
than wage employment. Also noteworthy is that the majority of the  labor 
force (56  percent) is engaged in agricultural activities, while 77  percent 
of the self- employed workers fi nd themselves in the agricultural sector, 
having a compounding effect on the volatility of  house hold incomes.
Thus, the agricultural sector, as well as the rural  labor market, is 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































16 Bhorat and Tarp
acting as a potential conduit for poverty reduction and job creation. 
Working on the land in rural areas is generally low- income work and 
the sectors potential to help transition workers out of poverty must be 
developed.
The number of working poor in Africa— defi ned as  those living in 
 house holds earning less than US$2 a day— currently at 193 million 
 people, constitutes almost two- thirds of the total employed and is 
approximately eight times the number of unemployed in the region. The 
pattern of the changes in the number of the ultra- poor ( those earning 
below US$1.25 a day) is consistent and shows a distinct re distribution 
of the world’s working poor from East Asia and South East Asia and 
the Pacifi c to South Asia and Africa, with almost a third of the world’s 
working ultra- poor residing in SSA, up from 18  percent in 2000 (Bhorat 
2013). Thus, while the proportion of the working poor to total em-
ployment in SSA has seen gradual improvement since 2000, the fun-
damental jobs challenge in the region remains the prob lem of the 
working poor.
Ultimately, then, policies targeting the working poor and, in par tic-
u lar, increasing the productivity and competitiveness of the sectors they 
are located in, remains crucial to reducing the high incidence of pov-
erty in many African economies. As one example, transforming the infor-
mal sector to become a more sustainable employer with backward and 
forward linkages to formal sector fi rms provides another focus for equi-
table development. Fi nally, growing Africa’s wage employment base must 
be a key ele ment of a growth strategy for African policymakers. Expanding 
the manufacturing sector, as noted, is another ele ment of a job- generating 
growth strategy, which has worked in the high- success economies of East 
Asia (Bhorat and  others 2015a; Newman and  others 2016a, 2016b).
A THREE- PART STORYLINE: EMERGING 
BARRIERS TO LONG- RUN GROWTH
The detailed country case studies that follow this chapter suggest at 
least three major common themes that serve, in part, to characterize 
the nature of the growth challenges and constraints in Africa, which, if 
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unchecked, could reinforce a pattern of low growth accompanied with 
limited poverty- reducing impact.  These themes are a resource- led growth 
path, an absent manufacturing sector, and the increasing informalization 
of the work force. In upcoming sections, we discuss each in turn and 
provide pos si ble policy  recommendations.
Resource- Led Growth
Numerous studies highlight the developmental benefi t of the diversifi -
cation of an economy’s productive structure. Additionally,  these studies 
also argue that the type of products the economy diversifi es  toward also 
 matters signifi cantly. One of the most infl uential studies in reviewing 
the relationship between resource- rich African countries and overall 
growth is the well- known cross- country regression fi nding by Sachs and 
Warner (2001). This paper fi nds a negative and statistically signifi cant 
coeffi cient for the variable capturing resource dependence (primary 
product exports as a share of GDP), when controlling for other growth 
variables such as geography and institutions.
Bhorat, Steenkamp, and Rooney (forthcoming), test for this natu ral 
resource curse hypothesis in Figure 1-3 by showing the relationship be-
tween natu ral resource intensity (as mea sured by the amount of arable 
land) and the log of GDP per capita for a cohort of high,  middle, and 
low income countries as well as some selected African countries. They 
observe a weak negative relationship between the two variables (0.11). 
More specifi cally, a country that has a high natu ral resource endow-
ment is more likely to be poorer than  those countries with a lower natu-
ral resource endowment, ceterus paribus. While this negative corre-
lation suggests the potential presence of the natu ral resource curse, further 
interrogation remains necessary to better understand the country- specifi c 
dynamics as well as the infl uence of mineral resources on overall growth 
 levels.
Proponents of the resource curse effect argue for a number of chan-
nels through which resources adversely impact economic development. 
First, the terms of trade argument posed by Prebisch (1959) argues that 
the price of commodities relative to manufactured goods is said to fol-
low a downward trajectory over time and, thus, countries specializing 
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in resource- intensive activities  will experience declining terms of trade 
over time. Second, Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) argue that, following 
a commodity boom, the growth of the resource sector crowds out man-
ufacturing activity. Third, a po liti cal economy- type argument contends 
that resource- abundant countries are less likely to develop sound institu-
tions  because of elites competing over resources rents. It is argued that 
countries characterized by weak institutions have a higher likelihood of 
armed confl ict. Fi nally, commodity prices tend to exhibit high levels of 
volatility that, coupled with export concentration in natu ral resource– 
based exports, result in broader macroeconomic volatility.
However,  there are, as well, other studies that contest the resource 
curse hypothesis. First, Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) propose a 
FIGURE 1-3.  Resource Intensity Relative to per Capita GDP
Source: Bhorat, Steenkamp, and Rooney (forthcoming), using the BACI International Trade Database.
a. The natu ral resource intensity associated with a country’s export basket (2013) is constructed 
using data from the UNCTAD Revealed  Factor Intensity Database developed by Shirotori, Tumurchudur, 
and Cado (2010). The construction of this mea sure follows the same technique that is applied by Hausmann, 
Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) when the use revealed technology content data (known as the PRODY mea sure) 
to construct a mea sure of the productivity level associated with a country’s export basket (known as the 
EXPY mea sure). In essence, the mea sure is a weighted average of the revealed natu ral resource intensity 







4 6 8 10 12
Log of revealed natural resource intensitya
High income: OECD

































 The Pursuit of Long- Run Economic Growth in Africa  19
“conditional resource curse” whereby the quality of a country’s institu-
tions infl uences  whether it is able to successfully exploit its natu ral 
resource abundance. They fi nd that resource- rich countries with weak 
institutions are associated with low growth, whereas resource- rich coun-
tries with strong institutions are associated with high growth. Second, 
Bravo- Ortega and Gregorio (2007) highlight the importance of the 
country’s  human capital levels. Specifi cally, they argue that low levels 
of  human capital and resource abundance are associated with low lev-
els of growth, whereas high levels of  human capital and resource abun-
dance are associated with higher levels of economic growth. Fi nally, 
Maloney and Lederman (2008) fi nd  little evidence for the curse and, 
instead, propose a “curse of concentration,” for countries that are overly 
dependent upon the exports of just a few natu ral resource– based prod-
ucts are associated with the negative growth effects.3
In summary, an abundance of mineral resources  will not automati-
cally limit a nation’s economy to low levels of growth and development. 
Rather, any mea sur able developmental benefi ts  will arise from the 
inclusion or the absence of a broader set of requirements for growth, 
such as the quality of institutions,  human capital levels, and a suffi -
ciently diversifi ed economy. And in the fi nal analy sis, it is impor tant to 
keep in mind that, if available resources are spent wisely, then growth is 
likely to ensue. The country chapters that follow  will directly and indi-
rectly attest to the challenges posed to the African growth agenda for 
African economies that fi nd themselves heavi ly dependent on resource 
revenues to fuel fi scal revenue, economic growth, and employment 
generation.
An Absent African Manufacturing Sector
During the 1970s, manufacturing in Africa thrived due to import- 
substitution industrialization. However, when economic liberalization 
and the privatization of state enterprises became rampant  under stabili-
zation and structural adjustment in the 1980s, African manufacturing 
went into secular decline, as the continent could not compete with low- 
wage Asian countries. Import competition led to the contraction of 
many domestic industries, resulting in  labor moving  toward less pro-
ductive sectors. According to Page (2014), African countries  were not 
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well prepared for import competition due to state- led import substitu-
tion creating high protection and heavy import de pen dency, but other 
 factors, including bad luck,  were also at play. Newman and  others 
(2016b) provide a comprehensive set of comparative studies of indus-
trial development in Africa and Emerging Asia.
Figure 1-4 shows a steady decline or fl atlining in the contribution of 
manufacturing to economic output across fi ve African regions, particu-
larly from 1990. Since 2000,  there has been a marginally upward trend 
for manufacturing in North and East Africa spurred on by the increas-
ing incidence of light manufacturing and medium technology manu-
facturing,  respectively.
An alternative approach to assessing manufacturing per for mance is to 
analyze the per for mance of manufacturing exports, as the ability to ex-
port and compete in global markets suggests a level of success and indus-
FIGURE 1-4.  Manufacturing as a Proportion of GDP by Subregion, 
1994–2013
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trial strength. Following the poor per for mance in manufacturing output 
across most of Africa, the trends in export per for mance are equally disap-
pointing. As illustrated in fi gure 1-4, West Africa’s share of manufacturing 
in exports  rose promisingly from 1995 levels to a peak of 24   percent in 
2004 before declining back to 1995 levels in 2013, at just  under 16  percent 
of GDP. An encouraging trend is emerging in East Africa, where, on 
average, manufacturing goods as a proportion of exports has risen from 
17.2  percent in 1995 to 20.4  percent currently. Over time, manufacturing 
exports reached a peak of 27  percent of exports from the East African re-
gion in 2006,  after which it gradually declined and has now stabilized.4
While this proportion varies signifi cantly across the African Lions 
in focus  here, the share of manufacturing as a proportion of GDP is 
highest in  Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa. Manufacturing in 
South Africa declined by almost 10   percent between 1994 and 2014. 
This contraction in South Africa followed the inability to compete in 
global manufacturing export markets, increased global competition, 
and volatile real exchange rates.  Kenya has failed to capitalize on the 
manufacturing exports in spite of its location, the presence of a large 
and skilled  labor force, and its market- focused orientation. Additionally, 
 Kenya has signifi cant resource endowment to enable agricultural indus-
tries to transform from small- scale downstream industries into expanded 
upstream manufacturing industries. This would serve a dual purpose 
of increasing growth and lowering unemployment.
Several trends are observed when focus shifts to the nature of manu-
facturing exports undertaken by African countries. First, as expected, 
exports typically consist of primary products. The volume of  these 
exports continues to be high even when compared with developing 
country counter parts in South Asia, Latin Amer i ca, and the Ca rib bean. 
Second, it is estimated that over half of  these manufacturing exports are 
capital- intensive in nature and heavi ly resource- based. In Mozambique, 
for example, the economy remains dominated by agriculture (27  percent) 
and private and public ser vices (51   percent), while manufacturing has 
grown more slowly than other sectors and has declined as a share of GDP 
(18  percent). Growth in the Mozambican manufacturing sector is driven 
entirely by investments in two aluminum smelters attracted to the country 
by its preferential tax structure. Smelting is, by nature, a capital- intensive 
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activity, which limits its overall contribution to manufacturing jobs. Fi-
nally, manufacturing exports out of Africa have relatively low technology 
content. Despite the Ethiopian government designating the manufactur-
ing sector as the conduit to achieving  middle- income country status by 
2025 and establishing vari ous incentives to spur growth, growth remains 
low (estimated at 5  percent) and employment within this sector is minis-
cule in relation to the size of the employment challenge.
Positive results from the continent, however, indicate that most 
economies are in transition, as the share of agriculture relative to GDP 
has declined while the contribution of ser vices has grown signifi cantly. 
A closer look at the data reveals that growth in the intermediate sector 
has principally been driven by expansion of the mining sector, whereas 
the manufacturing sector has experienced stagnation. Furthermore, the 
share of manufacturing exports in manufacturing output has remained 
signifi cantly low historically, which, as alluded to, begs the question of 
 whether service- led growth can deliver a suffi cient volume of jobs.
We now turn our attention to examining the pos si ble range of con-
straints on manufacturing per for mance in Africa, as well as pos si ble so-
lutions. We briefl y analyze the role of skills, capital accumulation, the 
regulatory environment, and vari ous infrastructure costs.
Low Capital Accumulation
A positive relationship is observed in the relationship between capital 
accumulation and GDP. This is true for both  human capital and physical 
capital. In general, an increase in wealth is associated with an increase 
in the use of  human capital in exports. Most African countries are not 
capital abundant when compared to other low- income countries in 
other regions of the world. Nigeria and South Africa are two excep-
tions, as they have a similar level of capital stock and wealth compared 
to other  middle- income countries. However, manufacturing in Nige-
ria has transformed to be more capital intensive amid a large and 
growing  labor force. This is accompanied by a signifi cant reduction 
in the proportion of workers in this sector, as well as an increasing de-
mand for a more skilled  labor force. Overall, however, this lack of both 
physical and  human capital stock, and the intensity of its use in produc-
tion, suggests that Africa  will continue to strug gle to industrialize.
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Using the Atlas of Economic Complexity toolkit developed by Haus-
mann and  others (2007), one can explore the link between the sum of 
knowledge available within an economy to produce goods (the com-
plexity) and connectedness to traded products and what this implies for 
structural transformation.5 Countries at lower levels of economic com-
plexity, mainly African countries, have relatively disconnected productive 
structures and, thus, their ability to diversify and undergo structural trans-
formation is constrained. In essence, the complexity index alludes to 
the fact that  these marginalized countries do not possess the productive 
knowledge and capabilities needed to shift their production structure 
to more complex products, particularly manufactured products. The 
peripheral nature of their product space does not afford them opportu-
nities to diversify and grow in  complexity.
Japan and Switzerland are currently ranked fi rst and second, respec-
tively, on the Atlas of Economic Complexity out of 124 states for which 
FIGURE 1-5.  African Lions’ Atlas of Economic Complexity Rankings, 2013a
Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity (2013).
a. Total rankings,  124.
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information is available. The higher the ranking, the better the trans-
formation and connectedness of that economy. Figure 1-5 summarizes 
the fi ndings for the six African Lion states. The fi ndings are instructive. 
They suggest that only South Africa and  Kenya have some degree of 
economic complexity, as they are ranked somewhere in the  middle of 
the distribution. The remaining four countries in our sample are ranked 
close to the bottom of the distribution in terms of economic complex-
ity. Nigeria is second from last in global distribution of economic com-
plexity, reinforcing the idea of the country’s overreliance on crude oil. 
It is fair to argue, in addition, that the majority of low complexity econ-
omies in this sample are from Sub- Saharan Africa.
Governance, Infrastructure, and Unit  Labor Costs
Despite extensive upgrades, Africa’s business environment continues 
to be plagued by costly ineffi ciency and onerous bureaucratic require-
ments. Eifert, Gelb, and Ramachandran (2008) analyze the cost of 
 doing business in Africa to conclude that the high indirect cost shares 
observed in fi rms in poorer African countries refl ect under lying weak 
fundamentals, which, in turn, reduces the competitiveness of Afri-
can fi rms relative to  those in Asian and Latin American developing 
 countries.
Figure 1-6 plots the World Bank’s Ease of  Doing Business rank for 
Africa, Latin Amer i ca, and South Asia. The higher the rank, the less 
conducive the country is for business. Africa’s average rank is 142, com-
pared to Latin Amer i ca’s 98 and South Asia’s 137. Ele ments of the busi-
ness environment, such as the time it takes to set up a business and get 
electricity and access to credit, all remain critical areas that need re-
form. Fi nally, weaknesses in the rule of law and regulation mean that 
African fi rms pay higher bribes (as a proportion of sales) and lose a 
greater fraction of their sales value to crime and theft than fi rms in 
other developing countries (Eifert and Ramachandran  2004).
All  these  factors point  toward an environment that is not fully con-
ducive to the start up and operation of effi cient small, micro, and medium 
sized enterprises (SMMEs), as well as a thriving informal sector. This 
is, no doubt, one of the contributory  factors to the low productivity of 
the manufacturing sector in Africa. Furthermore,  these business con-
straints may also limit the entry of formal, foreign manufacturing fi rms 
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into the market given that the business environment is a key cost  factor 
for fi rms, in addition to the estimated return on investment.
While the  Doing Business Indicators have occupied a central place 
in the dialogue about enterprise development in Africa, it is, as argued 
in Newman and  others (2016a, 2016b), critical to keep the overall con-
text and constraints in mind in developing appropriate policy. Esti-
mates suggest that poor infrastructure hampers economic growth in 
Africa by at least 2  percent each year and lowers private sector produc-
tivity by up to 40  percent (Kaberuka 2013). Poor infrastructure poses a 
fundamental threat to Africa’s potential for growth arising from its 
manufacturing sector.  Table  1-5 indicates that, while infrastructure 
provision in Africa has grown over the period  under examination, cur-
rent levels remain very low when compared with developing nations in 
other regions of the world. For example, the road density network as a 
proportion of land area is estimated at 24.3 in Africa, compared to an 
average of 54.2 for non- African developing countries. Furthermore, evi-
dence points to the fact that roads in Africa— which are the main means 
FIGURE 1-6.  Ease of  Doing Business in Africa vs. Latin Amer i ca and 
South Asia, 2015
Source: World Bank  Doing Business Report,  2015.
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of transporting freight— are unpaved and in poor condition (Pricewater-
houseCoopers 2012). Transport costs are cripplingly high and electric-
ity production remains low and unpredictable.
Ineffi cient logistics contribute signifi cantly to the cost of  doing busi-
ness in Africa and weaken the ability to leverage a comparative advan-
tage in, say, food pro cessing industries, where perishables require short 
transit times. Rail infrastructure remains poor and out of date, with few 
upgrades by most African states. Ports, key to facilitating international 
trade, are in undersupply and often do not function effi ciently, which, 
in turn, limits their overall ability to  handle large volumes of traffi c. A 
case in point is  Kenya, which, through the port city of Mombasa, ser vices 
fi ve landlocked neighboring countries that are fairly resource- rich: Ethio-
pia, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. To further benefi t 
from this comparative advantage, it is necessary for  Kenya to prioritize 
improvising ports and other transport networks and to develop trans-
port nodes.
High unit  labor costs in Africa are also cited as a reason for the poor 
per for mance of manufacturing in Africa. Ceglowski and  others (2015) 
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Africa 1990 514.24 41.60 63.66 n.a.




1990 457.13 41.23 63.35 n.a.




1990 1,515.15 67.57 83.27 n.a.
2010 1,889.98 78.58 90.48 54.2
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, 2015.














































































































































































































































































28 Bhorat and Tarp
fi nd that high unit  labor costs are a key explanatory  factor as to why 
African manufactured exports remain globally uncompetitive. Figure 1-7 
provides the authors’ estimates of formal sector manufacturing wages 
in Africa. Wages in Sub- Saharan Africa have increased between 2000 
and 2010 and are much higher than in Asian countries. In 2010, Afri-
can countries occupied the highest seven positions with regard to 
manufacturing wages. Only Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritius, and, to a lesser 
extent, South Africa can match the Asian countries in terms of costs. 
However, and to be sure, wages are only one ele ment hampering the 
pro gress of the manufacturing sector. The business environment fur-
ther infl uences operational costs and, therefore, long- run returns on 
investment. Investors are willing to pay a wage premium in countries 
where  there is good infrastructure and the population is well  educated.
It is worth noting that manufacturing is a heterogeneous sector of 
an economy and encompasses a variety of industries and products. For 
instance, manufactured output varies according to the inputs that go 
into production, such as capital,  labor, and natu ral resources. To capi-
talize on long- run growth opportunities, it is, thus, crucial for African 
economies to work on improving the quantity and quality of  human capi-
tal, to ensure  there is an enabling and effi cient regulatory environment, 
and to improve overall infrastructure levels.
Informalization of  Labor
The expansion of the African informal economy in the 1990s is often 
linked to trade liberalization and structural adjustment programs that re-
sulted in civil ser vice employees exiting the sector, as well as global com-
petition that resulted in lowered staffi ng levels for previously protected 
industries (Verick 2006; Calvès and Schoumaker 2004). Despite limited 
data and studies in this area, the general consensus is that the informal 
sector plays an impor tant role in Sub- Saharan Africa. A 2015 report by the 
African Development Bank reports that informal economic activities ac-
count for approximately 55  percent of GDP across the continent and as 
much as 70  percent of employment in the Sub- Saharan Africa region. 
Benjamin and Mbaye (2009) use  house hold level data from the West Af-
rican Economic and Monetary Union to conclude that in Benin, Burkina 
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Faso, and Senegal, the informal sector has, on average, contributed 
74  percent, 49  percent, and 54  percent, respectively, to GDP since 2000.
In  Kenya, in a trend that might apply across the other African econ-
omies, weak relationships are observed between economic growth and 
reduction in unemployment. This might imply that a signifi cant pro-
portion of individuals are employed within the informal sector that is 
not as responsive to economic growth such that, while growth in wage 
employment closely tracks GDP, no such relationship is observed for 
the informal sector. In addition, Gelb and  others (2009) observe a strong 
correlation between rising unemployment and the development of the 
informal sector, where this sector acts as an employer of last resort for 
 those unable to fi nd wage employment.6 Moreover, individuals em-
ployed in the informal sector have been observed to have, on average, 
lower levels of education relative to  those in the formal sector, which 
requires a skilled and educated  labor force (La Porta and Shleifer 2008).
An International  Labor Organ ization (ILO) report published in 
2013 shows that the SSA’s working poor not only constitutes almost 
two- thirds of the total employed but is also approximately eight times 
the number of unemployed in the region. Unsurprisingly, then, evidence 
indicates that poverty is signifi cantly higher among individuals em-
ployed in the informal sector (Benjamin and Mbaye 2009). Findings 
from Mozambique indicate the presence of a minority of workers earning 
a stable wage income, even in urban areas that provide more economic 
opportunities. Furthermore, wage differentials are prevalent depending 
on the aggregate economic sector where earnings are obtained. This is 
particularly true in  Kenya, where vari ous barriers exist to limit  labor 
mobility between the informal and the higher- paying formal sector. A 
wage differential of US$36 is calculated between Ethiopian workers 
in the formal and informal sectors while, in Ghana, earnings are pre-
sumed to be the lowest in the informal sector, with average daily earnings 
being estimated at 37.5  percent of public sector earnings and 32.1  percent 
of the average earnings in the private formal sector.
Within the informal economy, certain sectors are clearly dominant 
across the continent. Domestic work in the private homes of  others, home- 
based work, and street vendors dominate the African informal sector 
(International  Labor Organ ization 2013).7 The 2013 ILO report estimates 
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that, in Africa, the number of domestic workers has increased from 4.2 
million in 1995 to 5.3 million by 2010, where 73  percent are  women. 
Further research has shown that informal sector fi rms are signifi cantly 
less productive than formal fi rms (Gelb and  others 2009; La Porta and 
Shleifer 2008).  There is evidence from selected economies to indicate 
that retail trade and other non- tradables absorb the majority of informal 
sector workers (Verick 2006). South Africa, with a relatively smaller infor-
mal sector, indicates higher concentration in the retail trade, domestic 
work in private  house holds, construction, and transport ( Wills 2009).
In the case of the African Lions,  labor mobility from agriculture to 
the ser vices sector requires closer interrogation, as it often masks the 
fact that, despite increases in overall employment share,  there is a decline 
in overall  labor productivity. This implies that the bulk of  these new 
workers are mainly located in the informal sector, often have low levels 
of education, and are undertaking risky or low- paying jobs. The Nige-
rian ser vices sector is characterized as a low productivity sector, and any 
infl ows of  labor  will have the effect of lowering overall per capita pro-
ductivity, which diminishes any inter- sectoral shift effects. (It is similar 
in Ghana, which has an employment elasticity of 0.47. New jobs are 
being created in the informal sector generating a signifi cant proportion 
of the working poor, estimated at 22  percent of the overall working pop-
ulation). The share of employment in  Kenya’s informal sector was esti-
mated at 83  percent in 2014, following an average increase of 72  percent 
over a thirty- year period. The widespread growth of the  Kenyan infor-
mal sector is largely attributable to the fact that the formal sector is not 
growing rapidly enough to absorb the growing  labor force as a result of 
constraints to capital accumulation within this sector.
A rising informal sector is also signifi cant  because workers within 
this sector are often excluded from contributory social insurance 
schemes that require an employment relationship. Therefore, raising 
the productivity of the informal sector becomes an impor tant policy ob-
jective. This implies, fi rst, addressing issues surrounding the business 
regulatory environment that need to be addressed to develop this sec-
tor, including improving access to credit and provision of insurance 
products. Second, investment in basic infrastructure such as electricity, 
road networks, and information technology is fundamental. Third, 
wage differentials resulting from the proportion of unskilled  labor in 
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the informal sector necessitates the upgrading of skills for individuals 
within this sector. This has a dual effect, as it may help generate  viable 
fi rms as well as contributing to overall sectoral productivity. Last, policy 
strategies and programs should be put in place to make the informal sector 
more dynamic and formal, to deliver quality employment opportunities.
CONCLUSION
The analy sis presented in this chapter suggests that, despite signifi cant 
advances in terms of macroeconomic stability, it is evident that the struc-
ture of the African region’s growth remains of concern. The pattern of 
growth that is resource- dominant and manufacturing- absent would not 
seem to be the standard economic development path followed by all 
economies that have successfully transitioned from low- to high- income 
country status. The dominance of resources in production and exports 
and ser vices and agriculture in employment would, in turn, not appear 
to be the most appropriate strategy for long- term and sustained poverty- 
reducing growth. This lack of complexity in production, underpinned by 
constraints in infrastructure, a poor regulatory and governance frame-
work, and high unit  labor costs serve to reinforce challenges to growth, 
development, and employment generation strategies of this continent. In 
the chapters that follow, we hope to elucidate, at the country level, how 
 these challenges are being played out in six African economies.
NOTES
The authors would like to thank Arabo Ewinyo and Kirsten van der Zee 
for their outstanding and invaluable research assistance.
1. A similar result is observed for Latin Amer i ca, with Asia being the only 
one of the three regions where the contribution of structural change to eco-
nomic growth over this period was positive.
2. According to the International  Labor Organ ization (ILO) (1993), wage 
employment refers to jobs “where the incumbents hold explicit (written or oral) 
or implicit employment contracts which give them a basic remuneration” in the 
form of wages. Self- employment is defi ned as “jobs where the remuneration 
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is directly dependent upon the profi ts (or the potential for profi ts) derived 
from the goods and ser vices produced (where consumption is considered to 
be part of profi ts).”
3. A case study analy sis of Scandinavian countries by Blomstrom and 
Kokko (2007) argues that the current diverse high- tech manufacturing 
industries in  these countries  were developed upon the foundation of knowl-
edge- and technology- intensive natu ral resource industries. For example, the 
high- tech telecom com pany, Nokia, emerged from a forestry com pany.
4. This aggregate positive trend is driven primarily by increasing growth 
in Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda.
5. See this atlas at http:// atlas . cid . harvard . edu / media / atlas / pdf / Harvard 
MIT _ AtlasOfEconomicComplexity . pdf.
6. Maloney (2004) is a key proponent for the role that the informal sector 
could play in advancing better outcomes for entrepreneurs relative to em-
ployment within the formal sector. However, he also acknowledges the dif-
fi culties faced by workers in this sector, namely restrictive access to formal 
credit markets and weaker property rights.
7. Home- based work relates to own- account workers and subcontracted 
workers that carry out remunerated work in or very near their own homes.  These 
types of jobs include the manufacturing of crafts and related trade, the opera-
tion of small con ve nience stores or informal pubs, or brick- makers and con-
struction workers. Street vendors also make up a considerable portion of urban 
informal work in Africa (12 to 24  percent). Street vendors include  those who 
sell goods at fl ea markets, street- side hairdressers, and  those who sell fruit, vegeta-
bles, and other food on city streets (International  Labor Organ ization 2013).
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An Agrarian Economy in Transition
Yared Seid, Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse, and Seid Nuru Ali
Ethiopia has experienced rapid eco-nomic growth since 2005, with 
gross domestic product (GDP) growing at an average rate of 10.5  percent 
per annum in real terms between 2004–05 and 2012–13 (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development 2013). This makes Ethiopia one of 
the fastest growing countries in the world. The rapid economic growth 
has a multifaceted effect on a number of social, economic, and po liti cal 
domains. Considering 2015 is the end of the fi rst Growth and Transforma-
tion Plan (GTP), the country’s comprehensive fi ve- year development plan 
with targets aligned to the aim of achieving  middle- income status by the 
mid-2020s, it is a good time to explore the pattern of the economic growth 
in Ethiopia as well as the relevant growth opportunities and challenges.
Evidence suggests that economic growth in Ethiopia has been ac-
companied by signs of a structural shift away from traditional and 
primary sectors and  toward secondary and tertiary ones. For instance, 
the pace of output growth has been decreasing in agriculture, whereas 
growth rates of industrial and ser vice sectors have been increasing. As 
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a result, the agriculture share of the GDP is now comparable to that of 
the ser vice sector, a signifi cant change relative to a  couple of de cades ago.
Both economic growth and structural shifts have impor tant im-
plications for poverty reduction and income distribution.  Labor mar-
ket outcomes are a potential major ave nue through which  these infl u-
ences take place. The high rate of public investment in infrastructure 
has generated growth in construction and related industries and trig-
gered growth in other sectors through its linkage effects.  There are three 
major channels through which the pro cess is believed to have infl u-
enced income distribution in the country. First, the investment on infra-
structure and buildings led to higher employment of urban youth and 
rural mi grants in construction and allied subsectors. Second, in part 
caused by this expansion of employment, the demand for goods and ser-
vices  rose. This is particularly signifi cant to the agricultural sector, lead-
ing to improvements in terms of trade, in  favor of the sector. Policy re-
sponses to  these pressures have been aimed to  raise productivity in 
agriculture and included expansion of the agricultural extension system. 
Structural change formed the third channel.
As a consequence of  these changes, the role of agriculture has de-
creased continuously in the face of an increasing role of the ser vice and 
construction sectors, and this has led to reallocation of jobs and  labor 
from the low- productive agriculture sector to the high- productive ser-
vice sector. Historical evidence shows that this type of  labor reallocation 
is vital for more secure employment and higher living standards. The 
nation’s effort is to diversify the shift of economic activities  toward 
the manufacturing sector, to ensure more durable jobs and sustainable 
growth. This is, in par tic u lar, the focus of the second phase of the 
GTP, which began in the year 2015.
Another aspect of sectoral reallocations is their potential to engen-
der more unequal outcomes. The possibility of this outturn is not small, 
since the jobs created in the ser vice sector are, on average, relatively 
more knowledge- intensive and higher paying. The earnings gap be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers in Ethiopia can, thus, widen. This 
is obviously an empirical question. In this study, we, accordingly, at-
tempt to collate and analyze the relevant evidence, such as within- and 
between- sector employment shifts, to ascertain  whether economic 
 Ethiopia 39
growth and structural change in Ethiopia are pro- poor. Moreover, the 
study explores related social and economic changes that have affected 
employment of both skilled and unskilled workers in Ethiopia, includ-
ing population growth and its demographic structure, the expansion of 
education, returns to education, and the role of the public sector and 
social protection programs in employment.
BACKGROUND
The following paragraphs consider the pace and sources of economic 
growth in Ethiopia, which has been observed since the mid-1990s, 
and the status of structural transformation in the country. The aim is to 
provide some background to subsequent discussion.
Trends in Economic Growth in Ethiopia
 After being stagnant for many de cades, Ethiopia’s economy has ex-
perienced robust and continuous growth in the de cade since 2005. 
Figure 2-1 pres ents trends in GDP growth in Ethiopia since 1990.1 As 
can be seen from the fi gure, in the 1990s, GDP growth in Ethiopia was 
not only low on average, it was also highly volatile, with both high posi-
tive and negative growth rates throughout the de cade. The outcome 
refl ected a combination of  factors, including recovery from a lengthy 
civil war, war with Eritrea ( toward the end of the de cade), and volatile 
weather, combined with heavy reliance of Ethiopian agriculture on 
rainfall and its very large contribution to total GDP. Since the mid-
2000s, on the contrary, Ethiopia has enjoyed accelerated and sustained 
economic growth, with growth rates exceeding global averages. Indeed, 
it has become one of the fastest growing countries in the world, along 
with some Asian countries. Even during the global economic recession 
that began around 2008, Ethiopia continued to grow  steadily.
In addition to favorable weather conditions for agriculture, a set of 
 factors has contributed to the growth in Ethiopia. Conducive govern-
ment policies, including large market reforms in the 1990s, are a vital 
and defi ning ele ment of this set. Improvements in access to basic 
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ser vices (such as health and education) and heavy investment in in-
frastructure (such as roads and telecommunications) have signifi -
cantly helped, also, by addressing critical bottlenecks. More broadly, 
overall growth has been symbiotically accompanied by greater com-
mercialization of agriculture and private sector development.
An impor tant attribute of this high growth episode is that it has 
been resilient to vari ous shocks, such as drought and international eco-
nomic crises, contrary to the nation’s historical susceptibility to such 
shocks. It can be shown that war in the 1990s and very early 2000s and 
drought in 1975, 1985, 1997, and 2003 have had adverse effects on the 
Ethiopian economy (see fi gure 2-2).
Sources of Growth
This section explores the sources of aggregate and sectoral growth 
using Solow decomposition analy sis. Such growth decomposition has a 
long history, stretching back to Solow (1957).2
FIGURE 2-1.  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth in Ethiopia, 
1990–2014
Source: Authors’ computation using data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database 










GDP growth (annual %) Linear GDP growth (annual %)
Annual growth rate (percent)
 Ethiopia 41
 Table 2-1 reports half- decade averages for GDP growth and the part 
of that growth that originated in increased use of  labor and capital as 
well as changes in total  factor productivity (TFP).3 The acceleration of 
GDP growth  after 2004 is clear. Perhaps not surprisingly, the contribu-
tion of all  factors  rose in  later years.  Labor (employment expansion) 
continues to be an impor tant source of growth. Interestingly, the role of 
 labor quality improvements (particularly changes in  labor composition) 
has edged upward again, albeit from a very low base and remaining 
still small. This is most likely linked to expansion in education and ele-
ments of structural change to be outlined  later. The importance of 
capital as a source of growth is also  going up with aggregate capital– 
labor and capital– output ratios increasing (fi gure 2-3).  There is some 
corresponding micro- evidence suggesting capital intensity is rising 
and, more specifi cally, generating discernible productivity differentials 
in industry. Fi nally, consistent with Ethiopia’s signifi cant exposure to 
economic shocks in the past, changes in TFP  were negative or weak as 
FIGURE 2-2.  Sustained Growth in per Capita GDP in Ethiopia (Hodrick– 
Prescott Decomposition)
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a source of growth up to 2004. In contrast, they have been the largest 
contributor during the de cade up to 2014. Nevertheless, TFP growth 
and its share in GDP growth appear to diminish slightly in the last half- 
decade (2010–14), perhaps indicative of  things to come.
Fi nally, a comparison across the African Lions— the six large and 
rapidly growing African economies— reveals broad similarity among 
them regarding the role of employment expansion as a source of growth 
over the two and half de cades since 1990. Whereas Ethiopia and Mo-
zambique show comparable contributions from non- ICT (information 
and communication technologies) capital and TFP growth, South Africa, 
not surprisingly, is a clear  outlier.
STATUS OF STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN ETHIOPIA
Studies on structural transformation (Chenery 1960, 1986; Syrquin 1988) 
have documented that capital accumulation (both physical and  human), 
high rate of growth in per capita income, and a shift in economic activi-
ties from sectors of low productivity to sectors of high productivity are key 
signs of structural transformation. Ethiopia has been laying foundations 
to transform its economy since the mid-1990s. The most noticeable 

















Total  factor 
productivity 
growth
1990–94 −1.23 0.96 0.03 1.01 −3.23
1995–99 4.37 1.49 0.02 2.42 0.43
2000–04 4.00 1.39 0.01 1.88 0.72
2005–09 9.80 2.01 0.00 3.10 4.69
2010–14 9.51 2.07 0.06 3.42 3.96
Source: Authors’ computation using country details data from the Total Economy Database (TCB 
2015b).
GDP = gross domestic product.
ICT = information and communication  technologies.
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endeavors to be rewarded with high rates of economic growth took place 
 under the country’s Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to 
End Poverty (PASDEP), spanning the period from 2005–06 to 2009–10, 
and the GTP, which has been in place since 2010–11 (see fi gures 2-1 
and 2-2 for trends in economic growth in Ethiopia).
The country’s public investment in the economic and social infra-
structure and its intervention in the rural economy have been paying 
off, both in terms of accumulations and in the form of high economic 
growth. For instance, the rate of gross capital formation expanded from 
27.5  percent in 2010 to 40.3  percent in 2014. Efforts in domestic resource 
mobilization resulted in a signifi cant increase in the rate of gross do-
mestic saving, from 7.6  percent in 2010 to 22.5  percent in 2014.
The pro cess of accumulation seems to have succeeded on two 
counts. First, the country has developed a relatively better capability in 
FIGURE 2-3.  Signs of Capital Deepening in Ethiopia— Increasing 
Capital– Labor and Capital– Output Ratios
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terms of physical infrastructure and  human capital. Second, the pro-
cess of accumulation in the infrastructure sector has generated high 
growth in per capita income. The Ethiopian economy has grown at an 
average rate of 11  percent from 2005 to 2014.
Nevertheless,  there are challenges to be tackled to ensure that such 
changes are accompanied by shifts in sectoral proportions in terms of 
 factor use and contribution to GDP. The share of agricultural value 
added in GDP declined by about 10 percentage points between 1990 
and 2014 (from 52 to 42  percent; see fi gure 2-4).
Moreover, mea sures of sectoral contributions to GDP growth reveal 
that the role of agriculture, which jointly led the growth momentum 
with the ser vice sector during the period of PASDEP, has declined 
during the period of the fi rst phase of the GTP. The industrial sector, 
which had a declining contribution to growth during PASDEP, re-
versed its momentum and doubled its contribution to growth during 
the fi rst phase of the GTP. Changes in the growth contributions of 
FIGURE 2-4.  Sectoral Shares of GDP in Ethiopia, 1990–2014




































subsectors also corroborate the fact that changes in the structure of the 
economy are occurring across sectors, from agriculture to ser vice and 
construction sectors. Crop production, traditionally a dominant con-
tributor, has been overtaken by construction and  wholesale and retail 
trade subsectors. The increase in the industrial sector’s contribution to 
growth has largely originated in the construction subsector.4
If the pro cess of structural transformation in the Ethiopian econ-
omy is judged by the historical patterns of industrialization,  there is 
still a lot to be done. The pro cess that earned the nation an 11  percent 
growth in GDP and a 40  percent rate of gross capital accumulation 
was not accompanied by a substantial change in the share of the man-
ufacturing sector in the economy. About 70  percent of the decline in 
the GDP share of agriculture was accounted for by the ser vice sector, 
with the remaining 30   percent  going to the construction sector. In 
contrast, the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP hovered 
around 4.4  percent in 2013–14, only 0.2 percentage points higher than 
its share in 2005.
Many studies (Bigsten and Gebreeyesus 2007; Siba 2010; Sutton 
and Kellow 2010; Söderbom and  others 2006) identify limited access to 
credit, declining returns to capital, and limited backward and forward 
linkages as impor tant constraints facing manufacturing in Ethiopia. 
Söderbom and  others (2006) also hint at the limits to saving and rein-
vestment due to consumption needs of  owners’  house holds as another 
growth- restricting possibility.
Manufacturing fi rms also rely heavi ly on imported raw materials, 
which, generally, does not play to their advantage given the limited 
availability of foreign exchange and lack of access to adequate credit, 
particularly for small and medium- size fi rms.  There is also a lack of 
appropriately skilled  labor to support the production of high- quality 
manufacturing goods.5
The Ethiopian government has made the growth of manufacturing 
a major focus of its second and subsequent fi ve- year development plans. 
It actively encourages the private sector to diversify activities from local-
ized ser vices to manufacturing by addressing some of the key bottle-
necks already identifi ed. In this regard, the considerable public in-
vestments in infrastructural capabilities are likely to support industrial 
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expansion. Perhaps refl ecting this collection of positive  factors, the 
manufacturing sector had an encouraging per for mance, with its value 
added growing at an annual average rate of 17.2  percent between 2010 
and 2014.
 HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA
Investment in  human capital, in par tic u lar in education and health, 
has been one of the impor tant pillars of intervention by the Ethiopian 
government to foster the long- term capabilities of the country and to 
deal with rampant poverty. Policies and social mobilization in  these 
sectors have paid off in the form of improvements in the stock of  human 
capital, better livelihoods, and reduced poverty. Key outcomes of social 
sector endeavors, including child and maternal care as well as  family 
planning, are reductions in mortality and fertility rates. If effectively 
used,  these are expected to result in yet another opportunity for Ethio-
pia’s economic growth in the form of the demographic dividend.
Population Growth and the Demographic Dividend
With a population close to 100 million, Ethiopia is the second most 
populous country in Africa; only Nigeria has a larger population. The 
country is also characterized by a high, albeit falling, fertility rate. As a 
result, Ethiopia’s population is expected to grow at a high rate in the 
coming few de cades. The link between this population dynamic and 
economic growth is complicated. It depends on the size of the popula-
tion, its age structure, the speed with which both are changing, and the 
policy response of governments to  these changes (Bloom, Canning, and 
Sevilla 2003; Drummond, Thakoor, and Yu 2014). The demographic 
transition in the form of declining mortality and fertility rates leads to 
longer life expectancy and a bigger working- age population. The former 
encourages investment in education and health in general, particularly 
focused on  children. The change in the age structure in  favor of the 
working- age segment promotes savings, higher female  labor force par-
ticipation, and even lower fertility rates (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 
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2003). Moreover, the rise in share of the working- age population can 
lead to increased  labor supply, lower de pen dency ratio, higher savings 
and investment, and larger output (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003; 
Gribble and Bremner 2012; Drummond, Thakoor, and Yu 2014). This 
potential for higher growth constitutes the demographic dividend. Ap-
propriate government policies are required to realize this potential and 
avoid the pos si ble negative effects of rapid population changes.
Data from the 2012 Inter- Censal Population Survey show that the 
national average fertility rate has decreased from 6.2 in 2007 to 4.6 in 
2012, a 26   percent fall (Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 2013). 
The onset of the decline in fertility rate, the second phase of demo-
graphic transition, has followed the decline in overall mortality rates, 
the fi rst stage of demographic transition. This implies that Ethiopia is 
on the right track to start enjoying the demographic dividend, in part 
through a growing  labor force.
 There are some indications that this may have started, albeit slowly. 
Fertility rates in Ethiopia are likely to remain high and, as a result, the 
country’s population is expected to grow at a fast pace in the coming 
few de cades. However, the age structure of the population  will continue 
to change, as the fertility rate is projected to continue declining. The 
Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency (CSA), for instance, has projected 
that the percentage of  children aged fourteen years or younger  will de-
crease to 27  percent in 2037, from 44  percent in 2007, while the share 
of the working- age population  will rise from 53  percent to 68  percent 
during the same period (CSA 2013). This is a good outcome  because it 
implies a decrease in de pen dency ratio, which, indeed, is expected to 
fall from 0.89 in 2007 to 0.52 by 2037.6
Data from the 2015 revision of the “World Population Prospects” 
(United Nations 2015) reaffi rms the decline in de pen dency ratio in Ethi-
opia, as depicted in fi gure 2-5. The fi gure shows that the de pen dency 
ratio has been declining continuously since the turn of the  century, and 
although the de pen dency ratio for Ethiopia started to decline a bit  later 
than the Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) average, it did so at a faster rate. 
Hence, the de pen dency ratio for the country is currently below the SSA 
average. The change in Ethiopia’s demographic structure is in the right 
direction but needs to go much further before the country can start 
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enjoying its demographic dividend (Gribble and Bremner 2012). Ethio-
pia has gone a long way in improving its stock of  human capital. Never-
theless, more needs to be done in the spheres of education, health,  family 
planning, and policies promoting savings and investment. All  these are 
required to further increase its stock of  human capital and boost job cre-
ation before Ethiopia starts to fully enjoy the demographic  dividend.
Reforms in the Education Sector
One of the preconditions for exploiting any potential demographic div-
idend is a government’s commitment and ability to provide basic health 
and education ser vices. In this regard, the government of Ethiopia has 
been more effi cient than other governments of similarly poor countries. 
Through a series of fi ve- year education development programs, called 
Education Sector Development Programs (ESDPs), the government of 
Ethiopia has built a large number of primary and secondary schools 
FIGURE 2-5.  Ratio of Working Age to Dependent Population in Ethiopia










throughout the country, with the prime objective of achieving uni-
versal primary education. This effort has been largely successful, as 
most of the regional states of Ethiopia have achieved universal pri-
mary education.
The government of Ethiopia also has aggressively introduced the 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) program 
with the aim to increase the supply of semi- skilled and relatively well- 
suited workers to the growing manufacturing and construction sectors. 
 These types of complementary investments have the potential to pay 
off in the long run by increasing  labor productivity in  these specifi c 
sectors as well as in the entire economy.
The government’s effort in expanding TVET institutes is commend-
able and has led to substantial increases in the number of gradu ates 
from the institutes. Since the inception of the program, for instance, a 
large number of TVET institutes have been built. As a result, accord-
ing to data from the Ministry of Education (1999–2015), the number of 
students enrolled in TVET institutes increased from 5,264 in academic 
year 1999–2000 to 271,389 in 2014–15. This, in turn, has led to a large 
increase in the number and range of available skills in the Ethiopian 
 labor market.7
However,  there appears to be a mismatch between the types of skills 
students acquire at TVET institutes and the skill sets most manufactur-
ing fi rms are looking for. Besides that, research fi ndings indicate that 
the quality of TVET gradu ates does not meet the quality standards of 
manufacturing fi rms, and the TVET program does not seem to be driven 
by demand (Shaorshadze and Krishnan 2013). Thus, careful assessment 
of the sector to understand the current skill gaps and the trajectory of 
skill needs is crucial for tailoring the TVET program to the require-
ments of manufacturing fi rms.
In this regard, the federal TVET agency has taken steps to improve 
the quality and relevance of the TVET program. In line with this, the 
agency has  adopted and expanded cooperative training programs by 
bringing an increasing number of public and private enterprises into 
the training pro cess. In cooperative training, theory is taught in TVET 
institutes and practical skills are acquired through student apprentice-
ship in the enterprises. As trainees must be supervised and may operate 
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expensive equipment, offering training is costly to enterprises. Also, 
increasing the number of enterprises that participate in cooperative 
training programs is a serious obstacle. The challenge, thus, is con-
vincing enterprises that participating in the apprenticeship scheme is 
profi table.
At the same time,  there have been ongoing debates and attempts to 
defi ne occupational standards, assess occupational standards, and, sub-
sequently, certify TVET trainees. Certifi cation of occupational qualifi -
cation has, thus, been introduced into the TVET system. The certifi cates 
are awarded to students upon passing the occupational assessments. 
Unlike previous practice, access to occupational qualifi cations does not 
depend on attending a formal TVET program. This means gradu-
ates from any formal or nonformal TVET program now have access 
to occupational assessment and certifi cation, including  those who have 
learned informally and  those who have acquired the skills through tra-
ditional apprenticeship.
Similarly, higher education has also gone through restructuring 
since the mid-1990s. The rapid expansion of both private and public 
colleges has been one of the major changes in higher education. As 
a result, the number of public colleges in Ethiopia has increased from 
eleven in academic year 1999–2000 to thirty- four in 2013–14, according 
to data from the Ministry of Education (1999–2015). Hence, college en-
rollment has increased from a  little more than 10,000 in 1990 to more 
than 360,000 in 2015. This number is expected to grow further with 
the planned inauguration of more than ten new public universities as 
well as pos si ble private colleges.
The expansion of college education availability and the high popu-
lation growth rate have put tremendous pressure on the Ethiopian  labor 
market. Approximately 600,000 individuals enter the  labor force  every 
year (World Bank 2007). The economy, however, does not seem to cre-
ate enough jobs to match this infl ux. The imbalance between the in-
crease in the supply of and demand for workers in Ethiopia has resulted 
in a high unemployment rate and long unemployment duration, par-
ticularly among the youth.
Unemployment is a new phenomenon in Ethiopia’s skilled  labor 
market. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the large increase in the num-
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ber of college gradu ates following the expansion of tertiary education in 
recent years partly explains the high unemployment rate and long un-
employment duration among new college gradu ates. In academic year 
2009–10, for instance, 66,999 students graduated from college (Ministry 
of Education 1999–2015) and entered the skilled  labor market, whereas 
a total of 46,304 vacancies  were reported during the same year, of which 
only 13  percent (about 6,020)  were opened for skilled workers (Ministry 
of  Labour and Social Affairs 2009–10). As a result, mean unemployment 
duration among new college gradu ates seems to be rising. In fact, one 
recent estimate puts it as high as forty- fi ve months (Serneels 2007).
Restricted/costly information fl ow between employers and job seek-
ers can lead to longer spells of job search and unemployment for new 
college gradu ates. Understanding how the  labor market functions, par-
ticularly the job search pro cess, is crucial to addressing this issue. In 
Ethiopia, the majority of employers advertise job openings in newspa-
pers and/or on small boards installed on the busiest street corners and 
squares of cities in which the employers are located. It is not likely that 
 these types of advertisements  will reach the large number of new col-
lege gradu ates throughout the country. Also,  there is no communica-
tion among employers to coordinate their job advertisements and 
post them at a specifi c period of the year, say, around the months during 
which college students gradu ate. Rather, job openings are advertised 
randomly throughout the year, which may negatively affect the intensity 
of the job search and, hence, increase the unemployment duration.
On the other hand, se nior college students do not generally start look-
ing for jobs before they gradu ate. Starting the job search early (that is, 
while they are still in college) may help reduce the unemployment du-
ration among new college gradu ates. That most universities do not have 
 career placement offi ces to assist graduating se niors in their job search 
means it is diffi cult for students to initiate such searches. Moreover, in 
most cases, employers require job applicants to have their degree cer-
tifi cates in hand when they apply for jobs.
Considering the Ethiopian skilled  labor market is not well or ga-
nized, it is worth exploring the role information plays in unemployment 
duration among new college gradu ates. Better fl ow of information may 
improve the functioning of the  labor market by increasing both the 
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intensity of the job search and the quality of the job match. Job fairs 
may be one mechanism to nurture and exploit in this regard.
Educational Expansion and Returns to Education
As discussed earlier, the Ethiopian education sector has under gone a series 
of changes since the mid-1990s. As a result, both enrollment and gradua-
tion from primary, secondary, and tertiary schools have increased signifi -
cantly. Overall, Ethiopia has achieved universal primary school enroll-
ment and the average years of schooling in the country have increased. 
However, the same cannot be said for improvement in quality. In fact, 
some commentators argue that the quality of education has been com-
promised during the period of rapid school expansion (Kahsay 2012).
Although  there is no rigorous research on the effect of this school 
expansion program on the returns to education in Ethiopia, it is plau-
sible that the increase in years of schooling for an average worker led to 
higher earnings. It is also likely that negative changes in the quality of 
education dampened the effect of the education expansion on returns 
to education.
 Human capital has been emphasized as a critical determinant of 
economic pro gress. Better educational attainment implies more skilled 
and productive workers who, in turn, increase an economy’s output of 
goods and ser vices. Given the importance of educational achieve-
ment, we fi rst assess  whether (non- agricultural) wageworkers in Ethio-
pia have become more educated over time. Using data from the 2005 
and 2013 National  Labour Force Surveys (CSA 2006, 2014), we pres-
ent the education profi le of workers in Ethiopia in 2005 and 2013 in 
fi gure 2-6.
As expected, a large proportion of workers in Ethiopia (40  percent) 
had completed only primary education in 2005, followed by workers 
with secondary (34  percent) and tertiary (25  percent) education. Only a 
very small proportion of workers (less than 1  percent) had completed 
more than a college education. In contrast, in 2013, about 46  percent of 
workers have completed secondary education, a 12 percentage points 
increase from the level in 2005. Similarly, the proportion of workers 
with above college education increased from 0.8  percent in 2005 to 
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2.5  percent in 2013, but the proportion of workers with primary and 
college education decreased.
 There is extensive empirical work on returns to education, both in 
developed and developing countries. In Ethiopia, however,  there are 
limited studies on the topic, particularly  those that attempt to mitigate 
biases from potential endogeneity of ability in the returns to education 
equation.8 Perhaps an exception to this is the study by Girma and Kedir 
(2005) that has attempted to deal with the potential endogeneity of abil-
ity by using instrumental variable quantile regression. The authors 
found a positive and signifi cant effect of education on earnings and that 
the returns to education are higher for  people at the lower end of the 
income distribution. For instance, the impact of schooling at the 25th 
quantile is more than 10 percentage points higher than the returns to 
education at the 90th quantile.
Given the data we have (that is, pooled cross- sectional data from the 
2005 and 2013 National  Labour Force Survey (see CSA 2006, 2014)), it is 
FIGURE 2-6.  Workers’ Education Level in Ethiopia
Source: Authors’ computation based on data from the 2005 and 2013 National  Labour Force Survey 
(CSA 2006,  2014).
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diffi cult to control for endogeneity of ability in the returns to education 
equation. However, as a complementary analy sis to prior studies conducted 
on the returns to education in Ethiopia, and in the interest of presenting 
more current results, we estimated the returns to education equation 
using ordinary least squares regression and uncovered positive correlation 
between earnings and education level (see  table 2-2 for regression results).
In  table 2-2, the coeffi cient estimates of education level dummies 
are positive and statistically signifi cant, implying reasonably high re-
turns to education. For instance, workers who completed primary edu-
cation earn 14.1   percent higher wages relative to workers with below 
primary level education (the omitted group). The  table also shows that 
returns to education increase with years of schooling, where workers 
with above college education earn the highest.
 TABLE 2-2.  Ordinary Least Squares Regression of the Returns 
to Education in Ethiopia
Coeffi cient SE
Age 0.070*** 0.004
Age squared −0.001*** 0.000
Female dummy −0.426*** 0.014
Primary school gradu ate dummy 0.141*** 0.030
Some secondary school dummy 0.281*** 0.025
Secondary school gradu ate dummy 0.566*** 0.025
Some college education dummy 0.842*** 0.025
College gradu ate dummy 1.204*** 0.031
Above college education dummy 1.454*** 0.038
 Father’s years of schooling −0.029*** 0.003
 Mother’s years of schooling 0.013*** 0.002
Married dummy 0.274*** 0.023




Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the 2005 and 2013 National  Labour Force 
Survey of Ethiopia, Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency, 2006 and 2014.
Notes: The dependent variable is log(wage). Robust standard error (SE) is clustered by 
enumeration area, a primary sampling unit.  The regression also controls for district and year 
fi xed  effects.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH ON THE  LABOR MARKET
As indicated,  there are impor tant changes in the Ethiopian economy, 
including huge investment in infrastructure, interventions in the 
 agriculture sector, and rapid economic growth.  These changes are ex-
pected to alter the structure of the  labor market, which, in itself, is one 
of the indicators of intensity of structural transformation in an econ-
omy. Changes in  labor force participation, unemployment rate, sectoral 
share of employment, productivity, and wage rates are some of the indi-
cators of changes in the structure of the  labor market. In this part of the 
analy sis, we consider trends and patterns of  labor force participation, 
employment- to- population ratios, sectoral distribution of workers, un-
employment rates, and  labor engagement in the informal sector to 
make a preliminary judgment on the impact of the change in the eco-
nomic momentum on the structure of the  labor force over the last fi fteen 
years. The analy sis uses data from the 1999, 2005, and 2013 National 
 Labour Force Survey (CSA 1999, 2006, 2014) and the Groningen Growth 
and Development Centre (GGDC) 10- Sector Database of the Univer-
sity of Groningen (Timmer and  others 2014).
The general observation is that the nationwide activity rate of the 
 labor force increased between the years 1999 and 2013, and the change 
is predominantly attributed to the increase in female  labor force par-
ticipation in rural areas. This pattern has been corroborated by the rise 
in the employment- to- population ratio over the same period. The rise 
in  employment- to- population ratio is dominated by the increase in 
female  labor force participation in rural as well as urban areas of the 
country.
A decline is recorded in the share of  labor force in the agriculture 
sector by 7.5 percentage points between 2005 and 2013. This rate is par-
alleled by an increase in the share of  labor force in the ser vice and con-
struction sectors. The subsectors in the ser vice sector in which net  labor 
fl ow has increased vary signifi cantly by geography and gender. Consis-
tent with productivity mea sures,  there is no net shift of  labor force to the 
manufacturing sector during the period between 2005 and 2013.
Other impor tant developments during the period  under consider-
ation include a decline in unemployment rate in both rural and urban 
56 Seid, Taffesse, and Ali
areas and a decline in the share of  labor force operating in the informal 
sector in urban centers.
Changes in  Labor Force Participation
 There is an overall rise in  labor force participation rate between 1999 
and 2013 (see  table 2-3). The change in participation rate is solely ac-
counted for by the rise in participation of female workers. Between 
1999 and 2013,  labor force participation rates increased by about 6 per-
centage points for female workers. This change is the result of the up-
surge in activity rate among rural  women. The rise was robust enough 
to more than offset the decline in participation rate of female workers 
in urban centers (see  table 2-3).9
Changes in the Employment- to- Population Ratio
The employment- to- population ratio is found to have increased by about 
7 percentage points between 1999 and 2013 (see  table 2-4). Consistent 





 Male + Female 80.5 84.5 83.6
 Male 89.7 90.7 89.6
 Female 71.9 78.8 77.8
Rural areas
 Male + Female 81.5 87.2 86.2
 Male 91.2 93.7 91.7
 Female 72.3 81.2 80.8
Urban Centers
 Male + Female 75.0 71.4 74.1
 Male 81.5 75.8 81.6
 Female 69.8 67.7 67.5
Source: National  Labour Force Surveys, Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency, 1999, 2006, 
 and 2014.
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with the trend in  labor force participation rate, the signifi cant increase 
in the employment- to- population ratio is accounted for by the increase 
in employment of female workers. Unlike in the case of  labor force par-
ticipation rate, the rise in employment- to- population ratio was also an 
urban phenomenon, though the change in rural areas is by far  greater.
Between- and Within- Sector Employment Shift
In this part of the analy sis, we consider sectoral contributions of  labor 
to the Ethiopian economy using time series data from the GGDC 
10- Sector Database (Timmer and  others 2014). Figure 2-7 shows the 
interaction between GDP and employment growth by sector. Each of 
the  bubbles in the fi gure represents a sector. The vertical axis mea sures 
average annual employment growth, whereas the horizontal axis shows 
the annual growth in gross value added, both in percentages. Thus, the 
coordinates for the center of each of the  bubbles are the relevant sector’s 
 TABLE 2-4.  Trends in Employment- to- Population Ratio by Gender 
in Ethiopia
Percent
Employment- to- population ratio
1999 2005 2013
Ethiopia
 Male + female 69.1 76.6 76.2
 Male 80.2 84.7 82.7
 Female 58.5 69.0 69.8
Rural areas
 Male + female 73.0 82.0 81.6
 Male 84.0 89.8 86.9
 Female 62.1 74.4 76.3
Urban centers
 Male + female 48.2 50.2 55.5
 Male 57.4 57.7 65.6
 Female 40.5 43.7 46.6
Source: National  Labour Force Surveys, Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency, 2000, 
2006,  and 2014.
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employment and gross value added growth rates for the period. The 45° 
line divides the fi gure into two sections.  Bubbles below the line repre-
sent sectors in which employment growth was lower than gross value 
added growth, whereas  bubbles above the line represent sectors in which 
employment growth exceeded output  growth.
Figure 2-7 shows that all sectors in Ethiopia did well in the period 
between 1990 and 2011, where each sector experienced positive output 
growth. Regarding employment growth during the same period, however, 
“government ser vices” and “other ser vices” (that is, community, social, 
and personal ser vices) performed particularly poorly, with negative 
employment growth, suggesting employment in  these two sectors 
shrank during the period of analy sis. Note that  these are the only two 
sectors that experienced contractions in employment in the period of 
analy sis, with employment growth in government ser vices and other 
FIGURE 2-7.  Mean Value Added and Employment Growth by Sector in 
Ethiopia, 1990–2011
Source: Authors’ computation based on data from the GGDC 10- Sector Database (Timmer and 
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ser vices contracting by 0.4 and 0.6  percent, respectively. One potential 
 factor contributing to the contraction of employment in the government 
ser vices sector could be the privatization of a number of government- 
owned enterprises, particularly in the 1990s.
The construction sector experienced a disproportionately high level 
of employment expansion in the period between 1990 and 2011, where 
the employment growth (11  percent) was almost twice as high as output 
growth (5.6  percent) in the sector. This is not surprising considering the 
construction boom in Ethiopia since the early 2000s, which is driven 
by, among other  factors, large public investment in infrastructure de-
velopment, including the construction of large dams such as the  Grand 
Ethiopian Re nais sance Dam.
Financial ser vices, mining, and manufacturing sectors also experi-
enced higher employment growth than growth in output. Specifi cally, 
employment growth for the fi nance, mining, and manufacturing sectors 
was 7.3, 6.1, and 6.5  percent, respectively, for the period of analy sis. In 
contrast, the corresponding output growth rate for  these sectors was 5.9, 
5.1, and 4.1  percent, respectively. Trade, on the other hand, experienced 
 labor- neutral growth, where both employment and output grew by about 
5   percent. The agriculture sector experienced growth in both output 
and employment, the latter at a slower pace. Fi nally, the utilities and 
transport subsectors recorded employment growth rates of 0.41 and 
0.44  percent, respectively.
When we look at the patterns of within- sector employment shift be-
tween 2005 and 2013 using a dif fer ent dataset, a similar pattern emerges. 
As discussed, changes in sectoral shares in employment of  factors of 
production, in par tic u lar  labor, are both impor tant outcomes of critical 
changes in the economy and also key indicators of intensity of structural 
transformation within an economy.
Data from the 2005 and 2013 National  Labour Force Survey (CSA 
2006, 2014) reveal that the share of  labor in the agriculture sector de-
clined by 7.5 percentage points between 2005 and 2013.10 This is par-
alleled by the increase in the share of  labor in the ser vice sector by 
5.8 percentage points and in other industries (typically, the construc-
tion subsector) by 1.1 percentage points. In contrast, the manufacturing 
sector’s share of the  labor force declined marginally (0.4  percent).
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A major focus of the development effort in Ethiopia has been on 
laying foundations for industrialization in the form of infrastructure 
such as roads, railways, power, telecommunications, and  human capital 
formation. This focus had two implications for the manufacturing 
sector. First, initially limited infrastructure meant the country was less 
ready for manufacturing development. Power shortage is a case in 
point. Second, the ser vice sector has enjoyed better linkages with high 
rates of return to the relatively large public investments on social and 
economic infrastructure, thus attracting investors away from the rela-
tively risky manufacturing sector. In the face of quick and high rates of 
returns in the ser vice sector, the manufacturing sector is believed to 
have encountered a number of deterrents. Banks tend to extend loans 
to short- term businesses in the ser vice sector rather than to the manu-
facturing sector. The backward linkage of the manufacturing sector 
within itself and with the agriculture sector is weak, thus compelling 
investors to rely on imported raw materials and face the corresponding 
constraints.
A closer look at the patterns of changes in the sectoral share at disag-
gregated (that is, subsector) level (in  table 2-5), on the other hand, re-
veals that the 7.5 percentage points decline in the share of  labor in agri-
culture and allied activities is paralleled by a 6.7  percentage points 
increase in the share of  labor in the subsectors of ser vices such as social, 
cultural, personal  house hold activities, and activities by private house-
holds with employed persons. The balance is distributed to other sub-
sectors, the maximum being a 1 percentage point rise in education and 
health sectors.
The patterns of change in the distribution of the  labor force by rural 
and urban centers of economic activities are dif fer ent among sectors. In 
the case of urban centers, the share of  labor in the  wholesale and retail 
trade,  hotels and restaurants, public administration and defense, and 
other  house hold ser vices has declined. This decline is largely dominated 
by the decline in female  labor. The other side of the change is that the 
share of  labor in other subsectors (that is, construction, transport, stor-
age, communication, real estate and business activities, and health and 
education sectors) has increased. Female  labor has dominated the in-
crease in the share of  labor in the health, education, and social work 
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subsector, whereas male  labor has dominated the increase in the  labor 
force in the other subsectors.
Changes in Unemployment Rate
In general,  there is a decline in the national rate of unemployment 
among  people age fi fteen years and above, from 8.2  percent in 1999 to 
5.4   percent in 2013. Unemployment in Ethiopia has been an urban 
phenomenon. Over the same period, urban unemployment dropped 
from 26.1 to 21.0  percent (see fi gure 2-8).
A Transition of  Labor from the Informal to the Formal Sector
One of the impor tant developments in the structure of the Ethiopian 
 labor force is the signifi cant decline in the share of the  labor force 
operating in the informal sector. Between 1999 and 2013, the share of 
 labor force in the informal sector declined from 50.6 to 25.8  percent. 
The usually high rate of female  labor force in the informal sector de-
clined from 64.8  percent in 1999 to 36.5  percent in 2013, and the share 
of male  labor force more than halved, dropping from 38.9 to 18.1  percent 
(see fi gure 2-9).
Differential Effects of Economic Growth 
on Skilled and Unskilled Workers
In recent years, Ethiopia has seen patterns of economic transforma-
tion that have directly affected its  labor market, particularly the sala-
ried urban sector. Real wages have shown strong increases across the 
distribution, where the increase in wages is relatively higher for skilled 
workers.
The Blinder– Oaxaca wage decomposition between skilled and 
unskilled workers reveals that unskilled and skilled workers, on average, 
earn about 1,021 and 1,782 Ethiopian birr (ETB) per month, respec-
tively. This is a wage differential of 761 ETB per month in  favor of skilled 
workers. Our regression analy sis suggests that changes in demographic 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE 2-9.  Trends in the Proportion of  Labor Force in the Informal 
Sector in Ethiopia, 1999–2013











FIGURE 2-8.  Changes in Unemployment Rate in Ethiopia, 1999–2013




















of the observed increase in wage among skilled workers.11 The results 
from our analy sis also indicate that the increase in wages is driven by 
faster wage growth for high- skilled jobs.
Although it is diffi cult to be conclusive, the results from our Blinder– 
Oaxaca decomposition analy sis seem to suggest that Ethiopia is in 
some sort of skill- biased  labor demand trajectory. This, too, is implied 
by the discussion above, where data from the National  Labour Force 
Surveys of 2005 and 2013 (CSA 2006, 2014) show that the employment 
share of agriculture has decreased by 7.5 percentage points, whereas 
that of the ser vice sector has increased by 5.8 percentage points. This is 
particularly true since the average number of years of schooling among 
workers in the industrial sector is higher than that of workers in the ag-
riculture sector.
The Role of Public Sector in Employment
Given the extensive history of Ethiopia, public administration has long 
been at the center of dif fer ent regimes in the country. However, the 
inception of modern public administration and the emergence of civil 
servants and public enterprises are believed to have become prominent 
since the beginning of the twentieth  century.
The public sector has gone through a number of reforms since the 
current government came to power in 1991. In par tic u lar, the govern-
ment put in place a number of po liti cal and economic mea sures that 
infl uenced the role and the relative importance of the public sector in 
the economy. Following the country’s change in economic ideology 
from a mixed/command economy to a market- based economy and the 
subsequent adoption of the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Pro-
gram in the 1990s, a number of government- owned enterprises have 
been privatized. Another major reform during the 1990s was the issuance 
of a retrenchment policy, resulting in the cutback of civil servants and 
employees of public enterprises who  were said to be redundant. Among 
other  things,  these changes have decreased the relative role the public 
sector plays in the economy as well as in job creation.
 These changes and the subsequent policy choices made by the gov-
ernment are based on the assumption that the private sector is the 
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engine of growth. As a result, the relative size of the public sector (in 
total GDP and employment) has been decreasing continuously since 
the 1990s.
Although lack of data prevents us from presenting the effects of the 
policy changes (which favored the private sector) on the role of the pub-
lic sector in employment in the 1990s,  table 2-6 shows the change in 
the employment share in the public sector in the 2000s.
As can be seen in  table 2-6, the relative share of the public sector in 
total employment has been continuously decreasing in the 2000s. In 
2003, for instance, about 20  percent of workers in urban areas in Ethio-
pia  were employed by the public sector. This fi gure fell to 13  percent in 
2009, a 35  percent decrease from its 2003 level.  Table 2-6 also shows that 
the decrease in the employment share of the public sector was nearly, 
but not quite gender neutral; the decrease was a bit higher among male 
workers.
The Role of Social Protection in Growth and Employment
Most of the social protection programs in Ethiopia target  people in 
rural areas, with the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) being 
the largest social protection program in the country and the second 
largest in SSA, next only to South Africa (Gilligan and  others 2009). 
PSNP is a government program that attempts to offer temporary pub-
lic works employment as well as food or cash transfer to eligible 
 house holds.
 TABLE 2-6.  Public Sector Employment Share in Urban 
Ethiopia by Gender and Year
Percent
2003 2006 2009
Male 24 22 14
Female 16 14 13
Male + female 20 19 13
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Urban Employment 
Unemployment Survey (Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency 2000–09).
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Attempts have been made to assess the effects of PSNP on a number 
of growth- related outcome variables. For instance, it has been docu-
mented that PSNP increases the likelihood that  house holds  will use 
improved agricultural technologies and be more food secure (Gilligan 
and  others 2009), increases the number of trees that  house holds plant 
(Andersson and  others 2011), and improves child nutrition (Debela and 
 others 2014).
Evidence for the effects of PSNP on employment is, however, lim-
ited, except the fi ndings by Gilligan and  others (2009) that  there are 
no short- term disincentive effects of PSNP on  labor supply. The scar-
city of evidence for the effect of PSNP on employment is surprising 
considering the program is also designed to provide employment (that 
is, public works) to vulnerable  house holds during the agricultural slack 
season.
Although Ethiopia’s PSNP is one of the largest social protection pro-
grams ever, a parallel government- sponsored social protection program 
is not yet available to vulnerable urban  house holds in Ethiopia despite 
the tremendous pressure faced by the Ethiopian urban  labor market in 
recent years.
As mentioned, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Af-
rica and has one of the highest fertility rates in the continent. The fast 
growing population puts tremendous pressure on the Ethiopian  labor 
market. Approximately 600,000 individuals enter the  labor force  every 
year (World Bank 2007). The economy, however, does not create enough 
jobs to match the infl ux of workers into the  labor market. The imbal-
ance between available jobs and the increase in the supply of workers 
results in high unemployment rates and long unemployment duration, 
particularly among the youth.  These issues suggest a need to introduce 
government- sponsored urban safety net programs. The government’s 
effort to do so is at a well- advanced design stage. More broadly, studies 
on the design of urban social protection programs in other typical de-
veloping countries have strong potential to inform policy makers in 
Ethiopia.
68 Seid, Taffesse, and Ali
CONCLUSIONS
Since the mid-1990s,  there have been signifi cant public investments in 
Ethiopia. The nation has invested signifi cantly in social and economic 
infrastructure such as roads, schools, health facilities, and, more re-
cently, railways and energy.  These investments are a vital ingredient to 
enhancing the nation’s long- term capabilities. Considerable effort has 
also been exerted to transform the agriculture sector, reduce vulnera-
bility of rural livelihood to adverse shocks, and transform the rural 
areas, more broadly. More specifi cally, agricultural extension programs 
have been extended, schools have become considerably more widely 
available and accessible in rural areas, preventive rural health facilities 
have been expanded, and rural road networks have been enlarged. Re-
cent interventions in urban development in the form of urban infra-
structure and major housing schemes have not only contributed to 
the modernization of urban spaces but also created jobs for many urban 
youth.
Such investments spearheaded by the Ethiopian government have 
generated fast economic growth, on average 11  percent real GDP growth 
between 2005 and 2014. This growth has translated into rising incomes, 
with per capita GDP doubling between 2000 and 2014 (WDI database, 
World Bank 2015b). Indeed, growth has led to reductions in poverty from 
a 45.5  percent head count rate to 29.6  percent between 1995 and 2012. 
Combined with successes in the health sector, income growth has also 
contributed to the rise of life expectancy to sixty- three years in 2013, up 
from forty- three to forty- six years in the early 1990s.
Following the investments and other policy interventions, economic 
activities have shown signs of shifting from the agriculture sector to the 
ser vices and construction sectors. The contribution of the traditionally 
dominant crop subsector to the growth of GDP has been overtaken by 
the construction sector, followed by the  wholesale and retail trade sector. 
The change in the share of the  labor force has also been in line with 
changes in productivity. Changes in the  labor force participation rate 
and employment- to- population ratio, in par tic u lar among the female 
 labor force, the reduction in unemployment rate, and the movement of 
 labor outside the agriculture sector (up to 7.5 percentage points) are in-
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dicative of some level of change in the structure of the economy. Still, 
the country has to continue to deepen its focus on long- term capabili-
ties  toward industrialization.
Although investments in the manufacturing sector show encour-
aging trends with fairly high growth in value added in the sector 
(17  percent between 2010 and 2014), overall contribution to overall out-
put and employment growth has been overwhelmed by the sheer rate 
of expansion of value added growth in the construction sector. This 
trend can be deemed positive  because of the nature of investment in 
the construction sector; most of the investments are targeted  toward 
curbing infrastructural and energy constraints for the much- anticipated 
expansion of the manufacturing sector.
The next primary focus for the country is to ensure ways of redirect-
ing the already accumulated capabilities  toward delivering sustainable 
growth and development. This, in par tic u lar, calls for changing gears 
 toward the more productive sectors, such as new niches in the agricul-
ture sector and targeted manufacturing industries.
Cognizant of such a need for transforming the Ethiopian economy 
 toward a vibrant manufacturing industry, beginning in 2014–15, the 
second phase of the GTP— Ethiopia’s major policy and planning 
framework— has duly emphasized the indispensable role of the private 
sector in this pro cess. The correct stress on domestic resource mobiliza-
tion needs to include widening the set of saving and investment instru-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Analogous patterns emerge from the data of the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development (MoFED) from vari ous years.
2. For further details, see Barro (1998), among  others. Also see World 
Bank (2015c) for a more detailed examination of the growth per for mance of 
the Ethiopian economy covering 2004–14. Bachewe and  others (2015) do 
the same specifi cally for the agricultural sector.
3. This analy sis uses the Total Economy Database™ to enhance cross- 
country comparisons (see The Conference Board 2015a). Analogous results 
 were obtained using data from Ethiopia’s Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development (MoFED). See appendix  table 2- A1 for complete data.
4.  These are authors’ calculations using data from Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development (2013). The  tables and charts summarizing 
the details of  these trends can be obtained from the authors upon 
request.
5. World Bank (2015a, 2015c) provides detailed exploration of the pros-
pects and challenges of manufacturing sector development in Ethiopia.
6.  These fi gures refer to the medium variant of CSA’s projections. See 
CSA (2013).
7. See Appendix  table 2- A2 for the number of students enrolled in TVET 
institutes in Ethiopia in 2015.
8. Earning equations are the work horse of estimating the returns to 
education. The specifi c challenge is effectively controlling for endogeneity 
of ability to earnings. For instance, more able individuals may be inherently 
dif fer ent and earn more regardless of their education level. For this reason, it 
is impor tant to control for differences in ability in the returns to education 
equation.
9. On the other hand,  labor force participation rate by age group shows 
a slight decrease in activity rate among the young in urban areas, whereas 
a slight increase in activity rate is observed in rural areas for the similar 
age group. In general, the usual (inverted- U  shaped) pattern of relation-
ship between age and activity rate is maintained during the period of 
analy sis.
10. The fi gures in this paragraph are computed from data collected by 
the National  Labour Force Surveys of 2005 and 2013 (CSA 2006 and 2014).
11. The fi gures in this paragraph are computed using data from the 
National  Labour Force Surveys of 2005 and 2013 (CSA 2006 and 2014). 
The complete regression results from Blinder– Oaxaca decomposition analy-
sis are available upon request.
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A Successful Growth Story with Job Creation Concerns
Ernest Aryeetey and William Baah- Boateng
Ghana attained a  middle- income status in 2007  after rebasing its 
national accounts in 2006.  After recovering from economic recession 
in 1984 thanks to Bretton Wood’s sponsored economic reform intro-
duced at the time, Ghana’s growth has been remarkably strong, with 
the lowest economic growth rate of 3.3  percent recorded in 1994. The 
country’s growth rate reached its peak of 14  percent in 2011 on the back 
of the commencement of commercial oil production, making it one of 
the fastest growing economies globally during that year. The concern, 
however, has been the ability of the country to sustain this growth mo-
mentum given the low level and quality of education and skills in the 
population. In addition, this strong growth per for mance has not been 
refl ected in the creation of productive and decent jobs  toward improved 
incomes and livelihood.
The structure of the economy remains highly informal, with a shift 
in the country’s national output composition from agriculture to low 
value ser vice activities in the informal sector. The commencement of 
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the commercial production of oil raised the share of the industrial sec-
tor in national output, but the continuous decline in manufacturing 
activities has undermined the country’s economic transformation effort. 
Essentially, structural change  toward higher value added sectors and 
upgrading of technologies in existing sectors allow for better conditions 
of work, better jobs, and higher wages.
Evidence of low level and quality of  human resources, however, 
not only diverts the economy from its structural transformation path 
of development but also makes it diffi cult for the benefi ts of the 
growth to be spread widely through the creation of gainful and pro-
ductive employment. Indeed, a highly skilled, innovative, and knowl-
edgeable workforce constitutes a key ingredient in the pro cess of 
structural economic transformation. Additionally, an expansion of 
productive sectors applying more complex production technologies 
and research and development activities implies increased demand 
for education and skills. However, the weak  human capital base does 
not provide a strong base for the structural economic transformation 
of Ghana.
 There is also a widespread concern about the quality of the coun-
try’s growth in terms of employment and in equality, as well as general 
improvement in the livelihood of the  people (see Alagidede and  others 
2013; Baah- Boateng 2013). A key indicator for mea sur ing the extent to 
which growth results in gains in the welfare of the citizenry is the quality 
of jobs that the economy generates. Ghana’s employment growth lags 
 behind economic growth due to weak employment response to eco-
nomic growth, with  every 1  percent annual economic growth implying 
0.47  percent employment growth (see Baah- Boateng 2013). In addition 
to the slow rate of job creation is the pervasiveness of vulnerable em-
ployment and working poverty. In 2010, seven of  every ten jobs  were 
estimated to be vulnerable, with low incomes and precarious working 
conditions (Baah- Boateng and Ewusi 2013), while, in 2013, one of  every 
fi ve persons employed belonged to a poor  house hold.
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GHANA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH PER FOR MANCE
Ghana’s current status on the global income ranking as a lower middle- 
income country is an outcome of rapid economic growth per for mance, 
particularly  after the rebase of the national accounts in 2006. This section 
overviews the trend and pattern of economic growth and the changing 
structure of national output.
Growth Trends
 After a de cade of unstable growth per for mance in the 1990s, the eight 
years of continuous rising growth from the beginning of the new mil-
lennium came to a halt in 2009 at the height of the global economic 
crisis, with the lowest growth, 4.0  percent, in nine years (fi gure 3-1). 
Economic growth bounced back to hit a peak of 14  percent  because of 
commercial production and the export of oil for the fi rst time in the 
country’s history, before subsequently nose- diving in 2013 to rec ord the 
lowest annual growth, 7.6  percent, in four  years.
Ghana’s economy has experienced generally faster growth relative 
to Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA), particularly  after 2007. On average, the 
Ghanaian economy grew annually by 5.8  percent, compared to 3.7  percent 
in SSA in thirteen years from 1991. The strong growth per for mance 
pushed the country to the rank of lower  middle- income  after recording 
per capita GDP of US$1,099 in 2007. Per capita GDP, which stood at 
about US$439 in 1991, increased to US$502 in 2005, and  after rebasing 
of the national accounts, it surged to US$930 in 2006 and  rose further 
to reach US$1,858 in 2013 (fi gure 3-1).
 Drivers of Growth
An analy sis of the  drivers of growth from the demand side confi rms the 
signifi cance of oil rents in the strong economic growth recorded upon 
the commencement of the country’s commercial production of oil in 
2011. Export of goods and ser vices surged from 29.5  percent in 2010 to 
44.1  percent in 2011, and further up to 48.1  percent in 2012 ( table 3-1) 
largely as a result of the export of crude oil. The increase in exports is 
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deemed a positive development and makes a large contribution to Gha-
na’s economy through its effect on economic growth and export earn-
ings, but the concern is the concentration of export in only a few primary 
commodities. Indeed, available data from the Bank of Ghana suggests 
that gold, cocoa, and oil accounted for approximately 80  percent of total 
exports in 2013.
In contrast, imports do not seem to exhibit a clear tendency, but has 
consistently trended above exports, culminating in the country’s chronic 
trade defi cits. Private consumption, which has been a major source of 
demand in the economy, has lost over 20  percent of its share in the GDP 
since 1990, reducing its dominance in  favor of other demand sources. 
Public consumption reached new heights during the period of 2011 
through 2013, while gross capital formation peaked in 2012 before fall-
ing by about 9  percent in 2013 as a result of a decrease in oil exploration, 
transport, and machinery (Ghana Statistical Ser vice 2014a).
In terms of sectoral composition, economic growth has largely been 
driven by stronger growth in mining and construction in the industrial 
sector and fi nancial intermediation in the ser vices sector, particularly 
since the rebasing of the national accounts in 2006.  These sectors are 
known to create a limited number of direct jobs. Between 1993 and 2013, 
mining and oil recorded the highest growth rate of 15.9   percent, 
FIGURE 3-1.  Real GDP Growth and per Capita GDP, Ghana, 1991–2013
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 followed by 9.9  percent in construction and 9.1  percent in fi nancial in-
termediation ( table 3-2). On the other hand, growth has been slower in 
the high  labor absorption sectors of agriculture and manufacturing. In-
deed, agriculture recorded the lowest annual growth rate, of 3.9  percent 
on average, in the two de cades  after 1993, followed by manufacturing, 
with annual average growth rate of 4.2  percent over the same period 
( table 3-2).
The slower growth in manufacturing and agriculture has culmi-
nated in the dwindling share of  these sectors in GDP, while mining 
and oil, construction, and fi nance recorded gains in terms of their con-
tribution to GDP. Agriculture lost its dominance in national output, from 
41.4  percent in 1993 to only 22.0  percent in 2013. Similarly, manufac-
turing also saw its share in GDP drop, from 10.5   percent to a low of 
6.3  percent, over the same period, relegating it from its dominant posi-
tion in the industrial sector to the third largest contributor to industrial 
output. On the other hand, the share of mining and oil in GDP, which 
declined by 1.1   percent between 1993 and  2005, improved consider-
ably, from 5.0  percent in 2005 to 8.8  percent in 2012, largely as a result 
of the commercial production of oil, which commenced in 2011. The 
share of construction in GDP also appreciated substantially, from 
8.3  percent to a new high of 12.6  percent in 2013, while the share of fi -
nancial and business ser vices in GDP  rose from 4.4  percent in 2011 to 
5.2  percent in 2013.
Essentially, the per for mance of Ghana’s economy in terms of growth 
has been robust. The major concern, however, is that the growth has 
 TABLE 3-1.  Demand Side  Drivers of Growth, Ghana, 1990–2013
Percent
Demand source 1990 1993 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013
Private Consumption 85.2 80.2 77.8 84.3 81.0 80.4 59.3 51.0 64.2
Gross Capital Formation 14.4 24.2 21.6 24.0 29.0 25.7 29.6 32.9 24.2
Public Consumption 9.3 15.0 12.3 10.2 15.3 10.4 16.6 21.0 16.7
Exports 16.9 18.2 25.0 48.8 36.4 29.5 44.1 48.1 42.3
Importsa (25.9) (34.2) (33.5) (67.2) (61.7) (45.9) (49.7) (53.1) (47.4)
Source: National Accounts of GSS and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2014).



























































































































































































































































































































































been driven largely by the extractive subsector, which is known to have 
limited job- creation impact, while manufacturing and agriculture, with 
relatively better employment generation effect, continue to rec ord slower 
growth. The loss of agriculture dominance to ser vices in terms of contri-
bution to national output  after rebasing of the national accounts tends to 
be misconstrued as a structural transformation of the economy. How-
ever, productivity in both agriculture and ser vices is still low and, coupled 
with the weak growth per for mance and the declining size of manufac-
turing termed as the “missing  middle,” makes it diffi cult to equate the 
sectoral shift in national output to economic transformation.
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN GHANA
The relevance of economic growth is mea sured by its effect on the 
quality of life of the citizenry through the creation of jobs in suffi cient 
numbers and of suffi cient quality. What has been the  labor market per-
for mance in terms of quantity and quality of jobs created in response to 
high economic growth per for mance over the last three de cades? What 
is the pattern of change in unemployment in Ghana over the period?
High Level of Employment Dominated by Low- Quality Jobs
The availability of jobs and the quality of them, as well as poverty and 
income in equality, constitute key indicators of the health of an economy. 
Employment growth in Ghana has generally been slower than eco-
nomic growth, raising concerns about the quality of Ghana’s growth 
overall. Some concerns have been raised about the failure of SSA’s solid 
growth for more than a de cade to translate into a signifi cant improve-
ment in  labor market outcomes, especially the generation of suffi cient 
decent jobs (Sparreboom and Gomis 2015).
Overall employment levels in Ghana are marginally higher than 
the SSA average, based on a higher employment- to- population ratio 
in Ghana than in SSA ( table 3-3). This ratio mea sures the ability of an 
economy to create employment. Developed economies tend to have 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































associated with developing countries is an indication of an abundance 
of low productive and low quality employment. Employment levels 
in Ghana  rose from 5.77 million in 1992 to 12.03 million in 2013, repre-
senting a 3.7  percent average annual employment growth, compared to 
3.0  percent in SSA ( table 3-3).
Agriculture still constitutes the leading source of employment in 
Ghana, even though its share has been in steady decline. The sector now 
accounts for 44.7  percent of total employment, compared to 61.1  percent 
in 1984 ( table 3-3). In contrast, employment in the ser vices sector has 
seen remarkable improvement, from 25.2  percent to 40.9  percent, over 
a period of three de cades since 1984, with industry experiencing a marginal 
increase of about 1  percent over the period. The shift in employment 
from agriculture to ser vices may not refl ect structural and productive 
transformation, however, since the rising ser vices activities mostly occur 
in the informal sector. This is evident in the increasing share of infor-
mal sector employment, from 83.8  percent to 88.0  percent, and declin-
ing formal sector employment between 1984 and 2013. The decline in 
formal sector employment, particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
largely emanated from public sector retrenchment as part of the Struc-
tural Adjustment Program (SAP) implemented in the 1980s. Most of the 
job losses in the public sector seem to have been absorbed by the infor-
mal sector, considering the slower expansion of the private formal sec-
tor in terms of employment generation.
Despite the widespread concern about the high level of employment, 
 there are few decent jobs in terms of returns and type of employment in 
Ghana. Even though the working poverty rate has seen a continuous 
decline since 1992 ( table 3-3), it remains high, at 22.3  percent, indicating 
that at least one- fi fth of working  people live in  house holds considered 
to be poor. The prob lem of working poverty is linked to the high rate of 
vulnerable employment in the  labor market. Vulnerable employment 
is a defi ned mea sure of persons employed  under relatively precarious 
circumstances as indicated by the status in employment. It consists of 
own account and contributing  family work less likely to have formal 
work arrangements or access to benefi t or social protection programs, 
and are more “at risk” to economic cycles (International  Labor Organ-
ization 2009).
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As reported in  table 3-3, two of  every three jobs in 2013 are considered 
to be vulnerable, with gainful or productive employment accounting for 
28.7  percent, suggesting a high decent work defi cit in the country. The 
rate of vulnerable employment has seen a decline, with a corresponding 
increase in productive and gainful jobs since 1984, but the pace of im-
provement has been very slow. The low income associated with vulner-
able employment implies high working poverty in such jobs compared 
to productive and gainful jobs.
Unemployment
Unemployment does not seem to be a major  labor market challenge in 
Ghana even though the rates have generally increased over three de-
cades. Like most SSA countries, unemployment is generally low in 
Ghana, partly on account of a high degree of informality and vulnera-
ble employment. As Baah- Boateng (2015) notes, the high degree of in-
formality tends to mask the prob lem of unemployment, considering 
the large number of discouraged workers who are jobless and available 
for work but fail to make the effort to seek work for vari ous reasons. In 
2006, the unemployment rate more than doubled, from 3.1  percent to 
6.5   percent  after accounting for discouraged workers (Baah- Boateng 
2015), pointing to the extent to which the discouraged-worker effect un-
dermines the unemployment rate in Ghana.
It is estimated that about 5  percent of the  labor force was unemployed 
in 2013. The rate of unemployment  rose consistently from 2.8  percent 
in 1984 to 10.4   percent in 2000, and slowed down subsequently, to 
7.3  percent and 3.1  percent in 2003 and 2006, respectively ( table 3-4). 
The rate went up again in 2010 to 5.8   percent and dropped by 0.6 
percentage- point three years  later, to 5.2  percent in 2013.
Unemployment is a bigger challenge to the youth than adults, with 
youth unemployment rates estimated to be twice as high as the overall 
unemployment rate. The gender dimension of unemployment shows 
lower rates among females than males in 1984, and the reverse emerg-
ing thereafter. Baah- Boateng (2012) attributes the gender reversal of the 
relative unemployment rates since 1984 to the increasing desire of  women 
to participate in market work against the backdrop of fewer employment 
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opportunities available to them. The  labor force participation rate of 
 women improved faster than that of men between 1984 and  2010 
(Baah- Boateng 2012).
The unemployment rate is also higher among the highly educated 
than the less educated. The rate was highest among tertiary gradu ates, 
followed by secondary school leavers in 1992 and 2010, with the reverse 
being the case in 2000, 2006, and 2013 ( table 3-4). The rate is lowest 
among  those with no formal education, followed by  those with basic 
education, on the grounds that the less educated comfortably take 
refuge in the informal sector since they have limited access to formal 
sector jobs (Baah- Boateng 2013, 2015). In contrast, the highly educated 
 labor force would always focus on the formal sector as the source of 
employment and see the informal sector as an unattractive employ-
ment destination. Hence, limited job opportunities in the formal sector 
relative to the number coming out of secondary schools and tertiary insti-
tutions creates a larger army of educated unemployed.
7:8.41,8:7.78,9:8.64TABLE 3-4.  Unemployment Rates, by Age, Sex, and Locality, Ghana
Percent
Demographic group 1992a 1999a 2000 2003a 2006a 2010 2013
All (15+) 3.3 7.5 10.4 7.3 3.1 5.8 5.2
Youth (15–24) 8.6 15.9 16.7 16.3 6.6 12.9 10.9
Sex
 Male 3.4 7.9 10.1 6.9 3.0 5.4 4.8
 Female 3.2 7.2 10.7 7.7 3.2 6.3 5.5
Locality
 Urban 8.2 13.2 12.8 10.7 6.1 8.0 6.5
 Rural 1.7 4.9 8.6 4.8 1.3 3.5 3.9
Level of educationa
 No education 0.7 n.a. 9.6 n.a. 2.4 3.1 2.7
 Basic  education 3.6 n.a. 10.6 n.a. 4.6 6.0 3.3
 Secondary or  more 4.3 n.a. 12.7 n.a. 10.9 8.3 6.6
 Tertiary 8.0 n.a. 11.0 n.a. 7.8 18.4 6.0
Source: Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) III of 1991/92, IV of 1998/99, V of 2005/06;
Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) 2003; and 1984, 2000, and 2010 population 
census.
a. Computed by  authors.
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POVERTY AND IN E QUAL ITY
The extent of poverty and in equality is a function of the  labor market. 
The level and distribution of employment, as well as unemployment, 
which relate to the rate and structure of economic growth, has implica-
tions for the earning power and the poverty status of individuals and 
 house holds.
Ghana has made considerable pro gress  toward poverty reduction 
since the mid-1980s and managed to achieve the fi rst goal of the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDG) of halving extreme poverty ahead 
of the target date of 2015 (NDPC 2015).  After an initial rise from 
56  percent in 1987–88 to 61  percent in 1988–89, poverty incidence de-
clined consistently to 24  percent in 2012–13 (fi gure 3-2). Similarly, ex-
treme poverty also declined from 42  percent to 8  percent over the same 
period, suggesting that Ghana’s strong growth per for mance has re-
fl ected positively on the poverty situation in the country.  There are, 
however, concerns about worsening in equality in the country, implying 
that the benefi ts of the high growth per for mance that pushed the coun-
try to a  middle- income level have not been distributed evenly among 
Ghanaians. The extent of in equality, mea sured by the Gini coeffi cient, 
increased continuously from 35.4  percent in 1987–88 to 42.3  percent in 
2012–13 (fi gure 3-2).
Clearly, Ghana prides itself for having managed to reduce poverty 
substantially since 1991 to the extent of meeting the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) target ahead of time, but it has not been 
able to win the  battle against in equality. Poverty is still endemic in 
three regions in the north, and the depth of poverty also remains a 
challenge even in urban areas (Osei- Assibey and Baah- Boateng 2015). 
The poverty reducing strategy of giving cash transfer to extremely poor 
 house holds  under the Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty 
(LEAP) since 2008 has yet to make the hoped- for impact of averting in-
creasing in equality and depth of poverty. This requires a re- examination 
of Ghana’s growth per for mance, to make it more inclusive by ensuring 
that the benefi ts of the growth are evenly spread out through the gen-
erations of productive employment across all segments of the country.
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EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BY EMPLOYMENT
Related to the issue of in equality is earnings diversity according to sta-
tus of employment and demographic groups, as well as the application 
of minimum wage in a  labor market dominated by self- employment. 
Earnings differentials across employment type and sectors have impli-
cations for in equality among dif fer ent groups in the  labor market. An 
estimate by Baah- Boateng and  others (2013) indicate that, across eco-
nomic sectors, average daily earnings  were highest in ser vices in 2006, 
followed closely by industry, with the least average daily earnings reported 
in agriculture, with 46.1  percent and 46.3  percent of average daily earn-
ings in ser vices and industry, respectively.
In 2013, agriculture reported the lowest average basic hourly earn-
ings of GH¢0.69, compared with a range of between GH¢1.07 (in man-
ufacturing) and GH¢2.56 (in energy) in industry, and between GH¢0.98 
(in domestic work) and GH¢3.40 (in public administration) in the 
ser vices sector (Ghana Statistical Ser vice 2014b). Earnings are also esti-
mated to be the lowest in the informal sector, with average daily earn-
ings of that sector estimated at 37.5  percent of the earnings in the public 
sector and 32.1   percent of the average earnings in the private formal 
FIGURE 3-2.  Incidence of Poverty and In e qual ity, 1987–2013
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sector in 2006 (Baah- Boateng and  others 2013). Employers  were estimated 
to earn the highest in 2006, on average, followed by paid jobholders 
with average daily earnings of about 49  percent of employers’ earnings. 
Own account work on average earns about 26  percent of employers’ 
average earnings and 54  percent of earnings in paid jobs.
To capture the earnings differentials among dif fer ent types of em-
ployment, a standard semi- logarithmic earnings function (see appen-
dix 3A-1) was estimated using an instrumental variable technique to 
avoid any potential endogeneity prob lem. Each individual’s  mother’s 
and  father’s education was used as an instrument in the estimation. 
Data for estimation  were drawn from the fi fth and sixth rounds of the 
Ghana Living Standards Survey of 2005–06 (GLSS V) and 2012–13 
(GLSS VI).  Table 3-5 pres ents the estimated results to confi rm highest 
average earnings among employers, followed by paid jobs, with own- 
account workers being the lowest earners. Relative to agriculture, earn-
ings are also found to be higher in industry than ser vices in 2005–06, 
while ser vices jobs are estimated to earn better than jobs in the industrial 
sector in 2012–13.
Earnings are observed to increase with age from fi fteen years. Beyond 
forty years, earnings begin to increase at a declining rate with age. Gen-
der earnings differentials  favor men, with females earning signifi -
cantly lower than their male counter parts. The differentials worsened 
in 2012–13, with females earning about 49  percent less than men, from 
about 9  percent in 2005–06, which has implications for increasing gen-
der in equality. The results also confi rm higher earnings in urban over 
rural areas, while married workforce members earn more than unmar-
ried ones. Education, work experience, and effort at work have signifi -
cantly increasing effects on earnings, and with a lower share of educated 
workforce in total employment, this implies that a smaller proportion 
would benefi t from higher earnings, with many uneducated workers 
working to earn a subsistence  wage.
The lower earnings among  people in vulnerable employment, mostly 
in the informal sector relative to paid employment, can largely be 
linked to the exclusion of that type of employment from the benefi ts of 
 labor regulations.1 Indeed, a shift in employment from agriculture to 
ser vice and from public to informal implies changing earnings in the 
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 labor market. Since ratifying the Minimum Wage- Fixing Machinery 
Convention, 1928 (Convention 26) in 1959, Ghana has been fi xing 
minimum wage and expecting employers to abide by it. Essentially, the 
benefi t of minimum legislation accrues to wage earners whose employ-
ment contract is anchored on an employer– employee relationship. Over 
the past three de cades, the National Daily Minimum Wage (NDMW) 
has witnessed substantial improvement in real terms. The determina-
tion of the NDMW is anchored on the cost of living. The growth of 
minimum wage has largely been above the rate of infl ation, suggesting 
rising real minimum wage over time (fi gure 3-3).
 TABLE 3-5.  Results of Earnings Function by IV Technique, 2005–06 
and 2012–13, Ghanaa
Explanatory variable 2005–06 2012–13
Age 0.0169 0.0479***
Age squared −0.0002 −0.0006***
Female dummy −0.0853* −0.4938***
Married dummy 0.0174 0.0639***
Urban dummy 0.1842* 0.1573***
Years of education 0.1481*** 0.0541***
Work experience (years) 0.0132*** 0.0108***
Effort (hours worked weekly) 0.0023*** 0.0033***
Employment status (contributing  family worker and  others as reference dummy)
Paid employment 1.5908*** 0.2958***
Employer 1.7629*** 0.6097***
Own account work 1.4058*** 0.0974**





F- statistic 127.34*** 313.44***
Number of observations 10,456 15,843
Source: Estimated by Authors using Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) V and VI 
Datasets (2014b).
a. Dependent variable is lnE, which denotes log of monthly earnings.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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The benefi ciaries of the improvement in the minimum wage are 
mostly wage earners in the formal sector whose employers largely adhere 
to the minimum wage legislations. Indeed, the base pay of the govern-
ment’s Single Spine Pay Structure (SSPS) for workers in the public ser vice 
is directly linked with the NDMW and cannot fall below it. Consequently, 
all public ser vice workers on the SSPS enjoy upward salary review when 
the nominal minimum wage is upwardly adjusted. This could explain 
the highest average basic hourly earnings of GH¢3.40 among workers in 
public administration and defense in 2013 (Ghana Statistical Ser vice 
2014b). However, a vast majority of the workforce engaged in the infor-
mal sector dominated by own account and contributing  family workers, 
where enforcement of  labor regulation is a challenge, do not enjoy such 
benefi ts associated with upward review of nominal minimum wage in 
Ghana. This has implications for widening the earnings gap among dif-
fer ent employment groups and, thus, exacerbating income in equality.
GROWTH OF  LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
Economic growth and an increase in the size of the workforce, as well 
as the shift in the sectoral distribution of national output and employ-
ment, have implications for the growth of  labor productivity.  Labor 
FIGURE 3-3.  Minimum Wage Growth and Infl ation Rate











































productivity is crudely mea sured by output per worker and, based on 
employment data of the GLSS III, IV, V, and VI, we can compute annual 
growth of  labor productivity over 1991–99, 1999–2006, and 2006–13 at 
the aggregate and sectoral levels.
To identify the principal sources of change in aggregate  labor pro-
ductivity over time, a formal decomposition into two sector specifi c 
effects— within sector effect and between sector effects—is carried out. 
“Within sector” effect captures the growth of productivity within given 
sectors, while the “between sector” component mea sures the contribu-
tion to productivity growth of changes in the pattern of employment 
across sectors. The formula for the computation of annualized growth 
rate and the sources of changes in aggregate productivity are reported 
in appendix 3-2 and the results are presented in  table 3-6.
The Ghanaian economy recorded improvement in the aggregate 
annualized productivity growth rate from 1.3   percent in the 1990s to 
2.4  percent over 1999–2006 and, further, up to 4  percent over 2006–13. 
The source of the improved productivity growth varies across sectors 
and periods. The substantial productivity growth in 2006–13 was mostly 
driven by growth of output per worker in industry, at about 8  percent 
annually, on the back of the commercial production of oil from 2011. 
Growth of output per worker in ser vices was the key under lying  factor 
 behind the  labor productivity growth, of 2.4  percent, in 1999–2006. An 
annual  labor productivity growth of 2.1  percent in agriculture was the 
driving force  behind the moderate economy- wide productivity growth 
of 1.3  percent over 1991–99, with output per worker in industry declin-
ing annually by 3.0  percent.
In terms of sector- specifi c decomposition effects, a strong contribu-
tion of ser vices to aggregate productivity gains in the 1990s emanated 
from both productivity gains within the sector and  labor reallocation 
gains from other sectors. Productivity gain within agriculture was 
highest as a result of sectoral output growth as against a declining 
share of the sector in employment over 1991–99. Productivity loss in 
agriculture as a result of the shift in agriculture  labor to other sectors 
undermined the productivity gains within the sector and, thus, re-
duced the sector’s net contribution to aggregate productivity to only 
0.3  percent.
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In spite of the average annual output growth of about 4  percent in 
industry during 1993–99 (see  table 3-2), the fl ow of  labor into the sec-
tor, accounting for a 4   percent increase in the sector’s share of total 
employment over 1991–99, largely explains the productivity loss re-
corded within the sector. The productivity loss within the industrial 
sector emanated largely from the manufacturing subsector. Indeed, 
the subsector that, during the period, was the dominant subsector in 
industry in terms of output and employment, grew by only 3.6  percent 
(see  table 3-2) as against the 3.5  percent gain in its employment share 
(see  table 3-3). Nonetheless, productivity gains resulting from the fl ow of 
 labor into the industrial sector outweighed the productivity loss recorded 
within the sector, to yield a net contribution of the sector to aggregate 
productivity of 1.6  percent.
In 1999–2006, aggregate productivity growth was driven largely by 
productivity gains within the sectors. Ser vices and industry recorded 
3.0   percent and  2.7   percent annual productivity gains, respectively, 















Agriculture 2.1 1.7 - 1.4 0.3
1991–99 Industry −3.0 −3.4 5.0 1.6
Service 1.5 1.5 1.4 2.9
All 1.3 . . .  . . . .  . . . .  .
Agriculture 1.9 2.0 −0.03 2.0
1999–2006 Industry 2.5 2.7 0.2 2.9
Service 2.8 3.0 −0.05 3.0
All 2.4 . . .  . . . .  . . . .  .
Agriculture 2.7 2.4 − 2.7 −0.2
2006–13 Industry 7.8 10.0 0.2 10.2
Service 0.3 0.4 4.6 5.0
All 4.0 . . .  . . . .  . . . .  .
Source: Constructed from Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) III of 1991/92, IV of 
1998/99, V of 2005/06, and VI of 2012/13 for employment and national accounts for value 
added.
Note: Based on rebased  fi gures.
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with agriculture recording the least productivity gain within the sector. 
This is refl ected in the higher average output growth of 5.5  percent in 
ser vices and industry sectors, compared with 4.6   percent recorded by 
agriculture over the 2000–06 period ( table 3-2). Shifts in employment 
across sectors during the period  were quite minimal, resulting in very 
small productivity gains or losses between sectors. The drop in the share 
of agriculture and ser vices in total employment by only 0.1 percentage- 
point each in  favor of industry ( table 3-3) accounted for the marginal 
productivity loss for agriculture and ser vices against marginal produc-
tivity gains for industry across sectors during the period.
The strong contribution of industry to aggregate productivity growth 
in 2006–13 is traced mainly to productivity gains within the sector as a 
result of the high output growth of the sector upon the commencement 
of commercial oil production in 2011. Productivity gains from  labor 
reallocation  were, however, weak in industry. The shift of employment 
from agriculture largely to ser vices is evident in the productivity loss from 
the  labor reallocation effect, which overshadowed the productivity gains 
within the agricultural sector, resulting in overall negative net contribu-
tion to aggregate productivity. The contribution of ser vices to aggregate 
productivity growth is exclusively due to the reallocation of employment 
into the sector with very limited productivity gains within the sector. The 
small productivity gains recorded within the ser vices sector could be ex-
plained by the large amount of informal employment of low skilled work-
ers that  were relocated largely from agriculture to the sector.
Essentially, workers with a low level of skills who moved mainly from 
agriculture to ser vices largely accounted for the low “between effect” 
productivity gains in the sector. For Ghana to reap high productivity 
gains in all sectors of the economy requires large investment in  human 
capital development to promote high and quality education and im-
prove the skills of the country’s workforce.
Growth– Employment– Poverty Linkage
The relevance of economic growth is mea sured by its effect on the 
livelihood of the  people through the generation of productive and gainful 
employment. As Baah- Boateng (2008) remarked, whereas the link be-
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tween economic growth and job creation depends on the extent to which 
growth generates employment, the impact of employment creation on 
poverty reduction depends on the extent to which poor workers benefi t 
from their  labor. Thus, the poverty- reducing effect of economic growth is 
a function of quantity and quality of jobs created from the growth.
Generally, the pattern and distribution of employment growth 
mirrors activities in the real sector of the economy since demand for 
 labor is a derived demand. Evidence, however, shows that employ-
ment growth has not kept pace with the speed of economic growth 
over the last two- and- half de cades. Between 1991 and 2013, total em-
ployment increased from about 5.77 million to 12.03 million, represent-
ing 3.39  percent annual employment growth on average, compared to 
annual real GDP growth of 5.83  percent. Baah- Boateng (2013) estimates 
employment elasticity of national output of 0.47 between 1984 and 2010, 
suggesting that  every 1  percent economic growth produces job growth 
of 0.47  percent.
Using the arithmetic computation of elasticity (see appendix 3-3), 
we pres ent employment response to growth and poverty- reducing re-
sponse to employment creation based on employment fi gures of GLSS 
III, IV, V, and VI in  table 3-7. The results in column 1 show declining 
elasticity values from 0.76 in 1991–99 to 0.68 in 1999–2006, suggesting 
a marginal slowdown in job creation response to economic growth over 
the two periods. The subsequent seven years (2006–13) saw a substan-
tial drop in employment elasticity, to 0.5, largely as a result of high eco-
nomic growth driven by mining and commercial oil production, which 
commenced in 2011. Thus, in 2006–13,  every 1   percent growth of 
real GDP implies a 0.5  percent growth in employment, compared to 
0.68  percent in 1999–2006 and 0.76  percent in the 1990s. The declin-
ing employment elasticity since 1991 confi rms the observation by the 
International  Labor Organ ization (2009) of a decline in employment 
elasticity from 0.64 over 1992–2000 to 0.52  in 2000–04 and further 
down to 0.4 in 2004–08.
Columns 2 and 3 of  table 3-7 pres ent the results of the arithmetic 
poverty elasticity of employment to suggest a strong poverty reduction 
response to employment growth. Indeed, between 1991 and 2013,  every 
1  percent employment growth is accompanied by more than 1  percent 
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reduction in poverty incidence. The poverty reducing response to job 
creation was strongest in 1999–2006, with about 1.4  percent drop in pov-
erty incidence in response to 1  percent rise in total number of jobs. The 
extent of poverty- reducing response to job creation also depends on the 
quality of job. As shown in column 3 of  table 3-7, a 1  percent increase in 
the share of productive employment over 1991–2013 is associated with a 
1.65  percent drop in poverty. This observation clearly supports the view 
that a poverty reduction strategy would be most effective if it is directed 
at promoting the creation of productive and better- paid jobs.
Employment response based on estimation from an annual time 
series multivariate regression model (see appendix  3-3) is reported 
in   table  3-8. Over a thirteen- year period between 1991 and  2013, a 
1  percent economic growth induced a 0.6  percent growth in employ-
ment (based on employment elasticity of 0.632) without accounting for 
other relevant variables that infl uence employment growth. The elas-
ticity drops to 0.216, suggesting a weak employment response to eco-
nomic growth over the last two de cades, when wages and population 
are controlled for in the employment model. Thus, a 1  percent growth 
of real GDP is able to produce only 0.2  percent growth of employment. 
The statistically signifi cant coeffi cient of the rebase dummy clearly 
shows that employment response to growth was lower during 2006–13 
than during 1991–2005, confi rming the declining employment elastic-
ity in  table 3-8.









Year 1 2 3
1991–99 0.760 −1.199 −2.16
1999–2006 0.679 −1.387 −4.62
2006–13 0.505 −1.006 −1.04
1991–2013a 0.598 −1.033 −1.65
Source: Authors’ own calculation from national accounts and GLSS III, IV, V, and VI.
a. Based on gross domestic product (GDP) at 2006 constant  prices.
98 Aryeetey and Baah- Boateng
CONSTRAINTS TO GROWTH AND JOB CREATION
The weak job creation effect of Ghana’s strong economic growth per-
for mance requires investigation into the reasons under lying such an 
outcome. Giving the abundance of natu ral and  human resources, the 
country’s growth would have been higher than what has been recorded 
if constraints particularly related to skills development were addressed.
Quantity and Quality of  Labor Force
Economic growth and job creation depend on the size and quality of the 
 labor force. Indeed, the availability of  human resources in the right 
quantity and quality form the foundation of growth and development. 
Ghana’s population has been growing at an annual average of 2.5  percent 
over the last three de cades, with an estimated population of 26.3 mil-
lion in 2013 with the working- age population accounting for 60.7  percent.2 
The size of Ghana’s  labor force in 2013 stood at 12.31 million, increasing 
from 6.04 million in 1992, translating into 3.4  percent annual growth 
on average (see  table 3-9). Thus, the eco nom ically active population, of 
 TABLE 3-8.  Linear Regression Results, Ghana, 1991–2013a
Variable Base Base + controls
lnYt (log of real gross domestic product) 0.632*** 0.216***
lnRMWt (log of Real Minimum Wage)  . . .  . −0.009
lnPt (log of population size)  . . .  . 0.839***





F- stats 628.57*** 1368.17***
Breusch– Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation Chi2 11.81*** 0.446
Breusch– Pagan test for Heterskedasticity Chi2 3.64** 2.19*
Ramsey RESET test for omitted variable F (3, 15) 28.95*** 1.71
N 23 23
Source: Estimated by authors.
a. Dependent variable is log of employment.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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47  percent of the total population, is responsible for feeding the entire 
population.
Faster economic growth relative to the  labor force suggests that the 
size and growth of the  labor force has not reached a level that could 
be inimical to growth. The economy grew, on average, by 5.3  percent 
annually between 1991 and 2013, compared with a growth of the  labor 
force of 3.4  percent. The challenge, however, is that the quality of the 
 labor force has a constraining effect on long- term growth, the genera-
tion of quality employment, and poverty reduction. Historically, Ghana’s 
economic growth per for mance, mea sured by per capita income growth, 
seems to be largely attributed to productivity rather than production in-
puts (Aryeetey and Fosu 2002). Bosworth’s growth accounting decom-
position of Ghana between 1994 and 2000 attributes Ghana’s per capita 
growth of 1.77  percent largely to growth in  factor accumulation as mea-
sured by physical capital per worker (1.17%), with education per worker 
and total  factor productivity constituting 0.15  percent and 0.44  percent, 
respectively (Ndulu and O’Connell 2003).
The strong growth effect of physical capital  after 2000 is attributed 
to the strong contribution of capital- intensive sectors of mining and oil, 
as well as fi nance, to growth. This is refl ected in the improved contri-
bution of gross capital formation to GDP, which peaked at 33  percent 
in 2012 from a low of 14  percent in 1990 (table 3-1). The lowest contri-
bution of education to growth, as mea sured by education per worker, in 
the growth accounting raises a question about the quality of Ghana’s 
 labor force. The level of education and skills of the Ghanaian  labor 
force is generally low, with eight of ten having less than secondary educa-
tion ( table 3-9). This does not seem to be enough to propel the country 
for a sustainable long- term growth and economic transformation.
The pace of improvement in the level of education of the  labor force 
has also been slow. In 1992, only 2  percent of the  labor force had ter-
tiary education, and this improved to 5.4  percent in 2013. Even though 
the proportion of the  labor force with no formal education has im-
proved substantially, dropping from 44  percent to 26  percent over a pe-
riod of two de cades, an improvement in the proportion of the  labor 
force with post- basic education has been very slow, rising by about 
10 percentage points from 7.7  percent in 1992 ( table 3-9). Essentially, 
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the implementation of the  Free Compulsory Universal Basic Educa-
tion (FCUBE) largely explains this rise in the proportion of  labor force 
with basic education from 48  percent to 56  percent over two de cades. 
However, limited access to secondary education due to a combination 
of  factors, including an insuffi cient number of secondary schools and a 
lower pass rate at the basic level, leave a large number of  people ending 
their education at that level.
With a high proportion of low skilled  labor force, the informal sec-
tor is expected to be the main source of employment, culminating in a 
high degree of informality and a high vulnerable employment rate in 
the country. Indeed, job openings in the formal sector generally require 
at least secondary school certifi cates and, therefore, a chunk of the  labor 
force with at most basic education would fi nd it diffi cult to secure em-
ployment in the formal sector. In effect, they are left with no option 
than to  settle for jobs in the informal sector, where formal education is 
not an entry requirement.
Skills Gap as Constraint to Growth
Ghana is constrained by an insuffi cient number of high skilled  labor 
force relative to demand, especially in the areas of medicine, engineering, 
science, and mathe matics. Boateng and Ofori- Sarpong (2002) estimated 
supply defi cits in medical and health, engineering and technical, and 
business administration gradu ates, and an oversupply of gradu ates in 
arts/social sciences and agriculture in 1999–2000. Anecdotal evidence 
 TABLE 3-9.  Trends in Size and Education Level of the Ghana  Labor Force
Indicator 1992 1999 2000 2006 2010 2013
Total  labor force (million) 6.04 8.21 8.29 9.42 10.88 12.31
Level of education (percent)
 None 44.1 40.1 38.7 34.5 32.1 25.6
 Basic or less 48.2 49.1 44.7 53.1 48.0 55.8
 Secondary / vocational /
  technical /  commercial
5.7 7.9 11.0 8.2 13.0 12.1
 Post- secondary and tertiary 2.0 2.9 5.7 4.2 7.0 5.4
Source: Constructed from Ghana Living Standards Surveys and population censuses.
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suggests that when Ghana started commercial production of oil in late 
2010,  there  were some specifi c skills, such as engineers, drillers, and 
production and operation workers that  were diffi cult to obtain on the 
domestic  labor market. Oil companies had to rely on skills from Cote 
d’Ivoire and Nigeria to fi ll  those vacancies. This observation is gener-
ally linked to the fact that Ghana’s education system tends to produce 
a large number of gradu ates in humanities, in excess of what the econ-
omy requires, while scientists, engineers, and technologists needed for 
sectors such as manufacturing, construction, mining, and oil extrac-
tion are produced in limited numbers. Even though enrollment in sci-
ence in public universities and polytechnics has been rising in recent 
times, the improvement is very slow.
Over the last two de cades, most of the newly established universi-
ties and polytechnics in the country have focused largely on training 
gradu ates in business at the bachelor’s and gradu ate levels, while the 
existing ones continued to step up their enrollment in business and 
humanities. In addition, while most of the newly established universi-
ties train students largely in the humanities, which the  labor market 
does not need in such large quantities, existing science and technology 
universities are shifting from their core mandate to train more students 
in humanities. Some have attributed this development to the high cost 
of training gradu ates in the science and technology areas relative to costs 
of training gradu ates in the humanities (Baah- Boateng and Baffour- 
Awuah 2015).
Besides the shortage of specifi c skills in terms of area of qualifi cation, 
the issue of quality becomes a prob lem due, largely, to the method of 
training that is not fundamentally linked to the world of work. Lack of 
practical training and internships and the limited use of case study in 
teaching and training at the secondary and tertiary level leads to a situ-
ation where,  after graduation, the trainees are unable to cope effectively 
with the world of work. This type of skill mismatch tends to create a 
high degree of joblessness among the educated  labor force while, at the 
same time, fi rms are looking for specifi c skills in new employees. Es-
sentially, while the decision by the industry to resort to external  labor at 
a higher cost has the effect of boosting economic growth, the benefi ts to 
be accrued to the domestic  labor force is limited. Enterprises that fi nd it 
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diffi cult to fi ll the skill gap from abroad are compelled to fall on local 
sources, which may not necessarily match the vacancy, and this may 
have adverse productivity implications and contribute to reduced growth.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS
Ghana’s growth per for mance has been robust over the last three de cades, 
accompanied by a shift from agriculture dominance to ser vices, creat-
ing a missing  middle, on account of dwindling manufacturing activity. 
Manufacturing, which  until about 2005 was the highest contributor to 
industrial output, is now the third largest subsector  after construction 
and extractive (mining and oil) in the industrial sector. Consequently, 
employment response to growth has remained low, with declining em-
ployment elasticity of output. Essentially, Ghana’s economic growth has 
largely been driven by the low employment- generating sectors of mining 
and oil extraction, with high  labor absorption sectors of agriculture and 
manufacturing experiencing slower growth.
The  labor market has also experienced a structural shift in employ-
ment, from agriculture to ser vices, a situation that largely mirrors the 
structural change in output. Employment in manufacturing (particu-
larly wage manufacturing jobs) as a share of total employment has also 
suffered a decline. In contrast, most of the jobs that have emerged in 
the ser vices sector are mainly informal, culminating in low productiv-
ity growth in the sector. Thus, apart from the low and declining re-
sponse of employment to economic growth, most of the job creation 
has occurred in the informal sector. On the supply side, the low level of 
education has translated into low quality of  labor, and this underlies the 
rising informality. That chunk of the  labor force is constrained from 
accessing productive and/or formal sector jobs, which are characterized 
by better remuneration and working conditions with the implication 
for widening earnings differentials and in equality in the midst of de-
clining poverty incidence.
It is obvious that  these observations are indications of the urgent 
need for a rethink of Ghana’s growth strategy. The starting point is for 
policymakers to acknowledge the adverse consequences of the strong 
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obsession with economic growth regardless of the source of the growth 
and its job creation effect. Indeed, growth is a necessary condition but 
can only pass the suffi cient condition test if it translates into the genera-
tion of productive and high- earning jobs for all. A redirection of growth 
strategy  toward the promotion of manufacturing activities that are 
strongly linked with agriculture is key to making economic growth bet-
ter and more inclusive. Thus, fi xing the prob lem of the missing  middle 
(that is, the declining manufacturing subsector) and raising productiv-
ity in agriculture should be the priority of policy  toward growth inclu-
siveness. This calls for investment in areas that would promote manufac-
turing and agricultural activities, where job creation potentials are high. 
Thus, investment in the energy sector to ensure a consistent power sup-
ply within a stable macroeconomic environment would be a major step 
to reducing constraints to private sector– led growth. The business envi-
ronment could also be improved if the country’s institutional arrange-
ments and regulatory framework are properly streamlined in line with 
best practices.
On the supply side, low quality of  labor, mea sured by a reduced 
number of workers with at least secondary education, requires urgent 
policy attention. The link between education and productivity is quite 
clear and, thus, a comprehensive review of the current education system 
is needed to assess the medium and long- term relevance of education 
and skills development to promote high productivity and facilitate the 
creation of productive and more formal sector jobs.
The declining importance of agriculture relative to industry and 
ser vice activities is ample evidence of weak policy attention to the sec-
tor considered to be a major source of employment and livelihood for 
Ghanaians. Agriculture research support through improvement in agri-
culture extension ser vices, development of irrigation schemes to promote 
uninterrupted farming activities, provision of guaranteed price, and 
buffer stock fa cil i ty are key policy interventions that would improve ag-
riculture productivity. Fi nally, Ghana could also leverage on the strong 
growth per for mance of the low  labor absorption sectors of mining and 
oil extraction to boost growth in other sectors by channelling the re-
turns from these sectors into infrastructure to support growth agricul-
ture and manufacturing.
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APPENDIX 3A-1. EARNINGS FUNCTION
A function to capture earnings differential in a Mincerian form is specifi ed as:
lnE = α0 + X 'β + Y' ø + W' δ + ε
Equation (1)
Where:
lnE = log of monthly earnings
ε = the random error term
X = a vector of demographic characteristics of the employed per-
son (that is, age and age squared mea sured in years); female dummy 
(female 1, male 0); married dummy (married 1, single 0); urban dummy 
(urban 1, rural 0)
Y = a vector of productive characteristics of the employed, that is, 
education and work experience (mea sured in years) and effort at work 
(mea sured by the number of hours worked per week)
W = vector of dummies of employment type (paid employment, 
employer, and own account work with contributing  family work, 
domestic worker, and other as reference dummy); and dummies of 
industry of employment (that is, industry and ser vices with agricul-
ture as the reference dummy)
Instrumental variable estimation technique is applied to avoid potential 
endogeneity prob lem with the level of educational attainment of  mothers 
and  fathers used as  instruments.
APPENDIX 3A-2.  LABOR PRODUCTIVITY






Pt = aggregate  labor productivity
Yt = total real gross value added
Et = total employment
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subscript i = sector
t = period of time
Following Sparreboom and Gomis (2015), equation (1) could be ex-









The growth rate of aggregate productivity can, therefore, be decomposed 




































































Where the fi rst term in (3) mea sures the “within sector effect” 
and the second term accounts for the “between effect.” The “within 
sector effect” is due to the sectoral productivity growth (mea sured by 
the difference between sectoral value added growth and employment 
growth) weighted by the employment share of the sector (which is 
held constant). The “between effect” is due to changes in sectoral 
employment shares, weighted by a constant sectoral productivity. A 
positive “between effect” arises when sectoral employment shares in-
creases and vice  versa.
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APPENDIX 3A-3. ELASTICITY

















Y = real GDP
t and t − 1 = current and previous periods, respectively














P = poverty incidence
E = employment
t and t −1 = current and previous periods, respectively
A log linear regression of employment– output relationship to be esti-
mated using annual times series data over 1991–2013 is specifi ed as:
ln Et = β0 + β1 ln Yt + β2 ln Wt + β3 ln Pt + β4Dt + εt
Equation (7)
Where:
lnE = log total employment
lnY = log of real GDP
lnW = log of real minimum wage
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lnP = log of total population
D = rebase dummy (D = 0: 1990– 2005; D = 1: 2006– 13)
ε = random error term
lnE β1 = employment elasticity of output
NOTES
1. Vulnerable employment is the sum of own account and contributing 
 family work.
2. The working- age population includes  people age fi fteen years and 
above.
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Economic Growth,  Labor Market Dynamics, 
and Prospects for a Demographic Dividend
Mwangi Kimenyi, Francis Mwega, 
and Njuguna Ndung’u
Following recent rebasing of its economy,  Kenya is now classifi ed 
as a lower  middle-income country. With a 2013 GDP of US$53.4 billion 
and a per capita income of US$1,246, the country is ranked the ninth 
largest economy in Africa and the fourth in Sub- Sahara Africa (SSA). 
As it stands now, the  Kenyan economy is the dominant economy in the 
East African Community (EAC) and the primary source of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) for some of the countries of the region. The 
country has a youthful population and is well positioned to reap the 
population dividend.
In addition, the country has recently discovered oil and it is likely to 
be an oil exporter in the near  future, joining Uganda and South Sudan. 
Even without the oil discovery, the  Kenya economy stands at a strategic 
location in the Eastern Africa region. It serves fi ve landlocked countries 
that are relatively resource- rich (Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, 
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Rwanda, and Burundi). So its relative comparative and locational ad-
vantages lie in improving port facilities, road and railway networks, and 
transit airports as trade routes for  these fi ve countries. Even more sig-
nifi cant has been the strengthening of the institutions of governance 
through the 2010 enactment of a progressive constitution that has radi-
cally altered the previous dominance of the executive. At the core of 
the new constitutional dispensation is devolution of decision- making 
powers to forty- seven county governments. All  these  factors augur well 
for continued strong economic per for mance.
This study seeks to analyze the  drivers of economic growth both 
in the past and the more recent period and to evaluate the impact of 
economic growth on  labor market prospects, the population structure, 
and growth. We also review opportunities and pitfalls that are likely 
to infl uence the country’s growth trajectory. Initially, we start with a 
background of  Kenya’s economy and some impor tant policy and po-
liti cal developments that have a bearing on economic per for mance. 
Next, the study pres ents a discussion of the country’s population growth, 
structure, transition, and demographic dividend prospects. The in-
terest  here is primarily on  those aspects of the population that have 
a  bearing on economic per for mance and, specifi cally, on the  labor 
markets.
We also look at  Kenya’s  labor market, with a focus on the structure 
of employment and the growth– employment dynamics. We discuss 
the distribution of employment by industry and, also, by formal and 
informal sectors. We then discuss some aspects of  labor supply side, 
including wage earnings,  labor productivity, and returns on  human 
capital. We  conclude that examination with some evidence of the 
growth– employment nexus. Following that, we discuss some of the 
emerging challenges and opportunities to growth and employment 
and, fi  nally, provide conclusions that tie the study together to show why 
 Kenya qualifi es to be an African Lion, but with im mense challenges to 
overcome.
 Kenya 111
 KENYA’S GROWTH PROFILE
This section explains  Kenya’s economic growth per for mance since 
2000, updating an earlier study that covered the period from the 1960s 
to the 1990s (Mwega and Ndung’u 2008). This earlier study showed 
that the good economic per for mance in the 1960s and early 1970s was 
not sustained in the 1980s and 1990s. The latter period was character-
ized by per sis tently low growth and limited economic transformation, 
despite the fact that the country maintained a large mea sure of po liti cal 
stability and pursued a fairly consistent development strategy. In the 1960s, 
growth averaged 5.7  percent, accelerating in the 1970s to 7.2  percent. It 
declined in the 1980s to 4.2  percent, and in the 1990s fell to 2.2  percent 
(World Bank 2015).
In analyzing the per sis tent growth slowdown that got  under way in 
 Kenya around the 1980s, a shortlist of plausible determinants includes 
the global recession, commodity price decline, delayed structural ad-
justment policies, po liti cal succession in the country, as well as other, 
slow moving candidates such as institutional quality and distributional 
politics (O’Connell 2008). The country also experienced several nega-
tive shocks that undermined growth and contributed to the weak per-
for mance. Mea sures to reduce  Kenya’s susceptibility to exogenous shocks, 
hence, are necessary for improved economic growth (World Bank 2013). 
However, the scope for untangling the contributions of a large number 
of potentially relevant determinants is limited in a country case study 
(O’Connell 2008). For this reason, we focus on a few  factors that  will 
help explain the current period.
 Kenya’s Economic Per for mance since 2000
In explaining  Kenya’s economic per for mance since 2000, we focus on 
three dimensions: fi rst, the role of po liti cal economy; second, the 
macro- growth story that sheds light on how much of  Kenya’s experi-
ence is explicable in terms of growth regressions; and fi  nally, the role of 
markets in explaining  Kenya’s growth pro cess.
Since the early 2000s (fi gure  4-1), the economy has experienced 
some recovery consistent with the Africa Rising narrative of resurgent 
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economic growth in the region. The rapid growth in Africa has been 
attributed to a  whole range of  factors (Robertson 2013): better govern-
ment fi nances and fi scal policies refl ected in reduced debt and general 
government expenditures ratios; booming commodity exports, especially 
to China, although the region runs a trade defi cit with the country; in-
creased FDI; new discoveries of oil and other minerals; the increased 
role of telecoms; ease of  doing business reforms; increased investment 
in education; and democ ratization of the continent. Some of  these 
 factors have also applied to  Kenya, especially the rapid expansion in tele-
communication and fi nancial ser vices, although the country started 
from dismally low growth rates.
Po liti cal Economy of  Kenya’s Growth Pro cess
In 2000, the economy recorded an all- time low growth rate of 0.6  percent, 
increasing to 3.8  percent in 2001 but declining to 0.5  percent in 2002. 
Following a peaceful change of government in December 2002 from 
FIGURE 4-1.  Economic Growth in  Kenya since 1980
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the  Kenya African National Union (KANU), which had ruled the coun-
try since in de pen dence, to the National Rainbow Co ali tion (NARC) 
 under Mwai Kibaki, the growth rate accelerated. The economy expanded 
steadily from 2.9  percent in 2003 to 5.1  percent in 2004, 5.9  percent in 
2005, and 6.3  percent in 2006, to reach a peak of 7.1  percent in 2007, 
the highest in over two de cades and the only episode of fi ve- year growth 
acceleration in  Kenya’s in de pen dence history (World Bank 2014). The 
good economic per for mance was bolstered by the implementation of 
bold economic and structural reforms  under the Economic Recovery 
Strategy (ERS) and a favorable external environment. The ERS was a 
fi ve- year blueprint prepared to address  Kenya’s macroeconomic vulner-
abilities and structural weaknesses.
The Kibaki government put in place economic policy and gover-
nance reforms that enhanced economic per for mance. The average 
World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), pub-
lished since 2005, which rates twenty aspects of governance and poli-
cies, for example, generally improved over the study period. It im-
proved in 2005–06 (from 3.52 to 3.58); declined in 2007–08 (to 3.55 
and 3.52, respectively) as a result of the post- election vio lence, drought, 
and the global fi nancial crisis; and improved in 2009–13 (from 3.67 to 
3.80).1 In the absence of poverty mea sure ments, the World Bank (2014) 
estimates that poverty declined from 46   percent in 2006 to around 
42  percent by  2013.
Despite the relatively good per for mance, the failure to develop an 
inclusive po liti cal agenda widened divisions in the country. The co ali-
tion of parties that formed NARC splintered  after only three years, fol-
lowing disagreements over proposed constitutional reforms (Collier 
and  others 2010). The subsequent 2007 elections  were followed by a 
serious outbreak of ethnic vio lence, signifi cantly disrupting the econ-
omy. About 1,300  people  were killed and nearly 600,000 displaced. A 
group of eminent persons, led by former United Nations secretary- 
general, Kofi  Annan, brokered a peaceful solution to the po liti cal stale-
mate, leading to a power- sharing agreement between Mwai Kibaki and 
Raila Odinga.
The events that followed the 2007 general election left a diffi cult 
legacy by exacerbating inter- ethnic mistrust and lack of confi dence in 
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the rule of law, which can be expected to have detrimental economic 
effects. Collier and  others, therefore, recommend revamping efforts at 
building supervisory institutions, such as the electoral commission and 
judiciary, in which the country’s citizens can have confi dence. The ef-
forts in strengthening the institutions in the country since the promul-
gation of the new constitution in 2010 led, in part, to a peaceful change 
of government in March 2013.
In 2008, the growth rate declined to 0.23  percent as a result of the 
post- election vio lence, drought in the country, and the global fi nancial 
crisis, eroding the achievements of the previous half- decade. Following 
countercyclical demand management policies and favorable weather 
conditions that improved agricultural per for mance, growth subse-
quently picked up, to 3.31  percent in 2009 and to 8.41  percent in 2010. 
As a result of a surge in global food and oil prices and a drought in the 
country, growth declined to 6.12   percent in 2011, to 4.45   percent in 
2012, to 5.74  percent in 2013, and 5.30  percent in 2014. With an average 
economic growth of only 4.37  percent over 2000–14, not very signifi -
cantly above the population growth rate of 2.7  percent, the country con-
tinued to operate below its potential.2 This growth was lower than the 
average for Sub- Saharan Africa (4.88  percent).
Macro- Growth Per for mance
The  Kenya story is one of missed opportunities.  Kenya, for example, 
did not exploit globalization to increase manufactured exports, given 
its coastal location, relatively cheap  labor, and basically market- friendly 
orientation. The share of manufactured exports in manufacturing out-
put has historically remained quite low (at less than 15  percent). While 
the economy was liberalized in the 1980s and 1990s, the trade liberaliza-
tion policies  were not credible and  were subject to frequent reversals. 
Manufactured exports  were also subject to serious supply constraints, 
such as unavailability and/or high cost of credit and foreign exchange, in-
frastructural defi ciencies, and an adverse regulatory framework, increas-
ing transaction costs and undermining the country’s competitiveness. 
This makes it diffi cult to overcome the threshold of cost- competitiveness 
to sell in the global market arising from the Asian countries’ agglomera-
tion economies (Collier and O’Connell 2008).  There is agreement that 
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manufactured exports are mainly constrained by high transaction costs, 
not endowments, at least in the medium term. The poor per for mance 
has not been confi ned to manufactured exports only, but encompasses 
exports in general.
What differentiates  Kenya from peer countries, in par tic u lar  those 
outside the East Africa region, is the clogged “exports engine” (World 
Bank 2014). Exports of goods, as  percent of GDP, have been declining 
since the mid-2000s, from 21.7  percent in 2006–10 to 18.9  percent in 
2011–14, while imports of goods have been increasing. In contrast, ser-
vices exports have been expanding, but not enough to offset the widen-
ing gap between exports and imports of goods.  Kenya has, in the last de-
cade, therefore, experienced a large increase in the current account 
defi cit. The current account recorded an average defi cit of 1.75  percent 
of GDP in 2006, generally widening in subsequent years. By 2012, the 
defi cit had risen to an average of 10.6  percent of GDP, and by July 2015 
to 10.8  percent of GDP, mainly due to increased imports in the context 
of a stagnant export sector. Imports of machinery and other equipment 
have, however, continued to account for a higher proportion (about one 
quarter) of the import bill.  These are essential for enhancing  future 
productive capacity of the economy.3
The high overall current account defi cit is mainly fi nanced by short- 
term net capital infl ows. This is a major source of potential vulnerabil-
ity for the economy and for fi nancial stability. The easy reversibility of 
 these infl ows increases the risk of a “sudden stop” or a reversal as a shift in 
market sentiments creates a fl ight away from domestic assets (O’Connell 
and  others 2010).
The growth lit er a ture, however, takes cognizance that economic 
growth is a multi- faceted pro cess and that the rapid economic growth 
in East Asia from the 1960s to 1990s is attributable to a wide range of 
 factors. Rapid economic growth requires the positive interaction of mul-
tiple  factors, such as the “prevalence of primary education, agricultural 
development, macroeconomic stability, the role of public policies, the 
existence of regional dynamism, and so on” (Kurihara and Yamagata 
2003, p. 6). Achieving rapid growth and shared prosperity requires con-
tinued action on multiple fronts. Improving on the key determinants 
to growth necessitates not only enactment of legislation, but also its 
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enforcement; more public investment and better execution of capital 
proj ects; greater po liti cal and economic stability; and improved gover-
nance (World Bank 2014).
The rate of investment is one of the most impor tant infl uences on 
economic growth in  Kenya. As seen in fi gure 4-2,  there is close correla-
tion between growth and the gross capital formation ratio (0.3), with 
causality  running from the investment ratio to growth.4 Since 2000, 
 there was a general increase in the investment ratio, from 17.4  percent 
in 2000 to 21.3  percent in 2014.  These are, however, relatively low in-
vestment rates, driven by low private and public saving rates, as well as 
low foreign direct investment. Savings, for example, did not keep up 
with investment. The gaps increased from near zero to a defi cit equiva-
lent to 8.9  percent of GDP in 2011 (World Bank 2013). An obvious pol-
icy implication is that macroeconomic policies should be geared  toward 
stimulating more private and public investment rates (World Bank 
2013). The Second Medium Term Plan of Vision 2030 sets ambitious 
targets for augmenting public and private investment. To this end, it en-
visages an increase in the investment rate to 31  percent of GDP by 2018, 
an ambitious 11  percent increase from the 2013 level. While foreign 
FIGURE 4-2.  GDP Growth Rate and Gross Capital Formation/GDP 
Ratio, 1964–2014
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savings can fi nance some of the investment, the stated target cannot be 
achieved in a sustainable manner without higher national  savings.
Role of Markets in the Growth Pro cess
Markets are crucial for providing the incentive structure of the econ-
omy and shaping the direction of economic change  toward growth, 
stagnation, or decline. Markets and their accessibility are impor tant for 
inclusive growth. It is diffi cult to map out specifi c policies for each of 
the markets in  Kenya, but the general trend was that major controls 
 were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s and dismantled in the 1980s 
and 1990s. From being largely syndrome  free in the 1960s, regulatory 
syndromes of soft (mild) controls  were introduced in the 1970s, which 
persisted into the 1980s (Collier and O’Connell 2008).5  These controls 
acted as an easier response in controlling balance of payments and in-
fl ationary pressures in the economy. However, the 1980s and 1990s are 
characterized by economic reforms to aid markets to work better: struc-
tural adjustment policies.  There  were also parastatal and civil ser vice 
reforms. Whereas market reforms started in the 1980s with a slow pace 
and then accelerated in the 1990s, institutional reforms  were a phenom-
ena of the 1990s.
By the new millennium, therefore, most of the markets  were fully 
liberalized, although, more recently, in December 2010, price controls 
 were re- introduced in the oil industry. As well, legislation that allows 
the government to determine and gazette price controls on essential 
commodities like maize fl our, kerosene, and cooking oil was passed by 
parliament. In other areas, liberalization has continued. Privatization 
of state corporations like the defunct  Kenya Post and Telecommunica-
tions Com pany, for example, which resulted in East Africa’s most prof-
itable com pany (Safaricom), has led to their revival  because of massive 
private investment. But removing controls does not guarantee rapid 
economic growth (Collier and O’Connell 2008). First,  there are lags 
between reforms and private investment. Second, agglomeration econ-
omies by Asian countries make it diffi cult for African countries to break 
into international markets for manufactures and ser vices. Third, success 
requires “big push“ actions by the state, such as the provision of physical 
and social infrastructure.
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To summarize,  there are vari ous lessons to be learned reviewing 
 Kenya’s growth experience over the past de cade. While the economy 
has become fairly dynamic and innovative, the economic outcomes 
have not been transformative. Agriculture remains the mainstay of the 
economy and three quarters of the population continue to live in rural 
areas. Manufacturing has been disappointing, and ser vice industries, 
such as fi nance or communications, account for only a marginal share 
of employment.  Kenya’s modest growth per for mance is not surprising 
when the country is benchmarked against the most impor tant determi-
nants of growth (World Bank 2014). Countries at similar levels of devel-
opment typically have greater macro- stability, higher urbanization, are 
more open, invest more, spend more on health, have better governance, 
and have more developed higher education system than  Kenya.
 Kenya’s challenges in enhancing its growth per for mance, as noted 
by Robertson (2013), include identifying competitive advantages; deliv-
ering the energy and transport infrastructure required to achieve the 
Vision 2030 development goals; enhancing investment in education 
to support rapid growth; and ensuring sustainable fi scal policy and a 
stable macroeconomic environment. Achieving the desired growth tar-
gets, therefore, entails improvements si mul ta neously on two fronts: in-
creased physical and  human capital, and faster productivity growth.
THE PROMISING  FUTURE
The rapid population growth in  Kenya is a phenomenon of the 1960s 
to the 1980s: its growth was on average above the real GDP per capita 
growth. But in the de cades that followed, it is the age cohort analy sis 
that has been amenable to in ter est ing policy debate and pres ents an op-
portunity for a promising  future. Four outcomes have been observed in 
the  Kenyan analy sis: fi rst,  Kenya has witnessed a youth bulge that has 
increased the  labour force, we observe that 67.8  percent of the working 
age is comprised of youth. Second, urbanization in  Kenya has increased 
over time, it stands at 25.2  percent and is projected to increase to over 
32 percent by 2030. Third, the analy sis does show that  Kenya is reaping 
the demographic dividend. Fi nally, a combination of the above three 
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 factors strengthen the outcome of an emerging  middle class in  Kenya. 
This is a class of innovators and investors who have taken advantage of 
digital fi nancial ser vices to build savings and accumulate capital. It is a 
class that pres ents opportunities for social, economic transformation and 
growth in  Kenya.
 Kenya’s Population Structure, Transition, 
and Demographic Dividend
 Kenya has been disadvantaged by a more rapid population growth 
(Mwega and Ndung’u 2008). Up to the 1980s,  Kenya had one of the most 
rapid population growth rates in the world. Population growth rate 
increased from 3  percent in the 1960s to 4  percent in the 1970s and 1980s, 
whereas that of Highly Performing East Asian Economies (HPAEs) 
declined from 3  percent in early 1960s to 2  percent thereafter. In the 
1990s, the average population growth rate was 2.9  percent, declining to 
about 2.7  percent in the new millennium.
World Bank statistics show an increasing trend in population age 
ranges 0–14 years, 15–34 years, and 35–64 years since 1960, while the 
population age sixty- fi ve years and above has stagnated. The population 
aged 0–14 years continues to remain higher than the other age groups, 
followed by the youth population (ages 15–34  years) and  those age 
35–64 years. This trend indicates that  Kenya is likely to experience a 
youth bulge as more of  those age 0–14 years move into the youth age 
group. In 2014, the population age 0–14 years stood at 19.1 million, while 
the 15–34  years group stood at about 16.1 million. The population 
group age 35–64 years stood at about 8.9 million. On the other hand, 
the population age sixty- fi ve years and above has remained at below 
3  percent of the total population since 1981, with the 2014 fi gure being 
1.2 million.
 Kenya has also experienced a steady rise in urbanization. In 1950, 
the share of urban (rural) population was 5.5  percent (94.41  percent). In 
2014, urban population was estimated at 25.2  percent of the total pop-
ulation. So urbanization has steadily increased in  Kenya. It is projected 
that by 2030 the urban population  will be at 32.83   percent, while 
the  rural population  will have declined to 67.17   percent of the total 
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population due to rural– urban migration resulting from the pull  factors 
in urban areas (quality of life and economic opportunities in urban 
areas, among  others). The trend reveals that while, indeed, urbaniza-
tion  will continue at a steady rate, rural areas  will remain home to the 
vast majority of the population for the foreseeable  future.
An impor tant feature of the population structure that relates to  labor 
markets outcomes is the relative size of the youth population to that of 
the total working- age population (ages 15–64). The United Nations de-
fi nes youth as a person between the ages of 15 and 24 years, while in 
 Kenya, youth is defi ned as a person between 15 and 35 years old, accord-
ing to the  Kenya National Youth Policy (Republic of  Kenya 2006). The 
youth population has constituted more than half of the working- age 
population in  Kenya since 1950; in 1950, the youth population comprised 
57.5  percent of working- age population. The share of the youth popula-
tion increased steadily over time, reaching a peak of 67.7  percent of the 
working- age population in 2002. Since 2006, the ratio of the youth 
population to the working- age population has been declining. In 2014, 
the share of the youth population to the working- age population stood 
at 64.2  percent and is projected to decline gradually to 59.0  percent 
in 2030. The youth population can be disaggregated into two cohorts; 
that is,  those who are age 15–24 years (most of whom are still in school 
and are considered inactive in the  labor market) and  those age 25–34 years 
(most of whom have completed school and are employed or actively 
looking for jobs). Figure 4-3 pres ents the trend and projections for  these 
cohorts of youth population in the  country.
Figure 4-3 shows that the population of youth age 15–24 years has 
been higher than that of  those age 25–34 years since 1950, and this is 
projected to continue  toward 2050. In 2014, the share of the youth 
population age 15–24 years was 35.2  percent of the working- age popu-
lation, while the share of the youth population age 25–34 years was 
29.1  percent of the working- age population. The share of both cohorts 
of youth population in the working- age population has been declining 
since 2006 and is projected to decline further as we move to 2050. This 
decline is expected to reduce the youth de pen dency ratio as more of 
the working- age population  will be composed of  those aged between 
35–64 years as we move to 2050. The fact that the working- age popula-
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tion is not homogeneous is impor tant to note in developing policies to 
ensure that most of them are actively involved in the  labor market ac-
tivities in one way or another.
The second feature of the population structure, related to the  labor 
market, is the share of working- age population (ages 15–64) to the de-
pendent population (ages 0–14 and above sixty- four). In 1950, the 
dependent population was 2.7 million. In 2014, the dependent popula-
tion was estimated at 20.4 million (44.75  percent of the total population), 
while the working population was 25.2 million (55.25   percent of the 
total population). Figure 4-4 shows the trends in the working- age pop-
ulation and the dependent population in  Kenya.
From 1960, the dependent population was slightly higher than the 
working- age population  until 1994, when the working- age population 
overtook the dependent population. The fi gure indicates that, since 
1994, the working- age population has been growing faster than the de-
pendent population, and this trend is projected to continue into the 
next de cades. As noted, the population age 0–14 years continues to 
FIGURE 4-3.  Share of Youth Population
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remain higher than the other age groups, followed by the youth popu-
lation (ages 15–34 years) and  those age 35–64 years. As more of  those 
age 0–14 years move into the youth age group, the working- age popula-
tion in the country is expected to continue expanding, leading to further 
decline in dependent population and a larger working- age population 
that would accumulate savings and increase investment in the economy.
It is also worth noting that  Kenya has witnessed declining fertility 
rates, from eight births per  woman in the 1960s to seven births per 
 woman in the 1980s and, fi  nally, to 4.4 births per  woman in 2013. In 
2014,  Kenya had 46  percent contraceptive prevalence rate (all methods) 
and a fertility rate of 4.6  children per  woman (Republic of  Kenya 2014). 
The crude mortality rate has also declined from twenty per 1,000 
 people in 1960 to eight per 1,000  people in 2013. Consequently, the life 
expectancy has improved from 46.4 years in 1960 to 61.7 years in 2013. 
With the increase in the share of the working- age population, which 
FIGURE 4-4.  Trends in  Kenya’s Working Age and Dependent Population
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has accelerated since 1993 from 49.8  percent of the total population to 
55.1  percent in 2013,  these trends indicate that demographic transition 
has taken effect in  Kenya. This sets the country on the path to realiza-
tion of demographic dividend, if other contributing  factors are adequately 
provided for. Bloom and Canning (2008) observe that, as the de pen-
dency ratio falls, opportunities for economic growth tend to rise, creating 
a demographic dividend.
A demographic dividend is a temporary opportunity for faster eco-
nomic growth that begins when fertility rates decline, leading to a larger 
proportion of working- age population compared to young and retired 
dependent population (Republic of Kenya 2014). Bloom and  others 
(2014) note that  factors that can facilitate the reaping of demographic 
dividend for a country include integrated  family planning, education, 
and economic development policies. From Bloom and  others (2014), 
the emphasis is that, for a demographic dividend to be realized,  there 
should be a decline in birth rates and mortality rates, followed by an 
increase in  labor supply. This seems to describe what  Kenya has gone 
through. The increase in  labor supply must then fi nd a macroeconomic 
setting that  will absorb this  labor force (Gribble and Bremner 2012). 
With a low share of dependent population, the larger working- age pop-
ulation would be able to save and invest more in the economy. At the 
same time, they are able to produce more per work, hence boosting the 
national income per capita.
Computation of the demographic dividend focuses on the relative 
changes of the dependent and working- age populations. Based on the 
data of the working- age and dependent populations, the support ratio is 
obtained by dividing the dependent population by the working- age popu-
lation. The support ratio shows the average number of dependents per 
worker. Figure 4-5 pres ents the prospects of  Kenya’s earning demographic 
dividend, to which the change in support ratio is a key contributing  factor.
Figure 4-5 shows that the change in support ratio has been positive 
but declining from 1960 to early 1980s, when it became negative. 
Since then, the change in support ratio has remained negative, with a 
negative change of about 0.6   percent in 2011, 0.3   percent in 2012, 
and 0.4  percent in 2013. The consistent negative change in support ratio 
implies that the dependence on the working population in the country is 
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declining. With less dependence, the working- age population is able to 
save and invest more in the economy, hence creating opportunities for 
economic growth.
Lee and Mason (2006) and Bloom and  others (2003; 2007) acknowl-
edge the fact that demographic transitions do not in themselves guaran-
tee a demographic dividend  unless  there is a quality institutional environ-
ment to enhance the productivity of the working- age population.  Kenya 
has made positive steps in strengthening its institutions since the promul-
gation of the new constitution in 2010. Signifi cant steps have been made 
in reforms in the public ser vice, the police, the judiciary, the electoral 
system, and in devolving power. The CPIA public sector management 
and institutions cluster average (1 = low to 6 = high) for  Kenya has aver-
aged at 3.58 since 2005, improving to 3.80 in 2014.6 Though more still has 
to be done,  Kenya can be said to be on the right path in strengthening 
its institutional quality, a move that  will enhance the chances of the 
country realizing the demographic dividend even before the year 2050.
FIGURE 4-5.  Prospects of Earning Demographic Dividend
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The sustained increase in the GDP per capita since 2008,  after the 
post- election vio lence shock, is an indication that the prospects of  Kenya 
reaping demographic dividend by 2050 is real with improved po liti cal 
and economic framework. A demographic dividend model (DemDiv), 
developed by the USAID- funded Health Policy Proj ect (HPP), predicts 
that  Kenya  will benefi t from demographic dividend by 2050 if the insti-
tutional qualities are ensured. The DemDiv model integrates key 
ele ments needed for  Kenya to achieve a demographic dividend that in-
clude  family planning, education, and economic policies, especially on 
fi nancial effi ciency, ICT use, imports,  labor fl exibility, and public insti-
tutions. The DemDiv model pres ents a base scenario with no invest-
ment in  family planning and a combined scenario of investments in 
 family planning, education, and economic policies. In the base sce-
nario, with no investments in  family planning, the fertility rate would 
be the same in 2050 as it is  today, more than four  children per  woman. 
 Kenya’s age structure would remain very young and be dominated by 
dependents. In contrast, the combined scenario, which includes in-
creased use of  family planning, produces a youth bulge, which moves 
into the working- age years in 2050. An increase in a healthy, educated, 
and productive working- age population  will put  Kenya on the path to 
realization of a demographic dividend (Republic of  Kenya 2014).
Another notable feature of  Kenya’s working- age population that should 
be factored in the growth debate is the emerging  middle class popula-
tion and its role in driving economic growth in the country. According 
to the African Development Bank, the  middle class are  those who spend 
between US$2 (approximately 200  Kenyan shilling [Ksh]) and US$20 
(approximately Ksh2,000) a day or earn an annual income exceeding 
US$3,900 (approximately Ksh390,000). In 2011, the  middle class in East 
Africa was estimated to be about 29.3 million, representing an average of 
22.6   percent of the population: 44.9   percent of  Kenya’s population, 
18.7  percent in Uganda, 12.1  percent in Tanzania, 7.7  percent in Rwanda, 
and 5.3  percent in Burundi (AfDB 2011).
The emergence of the  middle class pres ents an opportunity for so-
cial and economic growth in  Kenya, since the  middle class has been 
argued to play a key role as a conduit for advancing social pro gress, an 
agent of change for institutional reforms, a catalyst for the realization of 
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inclusive growth, innovation, and entrepreneurial drive (Ncube and 
Shimeles 2012). The rise in the  middle class population in  Kenya has 
boosted the purchasing power in the country, leading to the thriving of 
the  wholesale and retail sector (evidenced by the growing shopping 
mall culture) in the country. Additionally, the rise in the  middle class 
population has led to an increase in demand for housing, giving rise to 
the boom in the housing market. It has also contributed to growth and 
innovation in the fi nancial sector that fi nances the increased consump-
tion by the  middle class population. Moreover, the growing  middle 
class is increasingly appealing to both domestic and foreign investors, 
thereby presenting  Kenya with an opportunity for wealth creation and 
increased investment in the country.
The  Labor Market, Employment, and Growth
In this section, we focus on some impor tant aspects of the  Kenyan  labor 
market. We note that analy sis of the  Kenyan  labor market is severely 
constrained by the paucity of data necessary to fully capture and ana-
lyze the dynamics of the  labor market and, especially, the link between 
economic growth, employment, and poverty reduction. Nevertheless, 
the available data reveals some key features of the  labor market and 
points to some specifi c policy proposals.
 Labor Market Structure, Employment, and Wages
To provide a broad picture of  Kenya’s  labor market, we start by looking 
at the trend of total employment and sectoral distribution of wage em-
ployment, as shown in  table  4-1 and fi gure  4-6, respectively. The 
 Kenyan work force is categorized into the modern (or formal) sector, 
the informal sector, and the small- scale agriculture and pastoralist 
sector. This section focuses mainly on the modern (formal) sector 
alongside the informal sector employment in view of the challenges of 
availability of data on small- scale agriculture and pastoralist sector. 
 Table 4-1 shows that in 1985 total employment, excluding employment 
in small- scale agriculture and pastoralist activities, was estimated at 
146,200 persons. Out of this, 80.33  percent  were in wage employment. 
The self- employed and unpaid  family workers  were about 2.26  percent, 
 Kenya 127
while  those in informal employment  were estimated to be about 
17.41  percent of the total employment.
Over the period  under review, wage employment grew by an annual 
average of 2.5  percent, self- employment and unpaid  family workers grew 
by an annual average of 3.7  percent, while informal employment grew by 
an annual average of 11.6  percent. Over the same period, the share of 
wage employment declined to 16.56  percent in 2014, and that of self- 
employment and unpaid  family workers declined to 0.72  percent of the 
total employment in the same year. On the other hand, the share of 
estimated informal employment increased from 17.41  percent in 1985 
to 82.73  percent in 2014. Informal employment increased from 1989 
into the 1990s, surpassing the wage employment in 1994. Since then, 
the composition of employment in  Kenya has progressively tilted 
 toward informal employment. Generally, since 1985, the trend in infor-
mal employment has defi ned the overall trend in growth of total 
 TABLE 4-1.  Shares of  Kenya’s Total Employment, 1985–2014














1985 80.33 2.26 17.41 146,200
1988 77.47 2.54 20 173,140
1991 56.38 2.04 41.58 255,710
1994 44.86 1.74 53.41 335,620
1997 35.06 1.36 63.57 469,840
2000 28.68 1.1 70.22 591,160
2003 23.53 0.9 75.57 733,940
2006 20.66 0.75 78.6 899,340
2009 19.13 0.65 80.23 1,045,650
2012 16.87 0.6 82.53 1,278,110
2013 16.89 0.62 82.49 1,351,700
2014 16.56 0.72 82.73 1,431,670








Source: Republic of  Kenya, Economic Survey (vari ous  issues).
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 employment in the country. This increased rate of growth of informal 
employment can be attributed to a multi- dimensional matrix of rea-
sons.  These reasons include but are not limited to the government pro-
motion of the informal sector and better informal sector data capture 
(Omolo 2010); limited capital, which hinders small entrepreneurs 
from venturing into large formal fi rms; the relatively high cost of  doing 
business, which pushes employers to cut on  labor costs (such as social 
contributions) through informal employment; and occasional freezes 
and/or rationalization of government employment, pushing  labor to the 
informal sector.
The informal sector, commonly referred to as the jua kali sector, 
therefore, currently dominates and plays a critical role in the  labor mar-
ket in  Kenya. Over the years, the sector has expanded into activities of 
manufacturing, transport and information, communication, and tech-
nology (Republic of  Kenya 2003). However,  there has been a lot of 
debate on the quality of employment in the informal sector. Addition-
ally,  Kenya’s informal sector enterprises tend to remain small with lim-
ited  labor absorption capacity. A look at the informal sector units in the 
period reviewed shows an increasing number of informal business units 
rather than expansion of existing units. This could be as a result of in-
creased self- employment in the sector, an indication that the sector has 
not been dynamic enough to absorb the excess  labor in the country. 
This suggests that focus should be on how to make the informal sector 
more dynamic while, at the same time, seeking to make it easier to do 
business in the formal sector. Bigsten and Wambugu (2010) argue that 
the formal sector employment expansion, on the other hand, has been 
constrained by the inability of the country to achieve rapid capital ac-
cumulation to improve on the capital– labor ratio and the  labor market 
regulations that have tended to increase  labor costs relative to produc-
tivity in the sector. They noted that the increase in informal sector fi rms 
leading to the employment expansion in the sector is mainly made pos-
si ble by the limited capital requirements for new jobs in the sector.
In the modern sector employment, a notable feature has been the 
increasing number of casual workers as compared to regular employ-
ment workers. Casual workers are individuals whose terms of engage-
ment provide for payment at the end of each day and who are not 
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engaged for a period longer than twenty- four hours at a time (Republic 
of  Kenya 2007). This category of workers enjoys the same rights as other 
employees to a large extent, but may be excluded from certain crucial 
benefi ts, such as leave entitlement, medical coverage, and pension con-
tributions. Most employers in  Kenya, including the public sector, have 
resorted to the increasing use of casual, temporary, part- time, contract, 
subcontracted, and outsourced workforces to reduce  labor costs, achieve 
more fl exibility in management, and exert greater levels of control over 
 labor (Omolo 2010). According to a report by the International  Labor 
Organ ization (ILO 2013), regular employment grew by only 7.0  percent 
between 2003 and 2011, while casual employment grew by 87  percent 
over the same period. Additionally, the proportion of casual formal jobs 
increased from 20  percent in 2003 to 30  percent in 2011 (Republic of 
 Kenya 2014).
 Until the end of 1980s, expansion of employment in the modern 
sector of the economy was largely attributed to the absorption of em-
ployees into the public sector. However, in 1994,  there was a turn- 
around in this trend with employment in the private sector expanding 
faster than that in the public sector. The share of the private sector in 
wage employment has been on the rise since 1991, dominating wage 
 labor progressively, to stand at 70.4   percent of wage employment in 
2014. On the other hand, the share of the public sector in wage employ-
ment has declined from 49.6  percent in 1991 to 29.6  percent in 2014. A 
comparison of the wage earnings in the public and private sector is 
presented in  table 4-2, which shows the real average annual earnings 
per employee in selected sectors in the  Kenyan economy.
As is evident,  there is a wide variation in earnings across sectors, 
with workers in fi nancial and insurance activities earning the highest 
and  those in agriculture, forestry, and fi shing sectors earning the low-
est. In essence, workers in agriculture, forestry, and fi shing, mainly 
rural workers, have low earnings, hence dominate the bracket of the 
working poor. Furthermore, the gap between public and private sector 
earning varies widely within the sectors. Earnings in the public sector 
are relatively higher than in the private sector for most of the selected 
sectors, as evidenced by the percentage divergence in  table 4-2. The sec-
tors of specifi c concern are the  wholesale and retail trade sector and the 
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education sector. In the  wholesale and retail sector, private sector 
employees’ real average earning is approximately a third of their 
counter parts in the public sector. In the education sector, private sec-
tor employees’ real average earning is slightly more than twice that of 
their public sector employees.
 These wage inequalities explain the frequent agitation for wage ad-
justments by trade  unions, such as  Kenya National Union of Teachers 
(KNUT), which has seen the public wage bill spiral in the last two de-
cades. The high wage bill in the public sector has turned out to be a 
constraint to economic growth, as it tends to crowd out resources avail-
able for development expenditure in the country. A study commissioned 
by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) and carried 
out by the  Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analy sis 
(KIPPRA) found that, generally, the public sector pays slightly higher than 
the private sector when comparing basic salary and allowances. How-
ever, the private sector pays a higher basic salary. The study also found 
 TABLE 4-2.  Estimated Real Average Wage Earnings Per Employee,  
Kenya, 2014






Agriculture, forestry, and fi shing 153,904 217,789.60 70.7
Mining and quarrying 229,400 205,021.70 112
Manufacturing 233,304 472,230.60 49.4
Electricity, gas, steam, and air 
conditioning supply
831,991 747,447.10 111.3
Construction 366,160 365,919.60 100.1
Wholesale and retail trade 346,494 1,042,822.50 33.2
Transportation and storage 702,651 819,062.60 85.8
Financial and insurance activities 1,003,456 950,288.80 105.6
Education 553,722 270,131.30 205
 Human health and social work 
activities
436,270 600,710.20 72.6
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 353,746 424,133.10 83.4
Information and communication 498,375 410,726.60 121.3
Source: Republic of  Kenya, Economic Survey (vari ous  issues).
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that  there is a large vertical wage in equality in both the public and pri-
vate sectors between the lowest and highest cadres (KIPPRA 2013). The 
wage differentials between the public and private sectors indicate 
that  there are barriers to mobility of  labor between the sectors and that 
the  Kenyan  labor market is not effi cient in allocation of  labor.
 Labor Productivity and  Human Capital Returns
In this section, we focus on  labor productivity and  human capital re-
turns.  Labor productivity mea sures the amount of real GDP produced 
by an hour of  labor. In  Kenya,  labor is the abundant  factor of production 
for the vari ous economic activities.  Labor productivity growth is impor-
tant in mea sur ing the effi ciency of  labor and in signaling an improve-
ment in the standard of living in the country. Figure 4-6 shows produc-
tivity in terms of GDP per person employed (for the period 1980–2012) 
converted to 1990 constant international dollars using Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) rates and agriculture value added per worker in constant 
2005 dollars (for the period 1980–2014). Agriculture value added per 
worker is a mea sure of agricultural productivity. In the analy sis, agri-
culture is comprised of value added from forestry, cultivation of crops, 
FIGURE 4-6.  Labor Productivity
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hunting, fi shing, and livestock production. Since agriculture is the domi-
nant sector of the  Kenyan economy, agricultural productivity provides a 
good estimate of the  labor productivity in the  country.
In the period  under review, GDP per person employed has experi-
enced a sluggish, inconsistent growth, dropping from 2,810 in 1980 to a 
low of 2,615 in 2000, then rising to 3,134 in 2012. Since 2008, GDP per 
person employed has been on a consistent upward trend, an indication 
of growth in  labor productivity in the economy. On the other hand, 
agricultural productivity has been quite erratic over the period  under 
review, dropping inconsistently from a high of 429.5 in 1983 to a low of 
331 in 1997. Since 2009, agricultural productivity has consistently grown 
from 347.5 to 395.8 in 2014. The trends of GDP per person and agricul-
tural productivity in recent years are an indication of growing  labor 
productivity in the country. This is essential for enhancing economic 
growth of the country.
The growth in  labor productivity in the country comes partly as 
a  consequence of the improvement in education attainment since 
in de pen dence. Barro and Lee (2010) show that educational attainments 
(average years of schooling) in  Kenya increased signifi cantly, from 
0.3 years in 1960 to about 4.4 years in 2000, then to 6.5 years in 2010. 
This was mainly driven by attainments in primary education (47.8  percent) 
when compared to secondary education (7.9  percent) and tertiary edu-
cation (2.8  percent), due to the introduction of  free primary education 
in 2003. Tertiary education has also expanded rapidly in the last two 
de cades, mainly driven by demographic pressures as well as pressures 
from the high subsidization of primary and secondary education, the 
upgrading of colleges to universities, and the introduction of what is re-
ferred to as “parallel programs,” where students pay tuition for part- time 
or distance learning programs (World Bank 2014).  These trends suggest 
an improvement in the supply of quality  labor that has positive effects 
on growth.
Information on the  human capital returns is scarce. Kimenyi and 
 others (2006) use data from the 1994 Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) 
to estimate  human capital returns for workers with dif fer ent levels of 
education using the Mincer (1974) earnings function. The sample used 
in the study includes only individuals in the working- age group 15–65 
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years who are full- time employees. The sample size consisted of 6,140 
observations covering individuals both in the rural (4,878) and urban 
(1,262)  areas.
 Table 4-3 shows private returns to education for dif fer ent levels of 
education by region and gender categories determined by Kimenyi and 
 others (2006). The results reveal large differences in returns between 
levels of education, with the largest difference in returns observed 
between primary and secondary education. The  human capital return 
for  those who have completed primary schooling was estimated at 
7.7   percent, while the return for  those with secondary schooling was 
estimated at 23.4   percent. The  human capital returns for  those with 
secondary education are about thrice the returns of  those with primary 
schooling. This has infl uenced the education policies in the country, as 
evidenced by the increased allocation for development of secondary 
schools to improve on their enrollment rates and the current push to 
review the education system. The results also indicate that returns to 
education are greater for females than for males. For example, the re-
turn for females with primary education was 13.2  percent compared to 
4.4  percent for males.  Human capital returns to females with secondary 
education  were estimated at 36.3  percent, while returns to males  were 







National 7.7 23.4 23.6 25.1
 Urban 9.3 34.4 26.2 34.8
 Rural 7.8 21 22.4 14.2
All Males 4.4 21.2 12.8 23.3
 Urban 6.1 25.6 17.9 30.7
 Rural 4.2 20.2 12.4 12.6
All Females 13.2 36.3 43.5 62.5
 Urban 6.2 44.9 28 66
 Rural 16 30.3 51.5 18.6
Source: Adapted from Kimenyi and  others (2006).
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21.2  percent. This informs the increased focus on girl- child education 
as the government endeavors to provide an equal opportunity for all 
 children to access basic education and to increase enrollment rates, 
especially for girls in secondary schools and institutions of higher learn-
ing. Additionally, the returns for urban workers  were found to be higher, 
except for the case of females with primary education, where returns 
are higher for  those in rural areas. The rising productivity since 2009 
and the results for returns on  human capital indicate an improvement 
in the effi ciency of  labor in the country. With the improvements in 
 labor quality and effi ciency, additional capital accumulation  will pro-
pel the country to a rapid economic growth path.
Growth and Employment
We have outlined  Kenya’s growth profi le and recent per for mance. One 
impor tant question is  whether growth has been effective in creating 
employment. In this section, we provide evidence on the relationship 
between growth and employment. As noted previously, this analy sis is 
severely hampered by the lack of accurate and updated data; hence, we 
rely on available data and anecdotal evidence to draw some conclu-
sions. Policies aimed at generating employment opportunities in  Kenya 
have consistently promoted economic growth as the panacea to em-
ployment creation in the country. The relationship between economic 
growth and employment is estimated using a  simple employment elas-
ticity (which is a mea sure of the percentage change in employment 
associated with a one  percent change in economic growth). The em-
ployment elasticity summarizes the ability of a country’s economy to 
generate employment opportunities for its population as its economy 
grows, and can also provide an insight into trends in  labor productivity 
in the country. According to ILO (2009), employment elasticity for 
 Kenya has been generally higher than that for the world and also for 
Sub- Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, employment elasticity varies greatly 
over dif fer ent periods, with the highest elasticity of 1.77 recorded for 
the period 1996–2000, when the growth rate was low (–1.6   percent). 
The lowest employment elasticity, 0.5, was recorded during the period 
2004–08, when the economic growth rate was high at 5.3   percent. 
Thus, in the latter high- growth period, employment response was weak. 
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This has been explained by the fact that growth in this period was 
driven by effi ciency gains.
It is evident from fi gure 4-7 that employment elasticity for  Kenya has 
been erratic, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s,  after which it 
stabilized between 1993 and 1998, before declining to a low of −4.7 in 
the year 2000. It then  rose again to 5.4  in 2002. Since then,  Kenya’s 
employment elasticity has stagnated, ranging between 0.5 and 1.6. In 
2014, the employment elasticity was at 0.56. This means that a 1  percent 
increase in the country’s GDP would trigger a 0.56  percent increase in 
employment in the economy. The decline in employment elasticity 
since 2009 shows the declining responsiveness of  Kenya’s employment to 
growth in GDP as more  labor is pushed into the informal sector. From 
the analy sis earlier, the informal sector is a reservoir of self- employed, 
unemployed, and underemployed, and so may have a weak relationship 
to economic  growth.
Figure 4-7 also shows that the growth in total employment in the 
country has closely tracked the economic growth in the country from 
2004 to 2014. The GDP growth witnessed between the years 2003–2007 
FIGURE 4-7.  Growth-Employment Elasticity
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can be related to the strategies employed by the government as per 
the Sessional Paper of 2003 on Economic Recovery for Employment 
and Wealth Creation (Republic of  Kenya 2003), but the growth experi-
enced up to 2007 was related to the effi ciency gains in the economy. 
However, the unemployment rates still remain high in the country. 
The employment and GDP growth dynamics indicate that the nexus 
between economic growth and reduction of unemployment in the 
country is weak. This can be explained by the fact that  labor force 
growth (mainly attributed to increase in working population and in-
creased  labor participation) in the country outpaces employment growth, 
leading to an increase in unemployment despite the positive economic 
growth witnessed in most of the years in the period  under review (which 
averaged 3.87  percent in the period 1986–2014 and 5.45  percent in the 
period 2003–07, which had the highest growth episode). However, 
economic growth seems to be a key  factor in generating wage employ-
ment in the country. The growth in wage employment tracks GDP 
growth closely. However,  there is no clear pattern in the relationship 
between GDP growth and growth in informal sector employment or 
growth in self- employment and unpaid  family workers.
EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES AND PITFALLS 
TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT
As discussed,  Kenya has recorded robust growth over the last de cade 
and is expected to sustain growth rates above 5   percent in the next 
few years. However, the growth achieved so far is still below what is 
necessary to achieve the targets set in the country’s Vision 2030 to make 
 Kenya an upper- middle country by 2030. But  there are many opportuni-
ties the country can exploit to maintain and raise its growth per for mance. 
An impor tant one is to take advantage of being a regional fi nancial hub 
and having a set of port and airport facilities and an effi cient road and 
railway networks that would serve the landlocked countries and gener-
ate economic rents and employment. As the largest economy in the 
East Africa community,  Kenya stands to gain from removal of barriers 
to trade. Advancement with the trilateral agreement between Southern 
 Kenya 137
Africa Development Community ( SADC), East African Community 
(EAC), and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) is bound to boost opportunities for trade and enhance eco-
nomic growth in the entire region, including  Kenya.  Kenya has also 
diversifi ed her commercial relationships to a wide array of partners, es-
pecially in Asia and, increasingly, in the  Middle East.  These new rela-
tionships offer new opportunities to boost economic growth through 
expanded trade and investment and also other dimensions of develop-
ment cooperation.
 Kenya has embarked on the implementation of an ambitious new 
constitution, the Constitution of  Kenya 2010. The key aspect of this 
constitution is devolution, which has resulted in the creation of forty- 
seven constituent county governments. The devolution pro cess is a sig-
nifi cant shift from the previous system, where power was concentrated 
with the central government. Devolution is particularly impor tant 
 because it provides for individual counties to deliver specifi c ser vices 
and to design policies to promote growth. The counties have dif fer ent 
resource endowments that can be used once devolved policies and 
resources are effi ciently employed but, also,  those disadvantaged by 
resource endowments have a compensatory mechanism in line with 
shared growth. If well implemented, devolution holds the potential to 
signifi cantly support growth. Each county has dif fer ent resource en-
dowments, so policies and the provision of ser vices closer to the popu-
lace  will spur economic vibrancy at the periphery.
 Kenya has also discovered new natu ral resources, with oil being the 
most impor tant. The exploitation and pos si ble exportation of oil by 
 Kenya is expected to support the country’s transformation pro cess by re-
ducing the cost of energy and stimulating manufacturing of petrochemi-
cals, plastics, and related products.  These are expected to drive economic 
growth and generate more employment opportunities in the country.
The large youthful population in the country pres ents the country 
with an opportunity to accelerate its growth.  There is an increasing 
number of educated youth, and this group has been active in vari ous 
mobile phone- based fi nancial ser vices innovations that have created 
job opportunities. With a supportive environment,  Kenyan youth hold 
 great potential for economic growth. Coupled with the growth in youth 
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population, the emerging  middle class in  Kenya forms a large market, a 
group of innovators, investors, consumers, and early adapters. The  middle 
class population prefers and preserves stable policy and po liti cal envi-
ronment. They have every thing to lose with vio lence and civil wars, 
hence are major contributors in creating a supportive environment and 
market that drive investment and employment creation in the country.
However, the country also  faces serious pitfalls that pres ent real risks 
to growth potential. A serious challenge to economic growth in the 
long run pertains to the limited transformation of the economy. Although 
 there have been impor tant shifts in terms of sectoral contribution from 
agriculture to ser vices, the economy has under gone only limited trans-
formation. In agriculture, which is the primary source of livelihood for 
the vast majority of the population, productivity remains low, and most 
subsectors are characterized by traditional production methods. Like-
wise, productivity in manufacturing is low, and the growth in this sec-
tor has been stunted. The share of manufacturing output to GDP has 
remained relatively fl at. The expectation given the resource endow-
ment pattern in  Kenya was that agri- industries would transform agri-
cultural production downstream and expand the manufacturing sector 
and product demand upstream. The failure to transform the economy 
is a major threat to economic growth and job creation.
The fragile democracy in  Kenya is also a challenge to sustained eco-
nomic growth in the country. The sporadic ethnic vio lence observed 
during elections has been a major concern, and private investors seem 
to have  adopted a waiting option, driven by election cycles. This is the 
pattern that was observed in most ethnically heterogeneous constitu-
encies in 1992, 1997, 2002, and even in 2007 general elections (see 
Kimenyi and Ndung’u 2005). This can only be resolved by strong institu-
tions of governance and obedience to the rule of law. Other risk  factors 
include the emerging terrorist attacks by the Al- Shaabab group based 
in Somalia, which has adversely impacted the country’s economy and 
directly affected the tourist sector. The youth bulge could also easily 
turn out to be a curse instead of a blessing if not enough jobs are created 
for the increased youth population. Likewise, poverty and in equality 
and, more so, in equality at the regional levels remain high and pose 
threats not only to sustained growth but also to stability. Empirical evi-
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dence has shown that in equality can choke a growth momentum. In 
addition, internal institutional weaknesses and governance challenges 
threaten the gains of the new constitution.  These and other risk  factors 
are of concern to the country’s ability to sustain growth and retain its 
position as a dominant economy.
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this study was to analyze the recent  drivers of economic 
growth in  Kenya and to evaluate the impact of growth on  labor market 
prospects, as well as population growth dynamics. This is in recogni-
tion that  Kenya, as the ninth largest economy in Africa and the fourth 
largest in Sub- Sahara Africa, pres ents some lessons that can boost its 
capacity and take advantage of its location and policy environment to 
drive growth in the region. We advance from Mwega and Ndung’u 
(2008), but also review the challenges as well as the opportunities that 
are likely to infl uence the country’s growth trajectory. We have pro-
vided a background to  Kenya’s economy and some impor tant policy 
and po liti cal developments that have a bearing on economic per for-
mance. The discussion and analy sis dwell on the macroeconomic per-
for mance and the role of po liti cal economy and markets in  Kenya’s 
growth pro cess. The most impor tant conclusion to be drawn  here, to 
relate it to the micro- analy sis, is one of institutional and policy failures. 
The study then focuses on the country’s population growth, its structure 
and transition, and the prospects of reaping the demographic dividend. 
The interest  here was primarily on  those aspects of the population that 
have a bearing on economic per for mance and, specifi cally, on the  labor 
markets. We focus on the working- age and youth populations, and the 
implication for population dividend, in addition to analyzing the trends 
in urbanization and the implication for economic growth.
The analyses of  Kenya’s population trends reveal a high rate of pop-
ulation growth, though the rate of population growth is expected to 
continue on a downward trend. Urbanization is expected to continue 
at a steady rate, even though the vast majority of the population  will 
remain in rural areas. Increased urbanization and expanding cities has 
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been shown to increase economic growth if accompanied with en-
hanced infrastructural development and decongestion of the urban 
areas. The demographic transitions experienced over the years in the 
country put  Kenya on the path to reaping demographic dividend. If 
mea sures are put in place to enhance institutional quality and provide 
productive employment opportunities to the large working population, 
 Kenya is likely to realize her demographic dividend even before 2050. 
The emergence of the  middle class in the country, which is driving 
innovations in the country, is also increasingly appealing to investors, 
hence pres ents an opportunity for economic and social– political growth 
through advancement of social pro gress, realization of inclusive growth, 
innovation, and entrepreneurial drive.
The  Kenyan  labor market is dominated by the informal sector em-
ployment, which has been rising since the early 1990s. On the other 
hand, employment in the modern (or formal) sector has remained stag-
nant over the period. In view of the insuffi cient capital accumulation in 
the country,  labor tends to move into the informal and self- employment 
sectors, which require limited capital as compared to the capital- intensive 
modern sector and capital- intensive agricultural activities. To enhance 
long- term growth prospects, the rapid growth in  labor supply should 
be accompanied with rapid growth in capital accumulation.  Labor mar-
ket growth and dominance of informal employment has reduced the ca-
pacity of the economy to deliver quality employment and output growth 
via productivity. Over the years,  there has been an increase in the num-
ber of informal units rather than expansion of the existing ones. The 
private sector is best positioned to drive  labor demand in the  future, hav-
ing increasingly dominated the provision of employment opportunities 
over the public sector. Therefore, continued implementation of mea sures 
to boost private sector investments should be highly encouraged.
Earnings across the vari ous sectors of the economy and even within 
the sectors (between public sector employees and private sector em-
ployees)  were found to vary. This refl ects barriers to mobility of  labor 
between the informal and formal  labor market, resulting in  labor with 
similar skills being rewarded differently in the two markets. This is an 
indication that the dif fer ent segments of the  labor market in  Kenya are 
not fully integrated and are less effi cient, since  labor mobility is impor-
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tant in ensuring effi cient allocation of the  labor force in the market. 
The rising productivity since 2009 and the results related to returns on 
 human capital indicate an improvement in the effi ciency of  labor in the 
country. With the improvement in  labor effi ciency, additional capital 
accumulation  will propel the country to a rapid economic growth  path.
Growth- employment elasticity has slightly declined in recent years. 
However, growth in wage employment and, by extension, growth in 
total employment has tracked GDP growth closely since 2004. On the 
other hand,  there has been no clear pattern in the relationship between 
GDP growth and growth in informal sector employment or growth in 
self- employment and unpaid  family workers. This affi rms the fact that 
the key to growth in formal sector employment is capital deepening, 
which is fundamental for economic growth.
Fi nally, it is the  middle class that seems to drive the economy. A de-
veloping country with a large  middle class is likely to enjoy peace, stabil-
ity, and increased private investments that  will drive overall growth. That 
is where the  Kenyan economy is at the moment.
NOTES
1. In 2014,  Kenya had an average score of 3.76, above Africa’s average of 3.20.
2. Recent growth rates have been revised as a result of the rebasing of the 
economy in September 2014. This involved revisions in sector classifi cations 
and the base year to 2009. Rebasing increased the GDP by 25   percent in 
2013 so that indicators such as the Debt/GDP, current account balance/
GDP, and fi scal defi cit/GDP improved (Central Bank of  Kenya, Monetary 
Policy Statement, October 2014).
3. According to a Central Bank of  Kenya (CBK) estimate, excluding 
heavy machinery and industrial equipment would reduce the current ac-
count defi cit to a sustainable 4.2  percent of GDP in the year to July 2014.
4. This is based on our own analy sis. Only at six lags is  there a two- way 
causality between growth and gross capital formation.
5. “Syndrome  free” refers to a situation where a country avoids four broad 
anti- growth regimes: 1) severe controls or regulations that distort production 
activities and reward rent- seeking be hav ior; 2) ethno- regional re distribution 
that compromises effi ciency in order to generate resource transfers to sub- 
national po liti cal interests; 3) inter- temporal re distributions that aggressively 
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transfer resources from the  future to the pres ent, especially in resource- rich 
countries; and 4) state breakdown characterized by civil war or intense po-
liti cal instability during which the government fails to provide security or to 
proj ect a coherent infl uence in a substantial portion of the country.
6. The public sector management and institutions cluster includes prop-
erty rights and rule- based governance, quality of bud getary and fi nancial 
management, effi ciency of revenue mobilization, quality of public adminis-
tration, and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector.
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Growth Experience through an Employment Lens
Sam Jones and Finn Tarp
Mozambique’s economy has expe-rienced substantial change over 
the past twenty years. In the early 1990s, the country emerged from a 
devastating and prolonged confl ict. Since then, aggregate economic 
growth has been sustained at high rates, making the country one of the 
top economic performers of the region. Other studies have noted that, 
while Mozambique’s growth  until the mid-2000s largely refl ected a 
pro cess of post- war recovery, sustained growth since then is a testament 
to solid macroeconomic management, pursuit of a wide range of eco-
nomic governance reforms, and substantial infl ows of foreign aid and 
po liti cal stability.1 This is underscored by recent access to external 
commercial debt markets. In 2013, Mozambique made its debut $850 
million U.S. dollar- denominated commercial bond issue with a coupon 
of 8.5  percent.2
Below the surface of strong aggregate economic per for mance lie a 
number of ongoing concerns. Principal among  these is evidence suggest-
ing that the pace of poverty reduction may have weakened. Data collected 
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from  house hold bud get surveys suggest that, while poverty reduced signi-
fi cantly from 1996–2003,  there is no clear evidence of signifi cant reduc-
tions at a national level from 2003–09.3 Although this partly refl ects 
temporary shocks, it is the absence of a convincing pro cess of structural 
transformation of the economy that is more worrisome from a longer- term 
development perspective. Indeed, the majority of Mozambique’s (grow-
ing) workforce remains reliant on low- productivity agricultural activities, 
and the agricultural sector has shown few signs of transformation that 
might provide a basis for  future growth and upgrading.
Positive or growth- enhancing structural transformation is character-
ized by a shift of workers out of lower productivity activities and into 
higher productivity and less vulnerable employment. Existing experi-
ence from a range of  middle and high income countries indicate that 
such transformation often involves comparatively rapid growth of both 
employment and  labor productivity in modern, industrial enterprises. 
In so  doing, modern fi rms operate as an engine of growth for the entire 
economy. However, structural transformation of this sort is also typi-
cally accompanied by productivity growth in the agricultural sector; for 
example, as surplus or marginal  labor is released. Concerns regarding 
the absence of structural transformation are not unique to Mozam-
bique and this theme has been raised in many other countries in Sub- 
Sahara Africa (SSA).4
Existing  labor market decomposition analyses for SSA nations are 
useful in describing general trends both at regional and country- levels.5 
However, in taking a cross- country perspective, they typically are unable 
to take advantage of the latest data and neglect impor tant details in indi-
vidual countries, such as divergent sectoral changes. As a result, careful 
analy sis of developments within individual countries over time remains 
vital, and  doing so with a focus on Mozambique constitutes the objec-
tive of the pres ent study. Specifi cally, this chapter has three main aims. 
 These are to: 1) provide an overview of recent economic developments 
in Mozambique at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels; 
2) apply  labor market decomposition tools to investigate the apparent 
disconnect between macroeconomic trends (GDP growth) and changes 
in  house hold well-being (poverty reduction); and 3) consider relevant pol-
icy priorities to support a more pro- poor pattern of  future growth.
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The chapter contains three main sections. First, we elaborate on 
recent economic trends in Mozambique, provide a brief historical back-
ground, and compare trends across a range of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic indicators. As already hinted, such analy sis raises con-
cerns regarding the structure of growth and the extent to which growth 
is effectively promoting the well- being of the poorest. The second main 
section contains the analytical core of the chapter. It begins by describ-
ing the data and empirical methods used to decompose changes in Mo-
zambique’s  labor market. Due to the limitations of regular offi cial data 
on employment, aggregate GDP data must be combined with irregular 
information on employment patterns taken from  house hold surveys. 
With re spect to the latter, we take advantage of preliminary data from a 
recent  house hold survey. Thus, the derived data encompasses the period 
1996–2014, which provides an extensive view of recent  labor market 
changes to the pres ent.
The  labor market decomposition is elaborated next, focusing on the 
distinction between within- sector productivity growth and productivity 
growth driven by structural change in the  labor market. The results 
clearly show that  labor reallocation effects have played a relatively small 
role in Mozambique’s post- confl ict productivity growth. Moreover,  there 
is  little evidence that sectors with relatively faster productivity growth 
are adding jobs at a faster rate than other sectors. In contrast, recent ag-
gregate growth appears to have been driven by capital- intensive growth 
in the mining sector and by comparatively rapid growth of employment 
in ser vices but, typically, in activities that are lower productivity than the 
sector average. Following this examination, the third main section looks 
ahead. We focus fi rst on a set of inevitable demographic issues.  These 
suggest that the supply of new entrants to the  labor market is of a mas-
sive scale in the coming years, which underlines the need to boost the 
demand side of the  labor market. We subsequently discuss the policy 
implications of the trends inherent in our  labor market decomposition, 
taking into account, as well, our demographic projections. The fi nal 
section provides our conclusions.
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BACKGROUND
Mozambique lies in southeastern Africa, and borders South Africa in 
the south and Tanzania to the north. Similar to other countries in the 
region, Mozambique experienced a long period of colonial rule. Portu-
guese interests in the country began in the sixteenth  century and  were 
maintained over the course of the next two centuries through military 
posts, settlements, and trading companies. Expansion of Portuguese 
interests began in earnest in the nineteenth  century, leading to the 
emergence of a settler economy based primarily on the production of 
cash crops (for example, cotton and tea). In addition, Mozambique’s 
major ports became impor tant hubs for trade into other southern Afri-
can nations, especially South Africa and Zimbabwe. Following the 
Second World War, and as global demand increased, the Mozambican 
economy grew rapidly and became a destination for foreign direct in-
vestment and large infl ows of Portuguese mi grants.
The 1960s saw the emergence of Mozambique’s national in de-
pen dence movement. Based in newly in de pen dent Tanzania, the 
Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, 
FRELIMO) began launching guerilla attacks into the north of Mo-
zambique. With support from the local populace and facing a relatively 
weak Portuguese military presence, FRELIMO was able to gain effec-
tive control of substantial territory. Although FRELIMO had a rela-
tively small number of active troops, their knowledge of the terrain and 
extensive use of land mines  were effective in resisting signifi cant Portu-
guese  counter- insurgencies. According to one historian, white settlers in 
Mozambique began to feel “panic, demoralization, abandonment, and a 
sense of futility” as the confl ict continued.6 Facing costly and unsuccess-
ful overseas confl icts, as well as increasing international isolation, the 
Portuguese government in Lisbon was overthrown in 1974. This quickly 
led to a retreat from its African colonies, and Mozambique achieved in-
de pen dence in 1975.
The new Mozambican government faced huge challenges in the 
early in de pen dence period. Perhaps most critically, mutual mistrust be-
tween the white settlers and the (elite) Mozambican population led to a 
huge exodus of  those with Portuguese heritage (passports) and destruction 
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of their business capital. As virtually all managerial and skilled positions 
throughout the economy had been dominated by  these settlers, skills 
shortages  were immediate and acute. Adding to this, the neighboring 
“white economies” of Rhodesia and South Africa viewed Mozambique’s 
in de pen dence as an existential threat. Consequently, they sought to 
destabilize their neighbor by funding and training a re sis tance move-
ment, RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana). Global eco-
nomic instability further undermined initial economic pro gress and, 
with economic support from the Soviet Union to FRELIMO, the con-
fl ict widened during the 1980s.
Without exaggeration, the 1980s  were miserable for most Mozambi-
cans. No less than one million  people lost their lives, the economy 
shrank severely, many rural areas became highly insecure, and a large 
share of the population was internally displaced. Food shortages af-
fected thousands such that, by the early 1990s, Mozambique had one of 
the lowest levels of per capita caloric availability in the world. Data from 
the FAO’s food balance series shows a clear trend of decline in food 
availability per capita over the period 1975–92, even from an initially 
low base. A sharp upward break in the series from 1992 marked the end 
of hostilities, refl ecting exhaustion on both sides and the end of signifi -
cant external support to RENAMO, which coincided with the move to 
democracy in South Africa.7 The transition to peace was quick and 
largely successful. Supported by a large UN presence, active troops  were 
demilitarized and some integrated into a single national army.
Macroeconomic Trends
The fi rst multi- party elections  were held in 1994, giving victory to Fre-
limo, which has retained a parliamentary majority in all subsequent 
general elections, the most recent one held in 2014.8 Postwar economic 
restructuring and rebuilding began  under the auspices of signifi cant 
international donor support, including extensive World Bank and IMF 
programs, initiated in the 1980s.9 Figure 5-1 provides an indication of 
Mozambique’s economic turn- around over the past two de cades. As 
previously described, ongoing confl ict had wrecked the economy and 
Mozambique was among the poorest countries in the world as it 
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 embarked on the task of reconstruction. Using the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, fi gure 5-1 reports real GDP per capita (in 
2005 U.S. dollars) and associated per capita growth rates from 1980 (the 
earliest observation) to 2013. This shows that average mean incomes 
doubled over the period, driven by sustained and stable real rates of 
growth equal to about 4.5  percent per person per year for 1993–2013 (or 
over 7  percent on aggregate).
Mozambique’s impressive rate of economic growth is substantiated 
by a range of other aggregate indicators.10 Robust positive trends are 
found with re spect to control of infl ation, reducing the current account 
defi cit, and expanding government spending.  These are not small 
achievements and compare highly favorably with trends in the rest of 
Sub- Saharan Africa. Indeed, most commentators agree that Mozam-
bique’s macroeconomic management was competent and provided a 
critical foundation to growth per for mance  until recently.11 Addition-
ally, while foreign aid fl ows have been and continue to be signifi cant, at 
more than 10   percent of GDP, Mozambique’s aid dependence has 
FIGURE 5-1.  Trends in Real GDP per Capita
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fallen signifi cantly over recent years. This is due to a combination of 
the mechanical impact of sustained GDP growth (rising more quickly 
than the value of aid), domestic revenue growth, and infl ows of alter-
native sources of external fi nance, such as foreign direct investment 
and international capital investment. As noted in the introduction, 
Mozambique’s debut international bond launch in 2013 marked its 
place as a frontier investment destination.
The post- confl ict period can be roughly divided into two main 
phases. The fi rst, lasting from 1992  until the mid-2000s, was character-
ized by a focus on stabilization, reconstruction, and consolidation of a 
market- oriented economy. Government intervention in the economy 
was scaled- back through privatization of state enterprises and removal 
of price controls and other explicit distortions, in essence completing 
the work started in the 1980s. As early as 1997, the World Bank trium-
phantly noted that the proportion of GDP subject to price controls had 
been reduced from over 70  percent in 1986 to around 10  percent.12 Mo-
zambique’s privatization program was extensive and rapid, prompting 
a chorus of criticism and concerns regarding po liti cal interference.13 
Nonetheless, and despite the emergence of winners and losers from this 
pro cess, robust rates of aggregate economic growth  were sustained.
This period of consolidation was largely complete within about a 
de cade. Echoing trends across the region, by the mid-2000s the natu ral 
resources sector had become an explicit focus of development. In the 
absence of suffi cient domestic capital or expertise, the focus has been 
on attracting foreign investment to the sector. An early proj ect of this 
sort was exploration of an inshore natu ral gas fi eld. This was developed 
by the South African com pany SASOL, which also fi nanced an 
865- kilo meter- long pipeline (completed in 2004) to take the gas for pro-
cessing to South Africa. Large deposits of thermal and coking coal, 
abandoned  after in de pen dence, became the next priority and prompted 
large investments by Vale (Brazil) and Riversdale (Australia), among 
 others. More broadly, given attractive global commodity prices and po-
liti cal and economic stability in the country, Mozambique witnessed 
an explosion of interest in its minerals sector. Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) increased from a moderate level in the 1990s and early 
2000s, growing to over 30  percent of GDP in the most recent period, 
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far outstripping aid infl ows. This refl ects investments in the coal sector, 
as well as exploration of offshore gas deposits.
It is worth noting that, since most resource proj ects remain in a start-
up or preliminary phase, infl ows of FDI have substantially supported 
acquisition of offi ces and equipment and on- site construction. As a re-
sult, the share of recent growth attributable to this resource boom is 
diffi cult to estimate and is likely to be refl ected in other sectors, such as 
ser vices and construction. According to offi cial fi gures, depicted in fi g-
ure 5-2, the relative contribution of aggregate economic sectors to GDP 
has remained broadly stable during the post- confl ict period. While 
mining has increased in relative terms over the past few years, this is from 
a very low base.  Today, as in 1996, the economy remains dominated by 
agriculture (27  percent) and private and public ser vices (51  percent). 
The growth in manufacturing seen from 1998–2004 is largely explained 
by the establishment of the Mozal aluminum smelter (phases one and 
two), operated by BHP Billiton  under highly favorable tax arrangements. 
FIGURE 5-2.  Trends in Sectoral Shares of Real GDP, 1996–2014



























































































































Over the period 2005–14, manufacturing grew more slowly than other 
sectors and, thus, declined as a share of GDP from its high of  18  percent 
in 2004.
Microeconomic Questions
Mozambique’s aggregate economic track rec ord since the early 1990s 
has been widely applauded. An outstanding question, however, is how 
and to what extent  these trends have been refl ected in improvements in 
well- being across the population.  Here, something of a puzzle emerges. 
On the one hand, since the mid-1990s,  there is good evidence of steady 
pro gress on a range of social indicators. Data from Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) support this view and are summarized in  table 5-1, 
panel (a). They show signifi cant reductions in infant/child mortality, as 
well as clear gains in access to education, particularly among  women 
and girls. Moreover, the  table suggests that the pace of improvement 
appears to have quickened; that is, annual proportional changes are 
larger over the period 2003–11 than for 1997–2003. This is likely to 
refl ect a number of  factors, including continued improvements in ser-
vice delivery (and access), as well as the cumulative effect of ongoing 
investments and spillovers through achievement of greater scale.
Positive trends in social indicators are also found in other survey 
data, as well as in administrative statistics on coverage of basic ser vices.14 
The same data sources also show broad increases in asset owner ship and 
access to transport.15 From this perspective,  there appears no immedi-
ate disconnect between the macro and micro trends. Deeper questions 
emerge, though, when we review the evidence on poverty reduction. 
This is summarized in  table 5-1 panel (b), using  house hold bud get survey 
data. The fi rst row reports the offi cial poverty estimates, which is the 
share of population considered poor according to their estimated level 
of consumption, calculated following a cost of basic needs approach. 
This shows a sharp reduction in poverty from 1997–2003, consistent with 
the narrative of post- war recovery, but no clear pro gress from 2003–09.
Admittedly, consumption poverty estimates are subject to both 
sample and non- sample mea sure ment error; therefore, they cannot be 
taken as exact. Multidimensional poverty metrics, which are based on 
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more directly observable  factors such as asset owner ship and housing 
quality, provide complementary insights.16  These indicate that the 
share of  house holds deprived in multiple dimensions has followed a 
slightly dif fer ent pattern— slow pro gress in the immediate post- war 
period and more rapid reductions since then. Combining  these insights, 
two main points emerge. First, the share of the population that is in 
some way deprived or poor remains large. According to the metrics in 
 table 5-1, in 2008–09, less than 20  percent of the population in 2008 
was found to be above both asset and consumption poverty thresholds. 
This underlines the need to keep in mind the severity of conditions 
Mozambique found itself in by the beginning of the 1990s. That is, 
what might appear to be a disconnect between welfare outcomes and 
aggregate growth is, in part, a refl ection of the low base from which 
 TABLE 5-1.  Trends in Selected Microeconomic Indicators, Mozambique
 Percent
Annual change
(a) DHS surveys Group 1997 2003 2011 1997–03 2003–11
No education Male 26.2 25.4 19.3 −0.1 −0.8
Female 47.4 44.4 32.8 −0.5 −1.5
Infant mortality Boys 153 127 75 −4.3 −6.5
Girls 142 120 67 −3.7 −6.6
 Under 5 mortality Boys 225 181 113 −7.3 −8.5
Girls 213 176 103 −6.2 −9.1
Total fertility rate Adults 5.2 5.5 5.9 0.1 0.1
Annual change
(b) Bud get surveys 1996–97 2002–03 2008–09 1997–03 2003–09
Consumption poor 69.4 54.1 54.7 −2.6 0.1
Asset poor 73.8 73.6 66.7 0.0 −1.2
Asset and 
consumption  poor
54.0 42.6 40.1 −1.9 −0.4
Non- poor 11.8 14.8 19.0 0.5 0.7
Source: Authors’ calculations using DHS and  house hold bud get surveys.
Notes: “No education” and bud get survey (poverty) fi gures all refer to population shares; mortality 
fi gures are per 1,000  children; fertility rate is expected number of births per adult  woman. Changes are 
calculated on a mean annual  basis.
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Mozambique has grown and the fact that pro cesses of accumulation 
are necessarily cumulative and take time.
Even so, and second, what ever metric we use, the elasticity of im-
provements in welfare to aggregate economic growth appears relatively 
low. In the second period (2003–09), the share of  house holds not in 
so- called asset poverty fell by around 1.2  percent per annum in absolute 
terms, or 9  percent over the period. This compares to average real GDP 
growth per capita of over 4  percent per year, or a cumulative gain of 
30   percent over the six years. The implication is that the pattern of 
growth has not so far favored the poorest segments of society. Moreover, 
in- depth analy sis of the  house hold surveys suggests this concern applies 
particularly to rural areas that are more distant from the capital city, 
Maputo, which is located in the far south.
 These points raise concerns regarding the structure or nature of 
growth in Mozambique, especially over recent years. To what extent 
are  these concerns justifi ed? On the one hand, the existing set of three 
bud get surveys, which are now dated, represents a limited basis to make 
such claims. Thus, it would clearly overstep the evidence base to claim 
that Mozambique has taken a fundamentally wrong turn in its devel-
opment path. The need for caution gains force from the argument that 
the weak consumption poverty per for mance in the period 2003–09 
was signifi cantly driven by a combination of climatic and external price 
(terms of trade) shocks in 2007–08.17 Since consumption is a relatively 
short- term concept and safety nets, including savings, are limited among 
the poor and vulnerable, it is not surprising that the scope for consump-
tion smoothing is limited. Thus, we observe sharp (regional) variations 
in consumption over time. At the same time,  these shocks have not 
persisted. So, in light of continued aggregate growth, it is reasonable to 
expect that new  house hold survey data (in the fi eld 2014–15)  will reveal 
gains in poverty reduction since 2009.
Despite  these reservations, complacency regarding the extent to 
which aggregate growth is mapping into welfare gains for Mozam-
bique’s poorest is not warranted. An insight into recent developments 
comes from the Afrobarometer surveys of adults, conducted in Mozam-
bique in 2002, 2008, and 2012.18  These surveys have collected informa-
tion (among other  things) on subjective perceptions of well- being, the 
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types of deprivations experienced by  house holds, and access to employ-
ment. Summary statistics from  these surveys are reported in  table 5-2. 
 These report the share of  house holds, split by region and location, 
responding in specifi c ways to selected questions. Panels (a) and (b) refer 
to perceptions of own living conditions; panels (c) and (d) refer to ac-
cess to some form of cash income. While the patterns are somewhat 
complex,  there is no clear evidence of rapid or distinct improvements 
in  either perceived living conditions or access to cash incomes over 
time. In rural areas, perceived conditions appear systematically lower 
 TABLE 5-2.  Insights from Afrobarometer Surveys, by Region, Mozambique
 Percent
Urban Rural
2002 2008 2012 2002 2008 2012
(a) Fairly or very good living conditions now
South 23.2 27.2 18.8 26.8 28.4 26.2
Center 40.1 18.8 24.7 45.4 24.5 25.8
North 35.1 23.2 29.9 51.7 35.3 24.7
All 31.6 23.6 23.7 44.3 28.9 25.5
(b) Better or much better living conditions now versus 12 months ago
South 32.3 40.1 47.0 15.3 43.2 36.7
Center 38.3 39.9 28.8 47.0 42.3 30.9
North 34.4 47.8 46.0 48.2 41.8 31.8
All 34.8 42.1 41.4 42.0 42.3 32.2
(c) Often or always without a cash income
South 25.5 28.0 33.3 66.7 53.0 55.4
Center 23.6 27.4 36.8 53.4 35.7 48.7
North 46.7 32.9 36.9 37.2 50.1 60.4
All 30.3 29.1 35.4 49.5 43.5 54.1
(d) Has a job that pays a cash income
South 57.1 43.1 53.0 42.4 26.2 36.3
Center 51.8 36.7 51.0 35.1 42.1 38.7
North 30.1 21.9 39.2 28.5 18.7 26.7
All 48.9 34.8 48.2 34.2 31.3 33.8
Source: Authors’ calculations using Afrobarometer surveys, Mozambique.
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in 2012 versus earlier periods. Also, the share of the adult population with 
access to employment that provides a cash income has displayed no major 
changes over time (2002–12) in  either rural or urban areas on aggregate. 
Perhaps the only systematic tendency is greater convergence between re-
gions in both perceptions and experiences. Nonetheless, it is notable that 
considerably less than half of the adult population has access to a cash in-
come; and many  house holds regularly strug gle to fi nd any cash.
The Afrobarometer fi ndings rely on subjective perceptions and are 
based on relatively small samples; for example, the proportions in 
 table 5-2 are based on between 104 and 760 observations. Nonetheless, 
they point to substantial stability in the broad structure of economic 
activities pursued by  house holds across the economy. Despite changes 
at the intensive margin,  there is  little to suggest  there have been signifi -
cant transformations in how workers make a living; for example, the 
same series of  house hold bud get surveys, as well as a one- off  labor force 
survey, show minimal changes to the aggregate structure of employ-
ment over the period 1997–2009 in Mozambique.19 In par tic u lar, the 
vast majority of workers do not earn a stable wage income, even in urban 
areas.  There are also large and per sis tent differences in well- being be-
tween  house holds whose income derives from dif fer ent aggregate eco-
nomic sectors, with the largest gap being between formal sector urban 
wage earners, who are predominantly found in ser vice industries, and 
the large share of  house holds who are uniquely reliant on smallholder 
agriculture. This is indicative of large productivity differentials between 
sectors. Additionally, contrary to what one would expect if a dynamic 
pro cess of structural transformation  were under way,  there is no sign of 
inter- sectoral productivity convergence.20 In line with the recent Af-
robarometer data,  these concerns motivate a deeper investigation of re-
cent  labor market trends. This issue is taken up below.
 LABOR MARKET ANALY SIS
The aim of this section is to analyze  labor market trends in Mozam-
bique over the post- confl ict period. Before  doing so, a remark on data 
sources is necessary. As in other low- income countries, the majority of 
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work effort occurs in the informal sector in both rural and urban areas. 
This sector is not monitored on a regular basis, meaning that offi cial 
 labor force statistics derived from administrative data, such as business 
or taxation rec ords, do not provide a complete picture of trends in the 
 labor market. Rather, irregular micro- data surveys must be used for this 
purpose. As alluded already, three  house hold bud get surveys have been 
completed in Mozambique to date.  These are the “Inquéritos aos 
Agregados Familiares” (IAFs) of 1996–97 and 2002–03; and the “In-
quérito ao Orçamento Familiar” (IOF) undertaken in 2008–09.  These 
surveys provide relatively detailed information about the  labor market 
activities of each adult member of the  house hold (for example, employ-
ment status, sector of activity, type of work performed). More recently, 
a new IOF went to the fi eld and basic, preliminary data is available 
from this for the fi rst quarter.21
Given the value of undertaking an up- to- date analy sis of  labor mar-
ket trends, we combine available employment data from the series of 
four  house hold surveys and match it to the offi cial aggregate sectoral 
GDP data, which is also available through 2014. This is the fi rst at-
tempt to use this latest data source in this way. Due to the preliminary 
nature of the 2014 IOF data, however, it is only pos si ble to classify indi-
vidual workers into one of four aggregate sectors.22  These are: 1) agri-
culture, which includes forestry and fi sheries; 2) extractive industries 
(indústria de extração mineira), which also includes construction and 
utilities; 3) manufacturing (indústria transformadora); and 4) ser vices, 
combining public administration, education, health, and a range of pri-
vate commercial and fi nancial activities. The rationale for combining 
utilities and construction with the extractive industries segment is that, 
in general, all  these activities are intensive in capital. Moreover, and as 
discussed above, many of the new resource extraction proj ects are cur-
rently in a construction phase.
Matching the macro- and micro- data sources by aggregate sector 
provides a sector- specifi c time series on employment and output (value 
added). While the employment data is not observed annually, we make 
a  simple linear interpolation between the survey years to fi ll the series. 
To deepen the analy sis, it would have been useful to split the aggre-
gate sectors into contributions from formal and informal activities. 
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However, this is problematic from the output side since the survey data 
only captures consumption at the  house hold level, not income. Aside 
from a bespoke survey of the informal sector in 2005, as well as a survey 
of informal manufacturing fi rms in 2011, very  little detail is available 
on informal sector enterprises in Mozambique (urban or rural).23 This 
refl ects a more general prob lem of weak enterprise data, which suggests 
that the sectoral classifi cation of GDP is likely to be rather crude. In 
turn, this justifi es retaining a focus on very aggregate sectors.
Methods
To analyze the employment and output series, we start by describing 
general trends.  Here the focus is on average  labor productivity, given 
simply by the ratio of output to employment:
Pit = Yit/Lit
where i indexes sectors; t is time; Y is value added at constant prices; 
and L is the number of individuals identifying i as their primary sector 
of economic activity. Absolute values of P are not of par tic u lar interest. 
Rather, we report changes over time and compare  labor productivity in 
each sector to the economy- wide average, denoted 0t. This provides an 
initial view into the structure of recent growth, and is given by the ratio 
of output to employment  shares:
Pit
Pt
= (Yit /Lit )
Yt /Lt( ) =
(Yit /Yt )
(Lit /Lt )
Other descriptive statistics, such as a comparison of changes in 
 labor shares to the level of  labor productivity, have been used elsewhere 
and provide complementary insights.24 To go further, however, a more 
formal decomposition is warranted. This aims to identify the principal 
 drivers of changes in aggregate  labor productivity over time.  These 
changes arise from dif fer ent sources: differential trends in employment 
growth (within and between sectors), as well as output gains occurring 
through acquisition of capital (technology). Put differently, it is instruc-
tive to learn  whether sectors with rapid productivity growth are also 
sectors that are signifi cantly attracting new workers. Identifying the 
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 drivers of changes in aggregate  labor productivity indicates the extent 
to which aggregate GDP growth is associated with transformation in the 
under lying structure of the economy.
Following other studies, changes in aggregate  labor productivity can 
be decomposed into three main components: within- sector productivity 
changes (the intra- effect); the contribution due to the reallocation of 
 labor across sectors, holding productivity fi xed (the Denison effect); 
and a dynamic structural reallocation effect given by the interaction be-
tween productivity growth and relative  labor growth (the Baumol effect).25 
The second effect is positive when workers are moving from lower to 
higher productivity sectors, yielding a static gain. The third term is posi-
tive when  those sectors experiencing employment growth are also expe-
riencing positive productivity gains. Not only is the overall magnitude of 
 these three effects of interest, we are also concerned to understand how 
dif fer ent sectors contribute to each component. Thus, with four sectors 
and three effects (per period),  there are twelve quantities of interest.
The three components can be calculated relatively easily from the 
output and employment time series. To do so, note that aggregate  labor 






∑ = Pitω itLi∈I∑i∈I∑
Thus, the change in aggregate  labor productivity between two peri-
ods (t and t − 1) can be separated into the contributions from pure 
changes in productivity in each sector and changes in  labor shares. 
That is, denoting the absolute productivity change in a given sector as: 
Pit − Pit − 1 = ΔPit, we  have:
ΔPt = (Pitω itL − Pit−1ω it−1L )i∈I∑
= (ΔPitω it−1L + PitΔω itL)i∈I∑
The above expression for the absolute change in  labour productivity 
is reminiscent of the Oaxaca– Blinder decomposition technique. The 
fi rst term on the RHS captures changes in  labor productivity holding 
 labor shares constant, which is the intra- effect. The second term cap-
tures changes in employment shares holding  labor productivity fi xed, 
which refers to  labor reallocation effects.
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This decomposition can be re- expressed as relative contributions to 
productivity growth. Dividing the previous expression by aggregate pro-



















= (gitPω it−1P ω it−1L + Δω itL[1+ gitP]ω it−1P )i∈I∑
= ω it−1P (gitPω it−1L + Δω itL[1+ gitP])i∈I∑
= (gitPω it−1Y + Δω itLω it−1P + Δω itLgitPω it−1P )i∈I∑
As required, the three terms on the RHS of the above productivity 
growth decomposition respectively denote the relative contributions to 
aggregate productivity growth of: within- sector productivity growth, 
static  labor reallocation, and dynamic  labor reallocation.
Results
Previously, we outlined a range of analytical tools that can be used to 
investigate how the structure of output and employment have coevolved 
over time. Applying  these to the Mozambican series, fi gure 5-3 illus-
trates trends in sectoral employment shares. Combining  these with sec-
toral shares of real output (fi gure 5-2), fi gure 5-4 indicates trends in the 
relative productivity of each sector versus economy- wide  labor produc-
tivity (ω itP ). Stated in log terms, bars less than zero indicate sectors with 
below- average productivity. Also, a unit change on the y- axis is consistent 
with an approximate doubling of  labor productivity relative to the  mean.
The fi gures are informative. Consistent with earlier data, we fi nd 
that the majority of Mozambicans continue to be employed in (small-
holder) agriculture. As shown in fi gure  5-3, this sector accounts for 
more than two in  every three workers. Nonetheless, the agricultural 
 labor share appears to have fallen rapidly between the two most recent 
surveys, from 79   percent of workers in 2009 to 72   percent in 2014. 
While part of this difference may simply refl ect the preliminary nature 
FIGURE 5-3.  Trends in Sectoral Shares of Employment, 1996–2014




















































































































FIGURE 5-4.  Sector- Specifi c and Aggregate  Labor Productivity





















































































































of the 2014 data, it is consistent with indications from agricultural sur-
vey data of a trend shift out of agriculture in certain areas, especially 
the south. This decline has been offset by a corresponding increase in 
the  labor share of the ser vices sector. The other aggregate sectors, min-
ing and manufacturing, account for less than one in  every twenty workers 
and show no material changes in their overall shares of  employment.
Figure 5-2 indicates that, aside from a small increase in the output 
share accounted for by the mining sector and a small decline in the 
contribution from manufacturing over the most recent period, output 
shares have remained broadly constant over time. In turn, fi gure 5-4 
indicates that productivity differences between sectors have diverged, 
particularly in the latest period (2009–14). This has been driven by two 
trends: a signifi cant increase in  labor productivity in the mining sector 
and a relative decline in  labor productivity in both ser vices and manu-
facturing. At the same time, agricultural  labor productivity has remained 
low and stable (in relative terms) at around half of the economy- wide 
level of productivity. This does not mean that  labor productivity in ag-
riculture has been stagnant. Rather, it has roughly tracked aggregate 
productivity growth. Specifi cally, between 2009 and 2014, the latter grew 
by around 25  percent, or an average of around 4  percent per annum. For 
the same period, we estimate agricultural productivity grew by around 
3.5  percent per annum. However,  labor productivity in mining grew by 
an average of over 35  percent per annum during this period, increasing 
about  fi vefold.
Figure  5-5 plots the relative level of  labor productivity against 
changes in  labor shares for the four sectors for two periods: 1997–2005 
and 2006–14. Of par tic u lar interest are sectors located in the positive 
quadrant,  those that show relatively high  labor productivity and in-
creases in their share of employment. In transition and developing 
economies we typically see large differences in  labor productivity be-
tween sectors.27 However, for  those economies undergoing positive and 
dynamic structural transformation, we often see that it is higher produc-
tivity sectors that are able to attract more  labor. The Mozambican data 
suggests the economy is in transition.  Labor productivity in agriculture 
is lower than productivity in any other sector by a  factor of at least two. 
Consequently, movement of workers out of agriculture and into other 
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sectors (or relatively faster employment growth in the latter) is consis-
tent with a trend increase in economy- wide  labor productivity. Even so, 
the fi gure gives rise to concerns. First, the only sector in the positive 
quadrant is the ser vices sector. Moreover,  labor productivity is falling in 
this sector, which suggests that new workers in this sector tend to oper-
ate on an informal basis and undertake more precarious activities rela-
tive to existing workers. Additionally, sectors experiencing the highest 
 labor productivity growth, namely mining, are not creating new em-
ployment posts in line with the pace of new entrants to the economy. 
Not only is this a small sector in employment terms; it is getting smaller 
as the working population  expands.
The previous discussion hints at results from the decomposition 
analy sis. This is summarized in  table 5-3, which reports mean absolute 
and relative contributions to average annual aggregate productivity 
growth by component (intra- sector productivity effects [intra], static 
FIGURE 5-5.  Relative  Labor Productivity vs. Changes in  Labor Shares, 
by Sector, 1997–2005 and 2006–14
Source: Authors’ calculations using Mozambican offi cial statistics.
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reallocation effects [SRE], and dynamic reallocation effects [DRE]), by 
sector and by period (1997–2002, 2003–08, 2009–14). For the absolute 
estimates, in each period the sum of the component- sector cells gives 
that period’s total aggregate productivity growth, or 100  percent in the 
case of the relative contributions. For instance, in the latest period ag-
gregate productivity growth averaged 4.2   percent per year, composed 
primarily of the intra effect (81  percent).  Labor reallocation (structural 
change) effects in the same period, given by the sum of SRE and DRE, 
contributed less than 20  percent of overall productivity growth.
Four key fi ndings emerge. First, as already indicated,  labor realloca-
tion effects have played a relatively small role in Mozambique’s post- 
confl ict productivity growth. Compared to  later periods, reallocation 
made the largest relative contribution in the immediate reconstruction 
period (1997–2002), at around 32   percent. This underlines the thesis 
that the under lying  drivers of Mozambique’s growth have shifted over 
time. Second, the same point is supported by evidence that the compo-
sition of  these  labor reallocation effects have altered. In par tic u lar, the 
dynamic component has turned negative, which refl ects the fi nding 
that sectors with the fastest rates of growth in employment are also sec-
tors with falling relative productivity, while  those with the slowest rates 
of employment growth show increasing relative productivity. In the 
most recent period, this negative dynamic effect reduced the contribu-
tion of structural change to aggregate productivity growth by around 
20  percent. It is impor tant to keep in mind, however, that the static 
reallocation effect in the latest period (absent the negative dynamic ef-
fect) was reasonably large and positive. This means that sectors are add-
ing jobs at quite dif fer ent paces ( either through new entrants or through 
job changes) relative to 2003–08; even so, the marginal worker added 
in the ser vices sector is not as productive as existing workers.
Third, a related issue is that while the intra effect remains the pre-
dominant overall contributor to aggregate productivity growth com-
pared to structural change, within- sector productivity growth— which 
also captures workers moving within the same sector from lower to 
higher productivity activities (for example, from smallholder to commer-
cial farming)—is highly uneven. Of most concern is that in all sectors 
excluding mining, the sector- specifi c intra effects are smaller in magni-
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tude in the latest period versus the two earlier periods. Put differently, 
absent the mining sector, inherent within- sector productivity growth 
appears to be weakening. Indeed, this growth has turned negative in 
ser vices and manufacturing, meaning that workers are less productive 
in  these sectors, on average, than before. This raises profound questions 
regarding the sustainability of Mozambique’s current rapid rates of ag-
gregate economic growth, particularly given current slack in global 
commodity prices. Additionally, such trends corroborate earlier dis-
quiet regarding the extent to which growth is translating into wide-
spread improvements in well- being.
Fourth, the analy sis suggests that aggregate productivity growth has 
become increasingly dependent on dynamics in the ser vices sector. 
This is indicated by the “total” columns of  table 5-3.  These report the 
sum of the component effects for each sector and show that ser vices 
accounted for two thirds of aggregate productivity growth in 2003–08, 
compared to 51 and 39  percent in the earlier two periods. The corollary 
of this insight is that the contribution of other sectors, including both 
agriculture and manufacturing, have declined over time. Indeed, the 
strong contribution of manufacturing witnessed in the fi rst period was 
almost entirely dependent on the establishment of a single large fi rm 
(Mozal), attracted by a highly preferential taxation structure. Also, de-
spite providing the majority of the population with a livelihood, agri-
culture contributed just 25  percent to aggregate productivity growth in 
2003–08. Again, this endorses concerns regarding the extent to which 
growth in Mozambique is pro- poor.
LOOKING AHEAD
We have just analyzed past developments in the  labor market to shed 
light on Mozambique’s recent growth experience. The results highlighted 
impor tant changes in the structure of growth and raised concerns re-
garding both the sustainability and the poverty- reducing capacity of the 
current growth mode. The latter appears to be dominated by two main 
currents: fi rst, rapid productivity growth in the mining sector, intensive 
in capital and contributing relatively few new jobs; and second, expansion 
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of the ser vices sector, largely in lower productivity activities. Given that 
the vast majority of the workforce is engaged in low- productivity infor-
mal activities (for example, smallholder agriculture), a guiding assump-
tion of this section is that the qualitative nature of growth  will need to 
change to achieve rapid improvements in well- being across the popula-
tion. Moreover, such changes are likely to be necessary to sustain high 
rates of growth per se.
Challenges
 Future challenges need to be considered in light of demographic trends. 
Fertility rates remain high in Mozambique. This means it is inevitable 
that the working- age population  will expand rapidly over the next gen-
eration. The UN’s baseline projections for the working- age population 
(ages 15–64), for the period 2010–50, predict that the total number of 
potential workers  will rise from around 15 million in 2015 to 36 million 
in 2050. This represents a growth rate of about 3.6  percent per annum, 
meaning that, by 2025, more than 500,000 new workers  will enter the 
 labor market each year. Given the pres ent structure of growth, this rep-
resents a signifi cant challenge and raises the specter of confl icts over 
productive resources (for example, land) and even social unrest if levels 
of well- being do not improve.
At the same time,  there is a potential demographic dividend. This 
comes from a relative reduction in the share of dependents (nonwork-
ers) in the population. The current de pen dency ratio is over 45  percent, 
meaning  there is approximately one dependent for  every potential 
worker. According to the projections, this ratio is expected to decline to 
around 35  percent by 2050, thereby reducing the effective burden on 
workers and raising possibilities for greater productive investments in 
the economy. Furthermore, the quality of the working population is set 
to change as access to schooling continues to increase. To model this 
shift, we use secondary data that estimates the average years of school-
ing of fi fteen- to nineteen- year- olds in multiple countries since the 
1950s at fi ve- year intervals.28 Using this data, we estimate the expected 
rate of growth in years of schooling conditional on its current level. 
This is necessary since years of schooling is bounded, meaning that as 
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one approaches a theoretical maximum of (around) fi fteen years, 
growth rates must decline. We undertake  these estimates at the 25th, 
50th, and 75th percentiles of the distribution of cross- country  human 
capital growth rates.29  These imply dif fer ent paths for how the mean 
years of schooling of any given country  will evolve, conditional on the 
starting level. The path at the 75th percentile would be consistent with 
the top 25  percent of all historically observed conditional growth rates 
(regardless of country or period).
We apply  these estimates to the demographic projections for Mozam-
bique. Specifi cally, we allow the mean years of schooling of the 15–19 
age cohort, which are taken as (potential) new  labor market entrants, 
to evolve according to  either the 25th, 50th, or 75th percentile estimated 
growth paths. The latter is taken as a reasonable upper bound on what 
Mozambique might achieve, and the fi rst a lower bound.30 We addition-
ally assume that years of schooling remains fi xed  after the age of 
twenty. As a consequence, growth in the overall mean years of schooling, 
encompassing all members of the working- age population, is uniquely 
generated by new  labor market entrants. Thus, the overall mean years of 
schooling  will change only gradually over time. Starting values for 2010 
are taken directly from observed mean years of schooling for each age 
group of fi ve years (as per the projections) from the 2008–09  survey.
 Table 5-4 reports aggregate results of our projections using the me-
dian (50th percentile) growth path. Figures 5-6 and 5-7 plot the same 
estimates, including the confi dence interval (that is, 25th lower and 75th 
upper bounds), plus a disaggregation by gender. A fi rst point to note is 
that years of schooling are presently low; only around one in four workers 
has completed primary education (seven or more years of schooling). 
This refl ects the predominantly rural nature of the work force and his-
torical legacies. At the median of the observed historical conditional 
cross- country  human capital growth rate distribution, average years of 
schooling should double to 6.6 years by 2050. In turn, this implies that 
over 40  percent of the working- age population should have attained a 
basic level;  under the upper bound scenario this share reaches around 
50  percent by 2050. Assuming increased literacy and numeracy implies 
a greater capacity to adopt (and effectively use) modern technologies, 
this raises hope for greater innovations and transformations across sectors. 
FIGURE 5-6. Trends in Working Population and  Labor Force Quality
Source: Authors’ calculations using UN baseline demographic projections and  human capital growth 
estimates based on data from Barro and Lee (2013).
Note: Shaded regions represent confi dence intervals defi ned as the 25th and 75th percentile 
conditional growth paths; solid lines are the projections at the median growth path (see text); all 
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 TABLE 5-4.  Decomposition of Contributions to Aggregate Productivity Growth, 
by Period, Mozambique
Year
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2010 Male 6.0 1.8 4.2 4.9 29.8
Female 6.6 1.2 5.5 2.9 17.5
2030a Male 11.2 4.1 7.1 6.1 36.5
Female 11.7 3.3 8.4 4.7 28.5
2050a Male 17.7 7.6 10.1 7.1 42.9
Female 18.1 6.8 11.3 6.2 37.5
2010 All 12.6 3.0 9.7 3.9 23.4
2030a All 22.9 7.4 15.4 5.4 32.4
2050a All 35.8 14.4 21.4 6.6 40.1
Source: Authors’ calculations using UN baseline demographic projections and  human capital 
growth estimates based on data from Barro and Lee (2013).
a. Projected numbers.  Human capital forecasts are projections at the median growth  path.
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Moreover,  these developments portend the likely emergence of thicker 
and more qualifi ed markets for  labor (in both rural and urban areas), 
which may stimulate larger- scale investments. Even so, the fl ipside is 
that many workers  will remain poorly educated. Transformation in the 
quality of the  labor force  will be slow and possibly  uneven.
Policy Priorities
Looking forward, a key question is what kinds of government policies 
are most likely to alter the shape or pattern of growth  toward a confi gu-
ration that is more pro- poor.  Here an impor tant distinction is between 
macro- structural policies and microeconomic sectoral policies. The for-
mer can be best described as policies that affect economic incentives 
and be hav ior across large swathes of the population ( people, fi rms, and 
sectors), without necessarily targeting specifi c markets or subgroups.31 
Examples include public investments in infrastructure, general  legal or 
FIGURE 5-7.  Trends in Mean Years of Schooling of Working- Age Population
Source: Authors’ calculations using UN baseline demographic projections and  human capital growth 
estimates based on data from Barro and Lee (2013).
Note: Shaded regions represent confi dence intervals defi ned as the 25th and 75th percentile 


















Years of schooling / worker (by gender)
172 Jones and Tarp
tax reforms, as well as monetary and exchange rate policies. Micro-
economic sectoral policies refer to more specifi c, targeted interventions 
that often seek to address market failures or effi ciency losses in specifi c 
sectors. Examples include active  labor market policies, such as employ-
ment subsidies, or investments in  labor market information systems.
Without ruling out the role of microeconomic policies,  there are 
good reasons to suggest that efforts should focus on deploying macro- 
structural policies to enhance the quality of growth. A main reason is 
simply the massive scale of the jobs challenge. The demographic pro-
jections already noted mean that Mozambique needs to run just to 
keep up. The number of projected new  labor market entrants per year 
is larger than the absolute number of workers currently found in the 
formal sector (that is, who receive a regular wage). Consequently, it is 
diffi cult to see how targeted microeconomic policies, which naturally 
tend to be directed  toward legally incorporated entities and/or the vis i-
ble (formal) sector, can have an adequate footprint even if undertaken on 
a large- scale.
A second reason to focus on macro- structural policies is that state 
capacity is weak. Not only are  there few examples of unambiguously 
effective microeconomic development interventions in pres ent- day 
Mozambique; the government also plays a minimal role in most sectors, 
except as a major purchaser of goods and ser vices. Thus, in the short- to 
medium- term, any kind of step change in the role and effectiveness of 
sector- specifi c microeconomic interventions is not realistic.
What can be done to raise the quality of growth? In keeping 
with previous studies, we recommend that very considerably increased 
 priority must be given to raising productivity in the agricultural sec-
tor.32 Since the majority of  house holds are reliant on agriculture and 
this sector shows signifi cantly lower levels of  labor productivity rela-
tive to other sectors, pro gress must be made in transforming agricul-
ture to achieve signifi cant poverty reduction. In this view, any broad- 
based interventions in agriculture are macro- structural in nature since 
they cut across the rural sector and feed into urban dynamics, for ex-
ample, through living costs. Also, raising rural incomes  will be impor-
tant to moderate migration out of agriculture into urban informal 
activities.
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We believe two main rural policy initiatives merit attention. The 
fi rst is to draw in private sector expertise and creativity to raise rural 
incomes. Presently, modern private sector entities face few incentives to 
engage directly with rural producers. Among other  things, this refl ects 
poorly coordinated and integrated value chains, high transaction costs, 
and low market predictability (for example, due to climatic and other 
 factors). Lessons can be learned from vari ous Asian countries regarding 
how structural interventions in staple food markets played a crucial role 
in their development successes. This does not necessarily require large- 
scale public interventions in food markets. Rather, the creation of a 
clear and stable set of incentives for private buyers is needed, which in 
turn supports domestic price stability.33 Existing pockets of agricultural 
success in Mozambique point in this direction. For instance, contract 
farming schemes in tobacco, cotton, and cassava (used to produce 
beer) have been shown to boost incomes.  There also has been success 
in establishing a more integrated value chain  running from produc-
tion of chicken feed (soya) by emergent commercial farmers to do-
mestic chicken production.34
A second and related macro- structural intervention is to focus a 
larger share of public investments on rural areas, with a key aim of fos-
tering market linkages. A recent infrastructure diagnosis notes that: 
“Mozambique’s connectivity among urban and economic clusters is 
quite limited, lacking linkages that connect parallel corridors to each 
other. . . .  Additionally, rural population accessibility to domestic 
markets . . .  is an enormous challenge, and lags  behind what is observed 
in the region.”35 Supporting this view, research shows that, relative to 
other countries, such as Vietnam, poor rural infrastructure in Mozam-
bique contributes to much lower agricultural income multipliers.36 En-
suring a network of high- quality all- weather roads to connect all major 
towns in Mozambique, as well as an expansion of rural feeder roads, 
requires sustained po liti cal commitment over the long- term.
A third issue is policy distortions that limit demand for domestic 
 labor. A fi rst example of this is the real exchange rate. A recent analy sis 
associated with the IMF suggests that the Metical was overvalued by 
between 26 and 41  percent in real effective terms, and this preceded a 
phase of signifi cant devaluation of the South Africa Rand relative to 
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the Metical.37 While a strong Metical may be “good” for urban con-
sumers in the south, who rely largely on food imports from South Af-
rica,  there are potentially damaging longer- term consequences for the 
rural sector and job creation in  labor- intensive exports. Research into 
price competitiveness suggest that certain cash crops, cotton and soya, 
could be seriously affected by any further sustained appreciation of 
the currency.38 The point is that maintenance of a reasonable and stable 
level of external price competitiveness provides a broad- based incentive 
to exporting activities and use of domestic  factors of production. Deter-
mined pursuit of such competitiveness is necessary given Mozambique’s 
current resource boom and high levels of external fi nancial infl ows.
Another distortion is minimum wage policies. National minimum 
wages are set for individual occupational sectors in Mozambique each 
year. Not only do  these minimum wages differ by a large  factor be-
tween sectors, it is clear they have increased much more rapidly than 
 labor productivity growth. Stated in constant 2009 prices, average min-
imum wages have increased by a  factor of nearly four since 1996; that 
is, from 28 to 138 U.S. dollars; and over the period 2009–14, they in-
creased at an annual rate of over 10  percent. This compares to average 
aggregate  labor productivity growth of below 5  percent.
 These trends are problematic for a number of reasons. First, high 
minimum wages constitute a bias  toward certain types of  labor; namely, 
skilled urban workers. This bias also appears to be material since  labor 
productivity in the majority of Mozambican manufacturing fi rms is 
well below that implied by the minimum wage.39 Second, as a national 
price,  these minimum wages ignore the large regional differences in 
prices (as well as urban– rural differences). Signifi cant spatial price 
disparities are found in Mozambique due to high transport costs, re-
fl ecting long distances between centers of production and consump-
tion, and weakly competitive intermediaries.40 The extent to which 
minimum wage policies directly affect job creation (for example, in 
manufacturing) is hard to assess and merits additional research. None-
theless, it is representative of a more general policy stance that tends to 
promote a structure of growth that has weak capacity to reduce absolute 
poverty. We recommend careful consideration of this and other poli-
cies and subsequent action in practice.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has reviewed recent macroeconomic and microeco-
nomics development trends in Mozambique. The overall aim was to 
make sense of the apparent disconnect between rapid aggregate growth 
and weaker trends in poverty reduction. While part of this discon-
nect refl ects temporary  factors, such as a conjunction of price shocks 
and climate events in 2008–09, more worrisome is a lack of growth- 
enhancing structural change in the economy. This motivated a de-
tailed decomposition of trends in  labor productivity for the period 
1996–2014. This represented the primary analytical contribution of 
the chapter and was able to take advantage of recent  house hold data 
from 2014.
Four main fi ndings emerged from the  labor productivity decompo-
sition. First,  labor reallocation effects have made a relatively small con-
tribution to productivity growth over this period. Moreover, when the 
full post- war period is split into phases of around six years,  labor reallo-
cation was found to have made the largest relative contribution, at 
around 32  percent, in the immediate reconstruction period (1997–2002). 
Second, the composition of  labor reallocation effects has altered over 
time. More recently, dynamic structural reallocation effects have be-
come negative, refl ecting the point that sectors with the fastest rates of 
growth in employment (primarily, ser vices) show falling levels of rela-
tive productivity. Third, within- sector productivity growth remains a 
predominant overall contributor to productivity growth, yet is highly 
uneven across sectors. We also found that, with the exception of min-
ing, sector- specifi c intra productivity growth has been falling over time 
and even is negative in ser vices and manufacturing. This implies that 
each worker is becoming less productive in  these sectors than before, 
raising concerns regarding the sustainability of Mozambique’s current 
growth path. Fourth, aggregate productivity growth appears to be in-
creasingly dependent on the ser vices sector. Despite large investments 
in mining and related industries, and associated within- sector produc-
tivity growth, this has not translated into large aggregate  labor produc-
tivity benefi ts due to the weak contribution (negative) of  these new 
activities to employment.
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The fi nal section of the chapter refl ected on what  these fi ndings 
mean for policy. We highlighted unavoidable demographic trends that 
suggest both forthcoming opportunities and also challenges, particu-
larly concerning the sheer number of new workers that  will enter the 
 labor market and that average worker quality (years of schooling)  will 
only evolve slowly. We suggested that macro- structural policies should be 
a primary though not exclusive focus of initiatives compared to sector- or 
fi rm- specifi c interventions. This refl ects both the scale of the jobs chal-
lenge and weak state capacity to intervene at the microeconomic level. 
Three specifi c macro- structural interventions  were recommended. The 
fi rst is efforts to raise agricultural productivity, particularly by establish-
ing larger and more stable incentives for the private sector to engage di-
rectly with rural smallholders. Second, investments in rural infrastruc-
ture and rural– urban connections  will be critically impor tant to exploit 
gains from trade and specialization. Third, we recommend efforts to 
minimize distortions that act against export- oriented and  labor- intensive 
activities. Distortions that merit specifi c attention are external price com-
petitiveness (via the exchange rate) and minimum wage policies.
We have argued that Mozambique’s economic development chal-
lenges remain signifi cant. However, it is impor tant to emphasize that 
substantial and laudable pro gress has been made in sustaining two de-
cades of rapid growth and establishing a stable macroeconomic and 
po liti cal environment. Moreover, the challenges Mozambique  faces 
refl ect, in part, the cumulative impact of historical experiences, as well 
as global interest in SSA commodities. Nevertheless, Mozambique 
must push back against trends that  favor a capital- intensive path of de-
velopment. Instead, we believe greater priority must be given to fi nding 
a more  labor- intensive, and thus pro- poor, growth path in which rural 
producers play a prominent role.
NOTES
1. See Jones (2006); Arndt and  others (2007); Nucifora and da Silva (2011).
2. This chapter was written in 2015, before the emergence of information 
regarding a number of large, commercial government guaranteed external 
loans that had not been declared to the IMF. Together with falling commod-
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ity prices,  these events have cast doubt on the sustainability of Mozambique’s 
recent growth path and have led to signifi cant economic and po liti cal tur-
moil, including substantial exchange rate depreciation since October 2015.
3. Arndt and  others (2012a).
4. McMillan and Rodrik (2012) use decomposition methods to argue that 
growth- enhancing structural transformation was largely absent in Africa over 
the period 1990–2005; de Vries and  others (2013) extend the analy sis to 2010.
5. For example, see African Development Bank (2013).
6. Quoted from Henriksen (1983, p. 44).
7. For further details, consult Jones and Tarp (2012, 2015).
8. In line with local practice in Mozambique, “Frelimo” is now written 
in lower case to mark the distinction between the in de pen dence movement 
and the post- in de pen dence po liti cal party.
9. For additional details see Pitcher (2002); Arndt and  others (2007).
10. See also Jones and Tarp (2015).
11. Jones (2008); Nucifora and da Silva (2011).
12. World Bank (1997).
13. Cramer (2001); Pitcher (2002).
14. Republic of Mozambique (2010).
15. For a review of this evidence see Arndt and  others (2015).
16. For elaboration, see Jones and Tarp (2012, 2013).
17. Set out in Arndt and  others (2012a, 2015).
18. A further round was undertaken in 2005; however, the rural/urban 
structure of this survey was distinct and appears less comparable.
19. Jones and Tarp (2012, 2013).
20. Gemmell and  others (2000).
21. Instituto Nacional de Éstatistica (2015).
22. In part, this refl ects changes in the occupational categories and codes 
used in the questionnaires. As a result, further work  will be needed to make the 
2014 data consistent with previous rounds when a fi nal dataset is released.
23. Rand and Tarp (2013).
24. For example, see African Development Bank (2013).
25. See Dumagan (2013); de Vries and  others (2013).
26. Superscripts on the share terms denote the variables from which they 
are derived; that is, ωitL = Lit /Lt ,  ωitP = Pit /Pt ,  etc.
27. For a similar exercise, see African Development Bank (2013).
28. This data is taken from Barro and Lee (2013).
29.  These estimates are based on quantile regressions where the depen-
dent variable is the observed (annualized) growth rate in the mean years of 
schooling over a fi ve- year period, and the explanatory variables are the ini-
tial level of schooling and population size. Coeffi cient estimates from  these 
regressions are used to construct our growth paths.
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30. The notion  here is that Mozambique must sustain rates of growth in 
mean years of schooling according to  these paths over a period of forty years. 
Since the growth paths are estimated from the full distribution of schooling 
year growth rates, the upper (lower) part of this distribution is populated by 
country- period observations that are often not sustained over long periods. 
Thus, our focus on the 25th–75th band is reasonable.
31. Macro- structural policies include certain ele ments of industrial policy, 
including infrastructure investments and exchange rate management, since 
 these affect multiple sectors at once.
32. For an early view of this thesis, see Tarp and  others (2002); also Jones 
and Tarp (2012, 2013).
33. See Timmer and Dawe (2007).
34. Hanlon and Smart (2014).
35. Dominguez- Torres and Briceño- Garmendia (2011, p. 8).
36. Arndt and  others (2012b).
37. See Vitek (2009). Note that in 2015, Mozambique has experienced 
signifi cant devaluation pressure.
38. Salinger and Ennis (2014).
39. Rand and Tarp (2013).
40. Arndt and  others (2015).
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The Relationship between Growth and Employment
Olu Ajakaiye, Afeikhena Jerome, David Nabena, 
and Olufunke Alaba
Nigeria has maintained remark-able growth over the last de cade, 
recording an average growth rate of 6.8  percent from a large economic 
base, and the potential for further growth is reasonably high. Real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth was estimated at 6.23  percent in 2014, 
compared to 5.49   percent in 2013. The rebasing of its GDP in April 
2014 by the National Bureau of Statistics, to better refl ect the size and 
structure of the economy, saw it surge past South Africa to become Af-
rica’s largest economy, with a rebased GDP estimate of US$454 billion 
in 2012 and US$510 billion in 2013. The rebased GDP, using updated 
prices and improved methodology, also reveals a more diversifi ed 
economy than previously thought, with rising contributions of previously 
undocumented ser vices (including the entertainment industry) to GDP. 
In addition, as a result of banking sector reforms, especially the bank 
consolidation exercise of 2004, an increasing number of private Nigerian 
banks are pres ent in many African countries.
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However, given the country’s high population, per capita GDP 
was only US$2,688 in 2013, ranking 121st compared to South Africa, 
which, at 69th, had a per capita GDP of US$7,507. The rebasing also 
indicated that the Nigerian economy is transforming from an agrarian 
economy to a tertiary ser vice economy, without  going through the in-
termediate stage of industrialization. This aty pi cal transition, the so- 
called tertiarization that has so far failed to deliver quality jobs, poses 
challenges for the sustainability and inclusiveness of economic growth 
in Nigeria.
Recent growth has also not translated into signifi cant social and 
 human development, contrary to the postulates in the development 
lit er a ture that associate faster economic growth with poverty reduction. 
The 2010 Nigeria Poverty Profi le Report by the Nigeria National Bu-
reau of Statistics (NBS 2010a) estimated the poverty incidence at 
69  percent in 2010, up from 54.4   percent in 2004, using the Harmo-
nized National Living Standard Survey (HNLSS) of 2009–10. The 
country’s per for mance is at odds with the general international trend of 
poverty reduction, in par tic u lar in other countries experiencing rapid 
economic growth (Ajakaiye and  others 2014).
Nigeria’s socioeconomic indicators are also poor. The level of un-
employment increased from 23.9  percent in 2011 to 25  percent in 2014, 
while the country’s  human development index (HDI) value increased 
by only 8.1  percent in the last de cade, from 0.466 in 2005 to 0.504 in 
2013, positioning the country at 152 out of 187 countries. Albeit mar-
ginal, Nigeria has made some pro gress in other development indicators. 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
(2014) HDI, which takes into account life expectancy and literacy as 
well as per capita GDP, life expectancy at birth increased by 6.9 years 
between 1980 and 2013, mean years of schooling increased by 0.2 years, 
and expected years of schooling increased by 2.3 years. Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita also increased by about 25.7  percent between 
1980 and 2013.
The country remains highly dependent on the oil sector, which ac-
counts for about 70  percent of government revenues and 85  percent of ex-
ports. While oil revenues have helped support the country during times of 
boom, the oil sector also pres ents a major challenge during bust periods. 
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For example, crude oil prices lost over 50  percent in the last quarter of 
2014 and traded close to US$50 dollar per barrel at the end of the year.
This has had a devastating effect on Nigeria, with major fi scal con-
tractions among the three tiers of government, and a slowdown in over-
all economic growth. The economy has been particularly hard hit by 
some major external shocks, including the rebalancing of the Chinese 
economy, which brought with it lower commodity prices; the slow global 
economic recovery; and other global fi nancial developments. They have 
impacted the Nigerian economy through trade, exchange rates, asset 
markets (including commodity prices), and capital fl ows, further aggra-
vating the country’s longstanding vulnerabilities, including inadequate 
infrastructure, high unemployment, and high poverty rate.
In a bid to shore up the Naira value and preserve the external reserves, 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) devalued the Naira in November 2014 
by 8.4  percent. However, with sustained pressure on the foreign exchange, 
the CBN shut down the offi cial win dow in February 2015, implying an-
other tactical devaluation of the Naira. This move led to relative stability 
in the currency market as the CBN intervened to meet excess demand 
through special interventions. Given continued efforts of the CBN to 
support the Naira in the face of declining oil prices, Nigeria’s external 
reserves plummeted to US$30.3 billion as of  March 17,  2015— barely 
enough to cover six months of imports— a threshold that posed a major 
threat to Nigeria’s balance of payments transactions.
Perceived neglect and economic marginalization have also fueled 
resentment in the predominantly Muslim North. The militant Islamist 
group, Boko Haram, has grown increasingly active and deadly in its 
attacks against state and civilian targets, including the April 2014 ab-
duction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, which attracted extensive in-
ternational attention.
Meanwhile, Nigeria’s demo cratic pro cess was further consolidated 
with the relatively peaceful outcome of the general elections held in 
May 2015, which ushered in a new regime. For the fi rst time in the 
country’s history, power was successfully transferred from a ruling gov-
ernment to the opposition. Elected offi cials both at the federal and state 
level are already confronted with a perfect storm in the area of the 
economy as a result of dwindling revenues. The challenges that the Buhari 
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administration has been trying to confront include the diversifi cation of 
the economy, fi ghting corruption through blockage of fi scal leakages, 
prioritization of government expenditures to boost investment in critical 
infrastructure, and job creation. While intuition suggests that employ-
ment growth and poverty reduction are closely linked,  there has been 
 little research in this area in Nigeria apart from Treichel (2010) and 
World Bank (2016). This paper, therefore, tries to fi ll this gap by studying 
the experience of Nigeria, where average annual economic growth has 
reached 6.8  percent in the last de cade but unemployment has been ris-
ing per sis tently. In line with the orientation of the proj ect, the Nigerian 
case study intends to deepen our understanding of the character of Nige-
ria’s non- inclusive growth experience and identify the potential limits 
and constraints to inclusive growth experience and the likely domestic 
and external economic growth opportunities available for Nigeria in the 
medium- to long- term, and explore how  these can be exploited.
STYLIZED FACTS OF  LABOR MARKETS, EDUCATION, 
AND GROWTH IN NIGERIA
Nigeria has continued to witness signifi cant growth above the conti-
nental average in the last fi fteen years.  Table 6-1 shows that Nigeria’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew from 3.1  percent in the 1990s to an 
average of more than 5  percent beginning in 2000, largely driven by the 
value addition from the ser vice  sector.
 Table  6-2 pres ents the sectoral composition of Nigeria’s GDP. 
While the economy has traditionally been dominated by crude oil pro-
duction, the sector accounted for only about 10  percent of the GDP in 
2014.
Nigeria is still predominantly agrarian. Approximately 50  percent of 
the population engages in agricultural production at a subsistence level 
despite its steady decline and benign neglect as a result of the oil boom 
that the country experienced in the early 1970s. Agriculture as a per-
centage of GDP has stabilized at about 20  percent in 2014 ( table 6-2), 
compared to about 40  percent in the mid-1980s. Agricultural holdings 
are typically small with low yields and low productivity.
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 TABLE 6-1.  Growth and Share of Sectors in Nigerian GDP Growth, 
Five- Year Averages, 1990–2014
 Percent of GDP
1990–94 1995–99 2000–04 2005–09 2010–14
Agriculture value added 25.4 27.5 29.2 25.1 21.9
Industry value added 24.8 22.4 22.3 21.2 25.5
Ser vices value added 49.8 50.1 48.4 53.7 52.6
Growth in GDP (%) 3.1 2.1 6.5 6.3 5.7
Source: Authors’ computation from under lying data obtained from World Development 
Indicators 2015 (World Bank  2015a).
The industrial sector’s contribution to the GDP declined from 
27.7  percent to 24.2  percent in 2014. Of note is the manufacturing sec-
tor, which has been in a deplorable situation. Its contribution to GDP 
has been declining since the structural adjustment era, and currently 
hovers around 10  percent, as shown in  table 6-2.
The decline in industrial capacity, especially in heavy industry, has 
had serious impact on Nigeria’s long- term economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Nigeria’s steel sector, especially the Ajaokuta Steel Com pany, 
no doubt represents a perfect illustration of why Nigeria’s industrializa-
tion drive remains stunted. Despite having the second largest iron ore 
deposit in Africa, Nigeria has, curiously, failed to breathe life into the 
moribund Ajaokuta Steel Com pany in Kogi State, which was conceived 
as far back as September 1979 with the vision of generating impor tant 
upstream and downstream industrial and economic activities critical to 
the diversifi cation of the economy into an industrial one. While the 
proj ect would directly employ about 10,000 workers at the fi rst phase of 
commissioning, upstream and downstream industries are expected to 
engage over 500,000 employees.
Unfortunately, none of the benefi ts has accrued to Nigeria, even as 
the country continues to spend about $3.3 billion annually on steel 
importation, which is set to rise to at least $15 billion in the next ten 
years to meet its high infrastructure needs. The steel complex has become 
a  subject of intense controversy and politicking by vari ous interests, 
culminating in the termination of the concession agreement between 
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the federal government and Global Infrastructure Nigeria Ltd (GINL), 
an Indian fi rm, in 2008. Although the federal government had accused 
the Indian fi rm of breaching the provisions of the concession agree-
ment and asset stripping, the com pany had gone to the International 
Court of Arbitration in London, challenging the revocation of the agree-
ment. While the  legal hurdles slowing down the proj ect have been re-
moved, the proj ect has been a subject of legislative scrutiny following 
revelations that the country was paying huge sums of money to the com-
pany’s idle staff.
As shown in  table 6-2, tertiary activities have gradually been on the 
increase, rising from 50  percent in 2011 to almost 61  percent of Nige-
ria’s GDP in the fi rst half of 2015. The major ser vice subsectors include 
retail and  wholesale, real estate, and information and communication 
 TABLE 6-2.  Sector Composition of Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product
Percent of GDP





Agriculture 22.3 22.1 21.0 20.2 17.8 17.9
Industry 27.8 26.8 25.4 24.2 21.1 21.2
 Oil and gas 17.5 15.8 12.9 10.8 6.6 7.6
 Solid minerals 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
 Manufacturing 7.2 7.8 9.0 9.8 10.2 9.3
 Construction 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.6 4.2 4.2
Ser vices 49.9 51.1 53.7 55.6 61.1 60.9
 Information and
  communication
10.1 10.1 10.4 10.8 11.9 13.9
 Finance and insurance 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.1 4.0 3.7
 Real estate 7.3 7.7 8.3 8.4 7.8 8.7
 Accommodation and
  food
0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.7
 Ser vices, arts, entertainment,
  and recreation
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
 Trade,  wholesale and
  retail
16.4 16.5 17.1 17.6 20.1 18.9
 Other ser vices 13.2 13.3 13.8 14.5 15.8 14.8
Source: World Bank (2015b).
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(African Economic Outlook 2015). Trade, information and communi-
cations technology, and real estate together comprise almost 70  percent 
of the ser vices sector output. The ser vice sector trade, especially, is still 
dominated by informal sector activities operating at low margins and low 
levels of productivity.
Trade was the single largest sectoral component of GDP in the fi rst 
quarter of 2015, at 20   percent, followed by agriculture (17.8   percent), 
information and communications technology (11.9  percent), manufac-
turing (10.2  percent), real estate (7.8  percent), with oil and gas contrib-
uting only 6.6  percent of the country’s fi nal output.
In sum, despite the high economic growth witnessed in the last de-
cade and a half, the country has not yet been able to transform into an 
innovation- based, high- skilled, “knowledge” economy; hence, its trade 
composition and pattern has remained predominantly on primary pro-
duction, with minimal participation in the global value chain.
The evidence in  tables  6-1 and  6-2 suggests that the pro cess of 
structural transformation, though in its formative stage, has commenced 
in Nigeria. The country is making the aty pi cal transformation from 
agriculture to ser vices, and this is not unique to Nigeria. Several devel-
oping countries in Sub- Saharan Africa and Latin Amer i ca are wit-
nessing what Rodrik (2015) described as premature de- industrialization, 
as the bulk of  labor are absorbed in nontradable ser vices operating 
at very low levels of productivity, in activities such as retail trade and 
 house work. Industry, especially manufacturing, has transformed in 
several ways, especially with the dominance of global supply chains. 
As Rodrik (2014) established, manufacturing has become much 
more capital- and skills- intensive, with diminished potential to absorb 
large amounts of  labor released from low- productivity agriculture 
This has sparked the debate on  whether a services- led model can de-
liver rapid growth and good jobs in Africa in the way that manufac-
turing once did. Ghani and O’Connell (2014), using historical data, 
established that ser vices can, indeed, be a growth escalator, while 
skeptics like Rodrik (2014) and Kormawa and Jerome (2015) posit that 
ser vices can hardly deliver rapid growth and good jobs, especially in 
developing countries where most operate at low margins and low levels 
of productivity.
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The result is slightly at odds with Adeyinka and  others (2013). Based 
on an analy sis of Nigeria’s General House hold Survey (GHS) from 
2006 to 2009, they indicated that Nigeria has exhibited what one might 
consider the standard pattern of structural change, with  labor leaving 
the agricultural and  wholesale and retail trade sectors to join sectors 
such as manufacturing, communications and transportation, and ser-
vices. Specifi cally, aggregate  labor productivity grew by approximately 
17  percent from 1996 to 2009 due to the movement of  labor to higher 
productivity sectors. While positive, this is smaller than the growth in 
 labor productivity arising from within- sector improvements, which re-
sulted in aggregate  labor productivity growth of approximately 62  percent.
The results are consistent for a resource- abundant country that has 
dif fer ent relative price structures that impact on their structural trans-
formation, especially through the so- called “Dutch disease,” which 
makes nonnatural resource sectors unprofi table.
While aggregate  labor productivity growth is positive, structural change 
has not proceeded at a pace consistent with the large gaps in  labor 
productivity across sectors. The country’s policy environment hampers 
structural transformation through restriction of agricultural productivity, 
and poor infrastructure has constrained the business environment and 
slowed down the expansion of manufacturing and business ser vices.
Structure of Nigeria’s Employment
In Nigeria, the total  labor force is made up of persons age 15–64 years, 
excluding students, home- keepers, retired persons, stay- at- home par-
ents, and persons unable to work or not interested in work (Kale and 
Doguwa 2015), while the unemployment rate is the proportion of the 
 labor force who  were available for work but did not work in the week 
preceding the survey period for at least thirty- nine hours. The  labor 
market and employment situation as presented in fi gure 6-1 reveals that 
 there was an average increase of 2.8  percent in the population growth 
between 2010 and 2014. Nigeria’s population  rose from 138.6 million in 
2005 to 159.7 million in 2010, and to 178.5 million in 2014. In the same 
vein, the  labor force, made up of the total number of employed and 
unemployed persons, increased by 2.9   percent on average, from 65.2 
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million in 2010 to 72.9 million in 2014. However, the total  labor force 
in full remunerative employment increased at an average of 2  percent 
over the period, compared to 6.1  percent and 16.48  percent for the un-
deremployed and unemployed population,  respectively.
Figure 6-2 pres ents the data on employed persons in Nigeria by sec-
tors from 1970 to 2014. Agriculture has continued to provide the most 
jobs for the country’s  labor force, although this is declining. In 2014, it 
accounted for 45   percent of all jobs, down from 51   percent in 2000. 
The ser vices sector is the second largest job- providing sector, rising 
from 24  percent in 2000 to 44  percent in 2014, while the share of the 
manufacturing sector fell from 11   percent in 2000 to 6   percent in 
2014. While the ser vice sector is the fastest growing sector, the fall in 
employment in manufacturing industries explicates signifi cant levels of 
de- industrialization. Its composition fell from 12.3  percent in 1970 to 
9.3  percent in 2005 and 6  percent in  2014.
While information on the employment situation in Nigeria is still 
confi ned largely to the formal sector, with scant information on the 
FIGURE 6-1.  Trend in Population and  Labor Market Situation, 2005–14
Source: Authors’ computations based on under lying data from United Nations Department of 
Economic Social Affairs (2015) and NBS (2014 and 2015b). 
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informal sector, it is generally acknowledged that the ascribed informal 
workforce has grown tremendously, both in real terms and in activity 
diversifi cation since the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of 
1986. Estimates suggest that the informal sector accounts for between 
45   percent and  60   percent of the urban  labor force, up from about 
25  percent in the mid-1960s and the percentage is more in rural areas 
(Abumere and  others 1995). A national survey carried out in the year 
2000 puts the number of informal sector enterprises in the country at 
8,604,048, employing 12,407,348  persons (Central Bank of Nigeria 
2001). By 2010, the total number of  people employed in the informal 
sector grew to 48,602,017  people, according to Nigeria’s National Bu-
reau of Statistics, as shown in  table 6-3.
A cursory examination of  table 6-3 indicates that employment in Ni-
geria’s informal sector generally follows the same pattern as the formal 
sector. It is dominated by agriculture,  wholesale and retail trade, and 
manufacturing. The three sectors contributed a whopping 66.4  percent 
of total employment.
While defi nitions and descriptions of the informal economy vary 
considerably, three successive national surveys recognize some notewor-
thy attributes of this sector, including its broad activity spectrum that 
spans the entire segment of the economy, its relatively low productivity, 
the dominance of youth in the age cohort, with the 20–40 years group 
accounting for over 50   percent of the workforce, owner ship structure 
FIGURE 6-2.  Employment Trend by Sectors (Shares), 1970–2014
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Source: Authors’ computation from under lying data obtained from NISER (2015).
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that is mostly sole proprietorship, and spatial location with a majority of 
informal enterprises neighborhood- based (Abumere and  others 1995; 
Central Bank of Nigeria 2001; Oduh and  others 2008).
Profi le of Unemployment in Nigeria
The unemployment rate across Nigeria has been very high since the 
beginning of this  century. The indicator that mea sures the proportion of 
active population that is without but is actively seeking work increased 




Agriculture, forestry, and farming 14,837,693 30.5




Other ser vice activities 3,471,702 7.1
Accommodation and food ser vices activities 2,730,308 5.6
Transportation and storage 2,009,183 4.1
Education 1,557,665 3.2
Construction 1,142,569 2.4
Administrative and support ser vice activities 986,480 2.0
Public administration and defense, compulsory social 
security
800,333 1.6
Professional, scientifi c, and technical activities 779,209 1.6
 Human, health, and social work 739,936 1.5
Activities of  house hold as employers, undifferentiated 
goods
551,353 1.1
Information and communication 469,513 1.0
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 390,275 0.8
Financial and insurance activities 171,403 0.4
Electricity, gas steam, and air conditioning supply 152,610 0.3
Mining and quarrying 146,488 0.3
 Water supply, sewage, waste management, and 
remediation activities
86,778 0.2
Activities of extraterritorial organ izations and bodies 75,633 0.2
Real estate activities 68,697 0.1
Total 48,602,017 100.0
Source: National Bureau of Statistics,  2010c.
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to 25.1   percent in 2014 from 24.7   percent in 2013, as shown in fi g-
ure 6-3. Since 2000, the rate of unemployment has grown at a com-
pound annual average of 4.8  percent, even as it has continued to fl uctu-
ate and  intensify.
Rising rural unemployment is also evolving sectorally, as opportuni-
ties are shifting away from agriculture despite the high prevalence of 
subsistence farming. Stagnating production and low productivity in 
the sector, where more than half of the rural population works, and the 
high growth witnessed in the ser vices sector, are key reasons for the 
large variations across urban and rural  labor groups. The unemploy-
ment rate is much higher in the northern part of the country, where 
two- thirds of the population engage in subsistence agriculture, and 
relatively lower in the southern part where more than half of the popu-
lation is engaged in self- employed wage work (World Bank 2016).
Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) also shows that 
 there is a higher incidence of unemployment for  women than men; and 
in recent times, their access to quality job opportunities declined even 
further. While the number of unemployed males has hovered around 
seven to eight million in the past fi ve years, the unemployed female pop-
ulation increased from 6.7 million in 2010 to over 10 million in 2014 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2015b).
Youth unemployment, on the other hand, is intensifying. Large 
concentrations of youth, both trained and untrained, educated and un-
educated, are idle and without any hope of securing a decent job. Youth 
unemployment was recorded as 45.8  percent in 2014. As can be seen 
from fi gure 6-4, unemployment is generally high regardless of level of 
education. For example, in 2014, unemployment rates among persons 









































































Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2014.
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who never attended school and  those with secondary and post- 
secondary education hover around 25  percent, while the unemploy-
ment rate among persons with primary education or below is somewhat 
lower, at 17.6  percent and 15.1  percent, respectively. Among  those who 
have secondary and post- secondary education, skills gaps and job search 
barriers are major barriers to gainful employment.
BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LIT ER A TURE
The current phenomenon of “jobless growth” witnessed across several 
developing economies, some in Africa, poses far- reaching challenges 
on the age- old economic assumption of growth in GDP directly result-
ing in an increase in employment. Okun’s (1962) pioneering and semi-
nal contribution provided some evidence in this regard. In his study of 
the statistical relationship between a country’s unemployment rate and 
economic growth rate, he demonstrated that  there is a positive relation-
ship between output and employment, given the logical conclusion that 
output depends on the amount of  labor used in the production pro cess. 
However, economic realities have since evolved.






































Source: Authors’ computations based on data from NBS (2015b).
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 Today, jobless growth has emerged as a global phenomenon. In its 
outlook on the 2015 Global Agenda, the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) reports that deepening income in equality and per sis tent jobless 
growth are two of the most pressing challenges currently confronting 
mankind. Jobless growth exists where economies exiting recessions dem-
onstrate economic growth while employment is  either decreasing or 
barely stabilizing (World Economic Forum 2014). In such situations, un-
employment remains stubbornly high despite economic growth. Accord-
ing to WEF,  these characteristics are often a result of technologically 
derived job displacements.
Some papers have focused on sectoral patterns of economic growth. 
For instance, Hull (2009), in her investigation of the relationship 
 between economic growth, employment, and poverty reduction, iden-
tifi es sectors as “more productive” and “less productive,” such that growth 
in a sector  will not directly lead to general benefi ts to all sectors of the 
economy. This highlights the relevance of the productivity intensity of 
sectors as a tool for profi ling growth. Using a sample of 106 growth peri-
ods covering thirty- nine countries, Gutierrez and  others (2007) concluded 
that the sectoral growth pattern and employment/productivity profi le 
vary signifi cantly among countries. According to their study, the sectoral 
pattern of employment generation and productivity growth are key deter-
minant  factors of the rate of unemployment. Loayza and Raddatz (2010) 
also support this argument that growth in unskilled- intensive sectors con-
tributes more to poverty reduction by providing better jobs.
The World Bank (2005), in its study of fourteen countries, noted 
that three countries that experienced pro- poor growth witnessed more 
 labor- intensive growth. In another country- specifi c panel data analy sis 
for the manufacturing industry carried out on eight Central and East-
ern Eu ro pean countries, employment was completely de- linked from 
output, mostly in medium and low skilled sectors (Onaran 2008). This 
result was particularly apparent in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and 
Romania, not only in the fi rst period of transition recession, but also in 
the post- recession period. Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) had also provided 
evidence that in the aftermath of 1996, the period of economic down-
turn in the CEE-10 led to signifi cant job destruction, and growth in 
GDP did not result in statistically signifi cant job creation. This study 
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was also consistent with Lehmann (1995), who argued that capital and 
managerial shortages could lead to weak  labor demand.
Based on recent studies on Africa, it has been observed that the 
continent’s rapid growth over the last de cade has so far not been able to 
create signifi cant employment opportunities. Ancharaz (2010) alludes 
to the hypothesis that such growth has been driven largely by commod-
ity exports. Export- led growth does not necessarily translate into higher 
employment levels, considering that extractive industries are generally 
capital- intensive and may not create many jobs, especially for  women, as 
they expand. Resource- driven countries in the continent are further faced 
with lack of export diversifi cation and equally concentrated markets. An-
charaz (2010) confi rmed that export growth was strongly correlated with 
real GDP growth, particularly in Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria.
Olotu and  others (2015) view the phenomenon as a result of an in-
ability to fully utilize available  factors of production. The study on Ni-
geria argues that jobless growth is increasing as a result of the very high 
number of gradu ates produced  every year and the country’s incapacity 
to absorb them. The country’s growth and business environment, which 
has not been able to signifi cantly expand the formal sector, has left the 
economy largely trapped in its pre-2001 trajectory, when it started to 
witness a sustained expansion in its non- oil economy.
On the empirical front, the World Bank has in recent years devel-
oped the Job Generation and Growth (JoGGs) decomposition tool to 
link “changes in employment, output per worker and population struc-
ture at the aggregate and sectoral level” (World Bank 2010). Using 
Shapley decompositions, the methodology decomposes growth in GDP 
per capita in two consecutive periods, in its employment, productivity, 
and demographic components to disentangle the sources of output- per- 
worker growth. The JoGGs decomposition tool has been  adopted to 
analyze the incidence of jobless growth in Uganda (Bbaale 2013) and 
Rwanda (Malunda 2013). In Uganda, Bbaale proved that the industrial 
and ser vices sectors have higher prospects for alleviating poverty 
through productivity and employment generation. On the other hand, 
Malunda’s research on employment intensity in Rwanda showed that 
the country’s manufacturing sector lagged  behind other sectors in 
terms of output and productivity growth. His results also showed that 
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growth in the East African country’s de pen dency ratio impacted nega-
tively on its per capita GDP growth.
Using the JoGGs decomposition tool, particularly in the context of 
economic structural transformation, Byiers and  others (2015) recently 
studied employment means in a group of Development Pro gress coun-
tries from Latin Amer i ca, Africa, and Asia.1 The paper showed that 
inter- sectoral shifts contributed more to growth than rising productivity 
within them.  These  labor movements  were also  toward the ser vices sec-
tor, including precarious, low- productivity jobs, rather than manufac-
turing. Byiers and  others additionally raised a rather crucial aspect of 
employment dynamics, underscoring the importance of politics as a 
key determinant of employment pro gress. New assessments of African 
government policies and institutions have emphasized governance as a 
crucial  factor responsible for the uneven growth per for mance in most 
of Africa (African Development Bank 2013).
GROWTH AND  LABOR MARKET ANALY SIS
This section provides a brief overview of the data and methodology 
 adopted for the study.
The Data
To profi le Nigeria’s growth in terms of the employment and productiv-
ity of sectors, we make use of aggregate data: total GDP, population, 
and employment from 2005–14, at fi ve- year intervals of (2005–09) and 
(2010–14) as presented in  table 6- 4. Monetary data are sourced from 
the National Bureau of Statistics (2015a) and World Bank World Devel-
opment Indicators (2015a). Population and  labor statistics are sourced 
from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(2015), the National Bureau of Statistics (2015b), and Nigerian Institute 
for Social and Economic Research (NISER) (2015).2 The sectoral dis-
aggregation of the economy into agriculture, mining, quarrying and 
construction, manufacturing, and ser vices is due to data limitation. Re-
sults are presented in the stepwise approach using the Job Generation 
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and Growth (JoGGs) decomposition tool from the World Bank. The 
unit for all monetary values is 1  unless other wise stated.
Methodology
We  adopted the methodology of Gutierrez and  others (2007)3 and the 
World Bank stepwise decomposition approach using the Shapley de-
composition method (World Bank 2010) to untangle the roles of output 
per worker, employment, and population structure in growth changes 
at the aggregate and sectoral levels. The Shapley decomposition method, 
presented in a stepwise manner, is used to decompose per capita GDP 
growth into output per worker, employment, and capital. Following this 












where Y is total value added, E is employment, A is the population of 
working- age, and N is the total population.
The ratio ω = Y/E is output per worker ( labor productivity), e = E/A 
is the ratio of  people employed to the total working- age population 
(that is, employment rate),4 and a = A/N is the ratio of working- age pop-
ulation to total population (that is, de pen dency ratio).
Applying the Shapley decomposition approach to equation (1), the 
changes in per capita value added can be decomposed into changes in 
 labor productivity, changes in employment rates, and changes in the 
de pen dency ratio. The approach is based on the marginal effect of 
eliminating the change in each of the contributory components in a 
sequence on the value of a variable and for each component, by consid-
ering all pos si ble alternatives, thus eliminating residuals using weighted 
average. Each component, thus, has the interpretation of a counterfac-
tual. For instance, from equation (1), the amount of growth that can be 
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attributed to changes in output per worker (w) is obtained by calculat-
ing the resulting growth in per capita value added  under the hy po thet i cal 
scenario in which employment rate (e) and the share of the working- age 
population in total population (a) had “remained constant,”5 but output 
per worker had changed as observed. The result between the hy po thet i cal 
growth and the observed growth is defi ned as the contribution of 
changes in output per worker to per capita value added growth. The 
same interpretation applies to other components.
Shapley decomposition has the advantage of being additive. There-
fore, if the marginal contribution of each component to the observed 
change in per capita value added, obtained through Shapley decompo-
sition is ω, e, and a,   then:
Δy
y
=ω + e + a
Equation (2)
While ē refers to changes in employment as a fraction of the 
working- age population (employment rate), the term ω  captures changes 
in output per worker, and ā refl ects changes in the demographic struc-
ture of the population, that is, changes in the de pen dency ratio. Observed 
increase in employment rates (ē)  will refl ect increases in participation 
and movements of  people out of unemployment and into employment.
Although the term 1 captures changes in output per worker, the 
interpretation is not completely direct due to infl uence from: 1) in-
creases in the capital/ labor ratio; and 2) relocation of jobs from bad jobs 
sectors (low productivity) to good jobs sectors (high productivity). 
 Under the constant returns to scale assumption, we can explain the fi rst 
two infl uences: if Yt = Φt f(Et, Kt), where Kt is the capital stock at time t, 
Φt is a technological pa ram e ter, then we can imply that output per 
worker Yt/Et is equal to Φt f(1, Kt/ Et). Change in the pa ram e ter Φt  will 
capture all other sources of growth not due to changes in capital/ labor 
ratio (this is the Solow residual). It  will, therefore, mainly capture 
changes in technology and relocation of production between sectors 
with dif fer ent productivity levels (inter- sectoral shifts). However, we 
should note that it may also capture cyclical be hav ior of outputs; given 
that fi rms operating in economic downturns may have underutilized 
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capital; when the demand rises again, this  will be refl ected as a rise in 
output per worker. The third infl uence is from workers moving to a 
high- productivity sector from a low- productivity sector, so that at the 
aggregate level, average output per worker increases.6
The last component in equation (2) refl ects changes in the demo-
graphic structure of the population. For instance, due to growing de pen-
dency ratio, an increase in  labor productivity and employment may affect 
per capita income negatively if the employment and productivity growth 
is not suffi cient to  counter the rapid growing young or ageing population.
A further analy sis is to understand sectoral employment and produc-
tivity intensity in relation to aggregate intensity, and we can, therefore, 
rewrite equation (2) as  follows:.
Δy
y
= ∑ sω s +∑ s es + a
Equation (3)
 Here, ω s denotes the amount of growth in output per capita that can 
be linked to productivity changes in sector s while ēs is the amount of 
growth in output per capita that can be linked to changes in the share 
of employment of sector s. The productivity term captures growth, 
changes in the capital/ labor ratio, and employment shifts within the 
sector. Most papers that analyze the sectoral growth pattern profi les 
aggregate growth in terms of sectoral growth with re spect to produc-
tivity and employment. We can, therefore, say that Shapley decomposi-
tion simply sums growth in each sector multiplied by the average 
share of the sector in total value added. And this is equal to aggregate 
growth.
RESULTS
Following the Shapley procedure, Nigeria’s growth episode is profi led 
by: 1) growth according to aggregate productivity, employment, and 
demographic change; 2) growth according to changes in sectoral pro-
ductivity, employment shares, and aggregate demographic; and  3) 



























































































































































































































































































































































































Nigeria recorded a growth rate of 19  percent in per capita value added, 
for the 2005–09 period. However,  there was a signifi cant decrease between 
2010 and 2014, to 10.01  percent. The growth in period one (2005–09) 
and two (2010–14) was accompanied by a 7.37  percent and 5.93  percent 
reduction in employment, and an increase in  labor productivity by 
29.5  percent and 17.8  percent in the two periods, respectively. The result 
indicates the phenomenon of jobless growth in Nigeria. In both cases, 
 there was a reduction in the share of the employed in the total popula-
tion of working- age, although now decreasing at a decreasing rate.
Decomposition of Growth Per Capita
The decomposition of aggregate per capita GDP growth into its main 
components using the Shapley decomposition for the two periods is pre-
sented in  table  6-5. The  table includes contribution in Naira value of 
2010 to absolute observed growth in per capita GDP as well as the per-
centage contribution.





change in per 
capita value 
added growth 2010 Naira
% total 
change in per 
capita value 
added growth
Total change in per capita 
GDP (value added)
51,443.48 100.00 34,219.55 100.00
 Change linked to output
 per worker
76,495.76 148.70 58,809.93 171.86
 Change linked to
 employment rate
– 22,798.11 – 44.32 – 22,005.09 – 64.31
 Change linked to ratio of
  working- age population 
in total population
– 2,254.17 – 4.38 – 2,585.29 – 7.56
Source: Authors’ calculations based on JoGGs decomposition  tool.
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According to  table 6-5 and fi gures 6- A1 and 6- A2 in the appen-
dix, while productivity was a dominant contributor, accounting for 
148.7  percent and 171.9  percent of observed growth in the two periods, 
respectively, growth changes linked to employment  were negative. The 
negative contribution of employment implies that 44.3   percent and 
64.3  percent of the change in per capita value added can be linked to a 
decrease in the employment rate in Nigeria over the 2005–09 and 2010–
14 periods, respectively. Thus, growth in Nigeria since 2005 was a job-
less growth, a growth not followed by satisfactory job creation. Interest-
ingly, changes in the structure of the population also contributed 
negatively to observed growth in both periods. It was −7.6  percent be-
tween 2010 and  2014 and −4.4   percent between 2005 and  2009. In 
other words,  there  were more dependents (minor and el derly) depend-
ing on each working- age adult. Given the negative effect on observed 
growth of high de pen dency ratio,  there may be a need to investigate 
the increasing population growth in Nigeria. It is, however, impor tant 
to note that the negative contributions of the employment rate and pop-
ulation structure to the growth in per capita value added  were swamped 
by that of growth in  labor productivity over the years.
Employment Generation and Productivity 
by Economic Activity
 Tables  6-6a and  6-6b pres ent the data on employment by sector for 
2005–09 and 2010–14. Total employment in Nigeria grew by 4.4  percent 
between 2010 and 2014, compared to 2.3   percent between 2005 and 
2009. Although mining and ser vices sectors registered absolute growths 
in the number of employed at both periods, only the ser vice sector 
gained in the share of total employment in 2005–09 and 2010–14, in-
creasing by 3.4  percent and 6  percent, respectively. An increasing mar-
ginal shift from the agricultural sector, which usually employs more 
than 50  percent of the population in both absolute fi gures and propor-
tion of  people working in the sector, can be observed. Agriculture, which 
is the leading employer in Nigeria, saw its output per worker increase only 
marginally (fi gures 6- A3 and 6- A4 in the appendix). This increase can, 
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This phenomenon of inter- sectoral mobility, which has seen  people 
leave the agricultural sector, explains a signifi cant level of prolonged 
low productivity and underemployment in the sector, which, as the high-
est employing sector, affects the majority of the country’s  labor force. 
The widespread trend suggests that a greater prob lem lies in the quality 
of jobs created, where a huge percentage of  people who cannot afford 
not to work engage in low productivity and low paying  jobs.
 Table 6-7 and fi gures 6- A5 and 6- A6 in the appendix are the result 
of the decomposition from equation (3).  Table 6-7 shows how growth in 
employment (–4.5  percent) and (–3.6  percent) in 2005–09 and 2010–14, 
respectively, are distributed among economic sectors. Over the two 
periods to 2014, overall employment in the agricultural and manu-
facturing sectors fell signifi cantly. However, while the number of 
 people employed in the agricultural sector fell even faster over time, 
the fall in manufacturing employment slowed relatively from −22.97 
 percent between 2005 and 2009 to −7.86   percent between 2010 and 
2014. Agriculture consistently had the largest negative contribution of 
4.12  percent and 4.27  percent to the change in the employment rate 
in Nigeria over the 2008–09 and 2010–14 periods, respectively. The 
global fi nancial crises of 2007–08 had varying impacts on Nigeria’s 
employment distribution, while employment in electricity, gas and 
 water, and mining and quarrying declined steadily, building and con-
 TABLE 6-6B.  Employment by Sectors of Economic Activity in Nigeria 






Agriculture 34.6 30.48 – 11.92 29.56 25.29 – 14.44
Manufacturing 6.15 4.28 – 30.28 4.08 3.39 – 16.97
Mining and
  quarrying, 
construction, 
other
2.73 3.07 12.22 3.07 3.05 – 0.62
Ser vices 22.62 23.4 3.44 23.52 24.93 5.99
Total 66.1 61.23 – 7.37 60.23 56.66 – 5.93
Source: Authors’ calculations based on JoGGs decomposition  tool.
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struction expanded, as employment of persons in the subsector in-
creased from just 1.3  percent of the total  labor force in 2005 to 3.3  percent 
by 2014.
Sectoral Employment Changes to Growth 
in Total Per Capita Output
This section investigates each sector’s contribution to observed growth 
and employment per for mance.  Table 6-8 and fi gures 6- A7 and 6- A8 
in the appendix pres ent the contributions of employment from vari ous 
sectors to growth in total per capita output. In the 2005–09 and 2010–
14 periods, employment contribution shrank in all sectors except in the 
ser vices sector, which more than doubled its contribution from 3,642.8 
Naira in 2005–09 to 8,675.1 Naira in 2010–14. Of note is the fact that 
the contraction of employment in the agriculture sector led to a 
76.9  percent reduction in its contribution to total change in per capita 
output.
 TABLE 6-7.  Contribution of Employment Changes to Overall Change 
in Employment Rate in Nigeria, 2005–09 and 2010–14
2005–09 2010–14
Contribution to 









change in total 
employment 








Agriculture −4.12 84.6 −4.27 119.5





0.33 −6.9 −0.02 0.5
Ser vices 0.78 −16 1.41 – 39.4
Total employment 
rate
−4.87 100 −3.57 100
Source: Authors’ Computation based on JoGGs decomposition  tool.
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Understanding the Role of Inter- Sectoral Shifts
Structural shifts or changes are the movements of  labor from low pro-
ductivity sectors to high productivity sectors, and they have an impor-
tant role in explaining the country’s growth pattern. While an increase 
in the share of employment in sectors with above average productivity 
is expected to increase overall productivity and contribute positively to 
the inter- sectoral shift effect, the opposite effect occurs with  labor 
movement out of above- average productivity sectors.
In other words, if sector i experiences productivity below the aver-
age productivity level (that is, a low productivity sector), and employ-
ment shares si decrease, it is expected that the sector’s contribution  will 
be positive, implying that the outfl ow from this low productivity sector 
has contributed to the increase in output per worker. However, if the 
same sector experiences an increase in si, then the infl ow into this low 
productivity sector  will decrease output per worker and, thus, have a 
negative effect on the inter- sectoral shift  term.
 Table 6-9 pres ents the inter- sectoral shift effect. The inter- sectoral 
shift captures the movement of  labor between sectors, implying that, 
on average,  labor moved from lower productivity sectors to higher pro-
 TABLE 6-8.  Sectoral Employment Contribution to per Capita GDP 
(Value Added), Nigeria, 2005–09 and 2010–14
2005–09 2010–14
Contribution to 
change in per 
capita GDP 
(Naira)
% of total 
change in per 
capita GDP
Contribution 
to change in 
per capita 
GDP (Naira)
% of total 
change in per 
capita GDP
Agriculture −19,295.1 −37.5 −26,298.0 −76.9





1,562.7 3.0 −117.5 −0.3
Ser vices 3,642.8 7.1 8,675.1 25.4
Total contribution −22,798.1 –44.3 −22,005.1 −64.3
Source: Authors’ calculations based on JoGGs decomposition tool.
Note: Monetary values are 2010 naira.
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ductivity sectors. The inter- sectoral shift effect on output per worker 
was 55,285.4 Naira in the 2005–09 period. However, the effect reduced 
marginally within the 2010–14 period, to 43,577.9 Naira.
 Tables  6-10a and  6-10b and fi gure  6-5 pres ent a summary of the 
growth decomposition profi le of Nigeria in percentage contribution 
and in Naira 2010, respectively. The demographic component accounted 
for a 4.4   percent negative contribution in the 2005–09 period, and a 
7.6  percent negative contribution between 2010 and 2014. Also, the total 
value added per capita decreased from 51,443.48 Naira in 2005–09 to 
34,219.55 Naira in 2010–14 ( tables 6-10a and 6-10b). The  table reveals 
that the ser vices sector played the biggest role from 2005–09 to within- 
sector changes in output per worker and also highest contribution to 
employment changes (fi gure 6-5). Nigeria’s growth is, thus, mostly ex-
plained by inter- sectoral  shifts.
In summary, Nigeria’s real GDP growth of 7   percent in the last 
de cade was largely driven by the ser vices sector, which experienced a 
 TABLE 6-9.  Decomposition of Output Per Worker within Sector Changes 


















to change in 
total output 
per worker (%)
Agriculture 62,049.3 27.6 58,706.1 31.0





−64,726.9 −28.8 −22,642.9 −11.9
Services 137,366.1 61.2 42,451.9 22.4
Inter- sectoral shift 55,285.4 24.6 43,577.9 23.0
Total change in 
output per worker
224,562.6 100.0 189,635.4 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on JoGGs decomposition tool.
Note: Monetary values are 2010 naira.
 TABLE 6-10A.  Growth Decomposition: Contribution to Total Growth in GDP 










Agriculture 21,136.66 −19,295.08 3,912.63 5,754.21
Manufacturing 11,782.43 −8,708.56 1,172.02 4,245.89
Mining and quarrying, 
construction, other
−22,048.78 1,562.70 10,906.87 −9,579.22
Ser vices 46,792.85 3,642.83 2,841.08 53,276.76
Subtotals 57,663.17 −22,798.11 18,832.59 53,697.64
Demographic 
component
. . .  . . .  . . .  −2,254.17
Total change in value 
added per capita
. . .  . . .  . . .  51,443.48
Source: Authors’ calculations based on JoGGs decomposition tool.
** Monetary values are 2010 Naira.
 . . .  = not  applicable.
 TABLE 6-10B.  Growth Decomposition: Contribution to Total Growth in GDP 











Agriculture 18,205.98 −26,298.02 7,978.04  −14.00





−7,022.05 −117.46 2,273.76 −4,865.75
Ser vices 13,165.22 8,675.09 4,248.65 26,088.96
Subtotals 45,295.52 −22,005.09 13,514.41 36,804.84
Demographic 
component 
. . .  . . .  . . .  −2,585.29
Total change in 
value added 
per capita
. . .  . . .  . . .  34,219.55
Source: Authors’ calculations based on JoGGs decomposition tool.
** Monetary values are 2010 Naira.
 . . .  = not  applicable.
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signifi cant increase in the total number of workers employed in the sec-
tor from 34  percent in 2000 to 44  percent in 2014 (an additional 9 mil-
lion workers).
While 6.6 million workers moved into tertiary activities between 
2005 and 2010, over 2 million workers left farming activities and around 
1.4 million workers  were disengaged from the manufacturing sector. 
Although the growth in services- led jobs cushioned the prevailing high 
 labor redundancy, it was unable to offset the unemployment trend, 
which fell only marginally from 7.37  percent during the 2005–09 period 
to 5.93   percent between 2010 and  2014. Ironically,  labor productivity 
also declined, from 7.37  percent to 5.93  percent over the two periods.
Growth in the country’s working- age population from 75 million in 
2005 to about 95 million in 2014, nearly half of its total population, 
contributed negatively to employment and slowed  labor mobility. At 
the micro- level, this contributed to underemployment as additional 
workers became less able to fi nd better paying jobs and improve their 
living situations. At the aggregate level, the phenomenon limited the 
FIGURE 6-5.  Growth Decomposition: Contributions Made to per Capita 















































































































Contribution of within sector changes in 
output per worker 
Contribution of changes in employment 
Contributions of inter-sectoral shifts
Source: Authors’ computations based on JoGGs Decomposition tool (World Bank 2010).
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country’s capacity to quickly adapt to technological changes and exploit 
its competitive advantage for industries to develop.
EMPLOYMENT ELASTICITY OF GROWTH 
IN NIGERIA, 1981–2014
A widely used indicator for analyzing the relationship between growth 
and employment is the employment elasticity of growth, which gained 
popularity following the seminal work of Okun (1962). Despite the 
widespread use of this concept, especially in tracking sectoral potential 
for generating employment, it has some notable shortcomings (see Hull 
2009). First, it is incapable of stating the  actual extent of job creation. For 
instance, a country that grew by 1  percent and enjoyed a 1  percent in-
crease in employment would have the same employment elasticity rate as 
a country that had a 5  percent growth rate accompanied by a 5  percent 
increase in employment. Second, the mea sure does not take demo-
graphic changes into account. Third, and most obvious, the employment 
elasticity of growth is incapable of indicating the quality of new jobs cre-
ated. In spite of  these criticisms, employment elasticity of growth is a 
con ve nient tool for summarizing the employment intensity of growth or 
sensitivity of employment to output growth (Islam and Nazara 2000).
Two major approaches have been used in the lit er a ture to estimate 
employment elasticity of output. The fi rst is the  simple arithmetic method 
of computing the arc elasticity by dividing the proportionate change in 
employment by the proportionate change in output during a given pe-
riod, usually a year. While this methodology is computationally easy, 
Islam and  Nazara (2000) demonstrated that it tends to exhibit a  great 
deal of instability and may, therefore, be inappropriate for comparative 
purposes. The base year or the terminal year may, for example, be ab-
normal, so that the elasticity obtained may not refl ect the “normal” 
technological relationship between  labor and output for a given sector 
(Ajilore and Yinusa 2011).
The second method involves applying the econometric method of 
regression analy sis, and  there are dif fer ent variants of this. This is the 
approach  adopted in this study. We compute a log linear regression 
equation between employment and GDP to generate both aggregate as 
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well as sector- specifi c employment elasticities for Nigeria using annual 
data between 1981 and 2014. The results, presented in  table 6-11, indi-
cate that the elasticity of employment with re spect to economic growth 
has been generally low except for ser vices. The aggregate employment 
elasticity estimates for Nigeria is estimated at 0.11, which implies that 
with  every 1   percent growth in GDP, employment increases by just 
eleven basis points. The implication is that the relative high growth has 
not led to an appreciable increase in employment.
The results from the sectoral analy sis indicate that agriculture has 
elasticity of 0.48, while the ser vices sector has generally been employment- 
intensive at 0.85. Manufacturing employment elasticity is 0.30 and in-
signifi cant. This is the sector that should constitute a repository of more 
productive, remunerative, and, hence, decent jobs. Consistent with the 
earlier results, the fi ndings confi rmed the low  labor absorptive capacity of 
the Nigerian economy at the aggregate and at sectoral levels, especially 
manufacturing, supporting the notion that growth per for mance in Nigeria 
is,  after all, a “jobless” one.
UNLEASHING ITS POTENTIAL
Although a number of  factors have also naturally positioned Nigeria to 
be among the topmost economies, half a  century following in de pen-
dence, however, Nigeria’s economic growth has not only been disap-
pointing  until recently, but highly cyclical, sporadic, and non- inclusive 
(Ajakaiye and  others 2014). From the aforementioned analy sis, we can 
observe the infl uence of changes in the structure of the population on 








*** represents the signifi cance at  1  percent.
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growth and the  labor market as well as the movement to the low- 
productivity ser vice sector. However, with the high level of  human and 
natu ral resource endowments, Nigeria is yet to unleash its potential. 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, with about 170 million  people 
in 2013, and the sixth most populous nation in the world. The current 
demographic structure of the country exhibits a growing youthful popula-
tion with an estimated median age of 17.9 years (17.3 for males and 18.4 for 
females), as well as the fact that 42  percent of the population are younger 
than fourteen years, 29  percent are age 15–19 years, and 24  percent are in 
the age range of 30–59 years (National Population Commission (NPC) 
[Nigeria] and ICF International 2014).
Demographic Dividend
The observed demographic structure implies that Nigeria is on the 
verge of a major demographic transition in which the ratio of youth to 
other age groups is increasing (Bloom and  others 2010). Total fertility, 
which is estimated to have fallen to 5.73 in 2015, is projected to slide 
further, to 5.10, by 2030. Hence, the working- age population, which is 
estimated at 52.9   percent in 2015, is expected to expand further, to 
55.1  percent, by 2030, as the  under- fi fteen population contracts. This 
growth would mean that the working- age population (WAP)  will grow 
from 97 million in 2015 to 151 million in 2030, representing almost 
16  percent of Africa’s  labor force. This youth bulge is expected to stim-
ulate growth and development, other wise known as demographic divi-
dend. Recent developments among the East Asian Tiger economies, 
such as Hong Kong, South  Korea, and Singapore, suggest that a demo-
graphic dividend is pos si ble for Nigeria (WEF 2014). The expansion in 
the number of  people in the workforce relative to the number of depen-
dents should provide a signifi cant boost in economic productivity, not 
only in the production of manufactured goods, ser vices, or agricultural 
produce, but also in the wake of an increasing purchasing power that 
fuels economic growth and development.
An empirical study carried out by Bloom and  others (2010) estimated 
that not only  will Nigeria’s economy be three times larger than  today in 
2030, with GDP per capita increasing by more than 29  percent, but the 
country also has the capacity to lift about 31.8 million  people out of 
 Nigeria 213
poverty if it can overcome its challenges to collect its demographic divi-
dend. In other words, if productively employed, the extra adults create a 
win dow of opportunity for signifi cant inclusive economic growth in Ni-
geria. However,  these dividends are not automatic (Olaniyan and  others 
2012). To reap this demographic dividend, the country needs concrete 
policy actions targeted  toward the creation of productive jobs for youths. 
Increased investment in education is necessary given that the country’s 
adult literacy rate is only 56.9  percent with huge variations between sex 
(male 65.1   percent and female 48.6   percent), regions, and states (NBS 
2010b). Furthermore,  there is a need for increased health investment in 
gender equality to improve  women’s opportunities and choices and 
achieve inclusive and sustained economic prosperity for all.
Apart from the population, Nigeria is endowed with highly educated 
individuals who mostly are in the diaspora, even though the country is 
increasingly experiencing a shortage of professionals due to  human capi-
tal fl ight. In 2007, the emigration rate of Nigerians with tertiary educa-
tion was estimated to be 36  percent, while, for physicians and nurses, the 
rates  were about 13.6  percent and 11.7  percent, respectively (Ratha and 
 others 2007). Long- term economic growth cannot be achieved in the 
absence of  people with professional technical expertise and investment 
in the real sectors (agriculture and industry) (Mba and Ekeopara 2012). If 
the external  human capital is harnessed alongside the internal capital, 
the growth trajectory is not only likely to be high but also inclusive.
CHALLENGES OF JOBLESS GROWTH IN NIGERIA
Our results show that the Nigerian economy is characterized by positive 
GDP growth, but it is a jobless one and this is due to a number of 
challenges.7
Challenge of Low Industrial Base
Industry is crucial to sustaining Nigeria’s economic growth. This is 
why economic development policies (with each having a bearing on 
the industrial sector)  were  adopted ranging from the Import Substitu-
tion Strategy (ISS) through indigenization to the Structural Adjustment 
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Program (SAP). The country’s recent growth rate is masking serious 
under lying defi ciencies that must be addressed if  there is to be any 
meaningful long- term transformation, a structural defi cit that illus-
trates a reliance on primary production due to the absence of industrial 
capacity. Bringing this prob lem to an end would partly require focusing 
on efforts that  will transform the largely agricultural economy into 
value added activities (Arrey 2013). Nigeria also cannot continue to de-
pend on oil as the major source of its foreign exchange and revenue 
earnings. The recent crash in the price of oil and its effect on the econ-
omy further lends credence to this necessity.
Challenge of Infrastructural Defi cits
Infrastructural ser vices such as transport,  water and sanitation, power, 
telecommunications, and irrigation have been critical in the structural 
transformation of advanced economies. They represent a large portfo-
lio of expenditure in  these economies, ranging from one- third to one- 
half of public investments. Besides proving that infrastructure capital 
has a signifi cant positive effect on economic output and growth (Kes-
sides 1993), studies have shown that where infrastructure appears to 
lead economic growth, the impact becomes relatively long- term.  These 
structural impacts are further explicated through the effect on the 
quality of life of citizens, as well as the infl uence on the marginal produc-
tivity of  labor and capital for both public and private investments. The 
current level of infrastructure defi cit in Nigeria has been identifi ed by 
Sanusi (2012) as the major setback to Nigeria’s Vision 20:2020 of becom-
ing one of the twenty largest economies in 2020. The absence of in-
frastructural ser vices has hindered urbanization and the demographic 
dividends of the country’s working population boom.
Challenge of Poor Governance and Weak Institutions
Governance is one of the key  factors that explain the divergence in per-
for mance across developing countries (Khan 2007). This especially 
defi nes the level of inclusiveness that policies bring, as they are formu-
lated and implemented by institutions. The role of the government 
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does not depend solely on its involvement in the economic transfor-
mation pro cess but, more impor tant, on how it is able to govern devel-
opment with a decisive ideological orientation and effective institutions 
and policies underpinned by adequate bureaucratic and orga nizational 
capacity and po liti cal  will (Nkurayija 2011). Good governance, there-
fore, promotes democracy,  human capital formation, and effi ciency in 
the economy. Besides the weakness in the poor intermediation of 
production  factors is the issue of the high cost of governance and ad-
ministrative structures associated with the  running of government. Ac-
cording to Warimeh (2007), the misuse of public funds is another cause 
of the increasing high cost of governance in Nigeria. This po liti cal econ-
omy eventually creates room for corruption and passiveness, thereby 
weakening government plans and policies for economic growth. For in-
stance, Nigeria’s rank in government effectiveness fell from its highest 
level in 2000 of 30.29 to 27.49 in 2013.
Challenge of Insecurity
Nigeria, in recent times, has witnessed an unpre ce dented level of inse-
curity. The phenomenon has found greater expression following the 
emergence of Boko Haram since 2011, which led to humanitarian cri-
ses particularly in the northeastern parts of the country (Jerome 2015). 
According to Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency 
(NEMA), at least 470,500  people  were displaced in 2013 alone by such 
vio lence, and  there is very  little information about their protection and 
assistance needs. The country ranked 151 out of 162 in the 2014 Global 
Peace Index for major  factors such as society and security, as well as 
domestic and international confl ict, with a national cost of vio lence 
estimated at US$28.5 billion.8  There are also the associated effects of 
insecurity, including fear, coercion, loss of relatives, properties, and 
livelihoods, displacement, breakdown of production channels, and de-
privation of basic needs, which worsen the already high level of poverty. 
Vio lence and insecurity have a global impact as they erode a country’s 
 human and social capital, reduce life expectancy at birth, destroy its 
productive and fi nancial capital, and can threaten macroeconomic sta-
bility (Soares 2006; Geneva Declaration 2008). Security expenditures 
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have the effect of eroding savings and investments in the broader 
economy, as well as  labor productivity at the individual level. The 
World Development Report 2011 found that “a country that experi-
enced major vio lence over the period from 1981 to 2005 had a poverty 
rate 21 percentage points higher than a country that saw no vio lence” 
and for  every three years a country is affected by major vio lence, pov-
erty reduction lags  behind by 2.7  percent (World Bank 2011).
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSED REMEDIAL ACTIONS
Over the last de cade, Nigeria has experienced a steady and unpre ce-
dented wave of growth, which came with unique structural changes in 
sectoral employment. Characteristics of this growth pro cess in the light 
of fi ndings of this study hold an impor tant development policy interpre-
tation, with the need for the reallocation of  people to better- quality jobs 
to address unemployment, underemployment, and poverty. Nigeria 
 will need to galvanize its policy space not only to stimulate job creation 
and productivity within sectors, but also to ensure sector growths that 
encourage  labor shifts from low- to high- productivity sectors. Findings 
show that Nigeria’s highest productivity sector is the manufacturing 
sector, which has lagged  behind in terms of contributions to output and 
employment elasticity of output.
Although several  factors have contributed to growth in Nigeria, fore-
most, growth has been driven by sectoral variations in terms of employ-
ment, sectoral development, and value added, but  there is no signifi cant 
structural change on the employment front. Even though the share of 
agriculture in total GDP has reduced, it is still the sector that employs 
the highest number of  people, despite its low productivity and subsis-
tence features.
Proposed Remedial Actions
Our results show that Nigeria has been experiencing jobless growth 
over the past de cade and a half. The observed structural changes do 
not seem to be growth enhancing and seem to lack an employment 
generation capability. Thus, this type of growth is not inclusive.
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Given the need for  people to move out of less rewarding sectors (es-
pecially agriculture and rudimentary, informal ser vices sectors) and the 
ongoing high rate of urbanization, underemployment has become en-
trenched rather than just a passing phenomenon. In the circumstances, 
unemployment has continued to increase, while underemployment has 
resurfaced as a bedev iling challenge facing the country’s large youthful 
 labor force.
To remedy the situation, Nigeria fi rst needs to create more decent 
jobs. The World Bank has estimated that the Nigerian economy needs 
to create between 40 and 50 million jobs between 2010 and 2030 as a 
result of the continued high fertility rate, which is set to rapidly in-
crease the working- age population by some 66 million  people between 
2010 and 2030, compared to an increase of 35 million  people between 
1990 and 2030 (World Bank 2016).  These numbers roughly translate 
into over 2 million additional jobs per year, which  will be mostly 
taken up by new entrants to the  labor market. Emphasis should be 
on productive jobs that work well for development, as encapsulated 
in the World Development Report on Jobs (World Bank 2012). This 
could be sourced by: 1) promoting higher agricultural productivity, 
especially in smallholder farming; 2) spatially balanced investments 
that provide opportunities in the currently disadvantaged northern 
regions; and  3) bringing more girls into education and productive 
employment, which would contribute to higher  family earnings, en-
hance  family planning, and improve nutrition for  children. For the 
foreseeable  future, agriculture and small nonfarm  house hold enter-
prises  will continue to account for the bulk of new jobs. Nigeria must 
consider how to increase productivity in agriculture and non- farm en-
terprises and devise ave nues of attracting youths into the sector.  There 
should also be resolute commitment to raising productivity in the agri-
cultural sector through sustained massive support for agricultural 
research and extension (as has been done in Brazil, China, India, and 
Malaysia), mechanization, commercialization of technologies, and 
enhanced value addition through effective support for agro- processors 
and agri- businesses.
Nigeria needs to invest more in building a skilled workforce through 
diverse mea sures, such as improving the quality of basic education; the 
removal of barriers to good- quality education; making education more 
218 Ajakaiye, Jerome, Nabena, and Alaba
relevant to the  labor market through better links between schooling 
and job needs as well as strengthening the employability of gradu ate; 
and emphasis on vocational education.  These investments would help 
increase the productivity of Nigeria’s workforce. While Nigeria is al-
ready the sixth largest receiver of remittances in the world, with a tan-
gible $20.8 billion recorded in 2015 according to the World Bank 
Group (2016) Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, the diaspora 
could participate more in Nigeria’s development by bringing much 
needed skills. The Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission esti-
mated that each year, some 2,000 Nigerians who have been trained 
outside the country return home to seek employment or business op-
portunities. Such “diaspora- tapping” also provides the rationale for the 
TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Networks) pro-
gram of the United Nations Development Programme.  These programs 
need to be  either formalized or scaled up.
Special attention should be paid to the development and tech-
nological upgrade of the manufacturing sector in general and 
 labor- intensive components in par tic u lar. In addition, effective pro-
grams for the modernization of the ser vice sector, especially the 
 distributive trade subsector characterized by informality and low pro-
ductivity, should be articulated, effectively implemented, regularly 
monitored, and their impacts carefully evaluated to provide a basis for 
evidence- based pragmatic and proactive modifi cations as may be 
necessary. For Nigeria to benefi t from its demographic dividend, de-
veloping the entrepreneurial potential of its youth population is an 
impor tant opportunity for growth. Specifi c  labor- market interventions, 
including federal and state- level youth skill- building institutions— for ex-
ample, post- secondary trade schools, post- tertiary education skill build-
ing institutions (as in Canada), and innovative public works programs— 
should be targeted  toward the high number of poor and vulnerable 
 people.
Fi nally, an enabling business environment needs to be created by 
tackling the obstacles to  doing business, such as electricity, poor infra-
structure, and corruption. Federal, state, and local governments should 
focus on improving regulatory environments, infrastructure, and devel-
oping  human capital as essentials for inclusive  growth.
FIGURE 6- A2.  Aggregate Employment, Productivity, and Demographic 
Profi le of Growth in Nigeria, 2010–14
Source: Authors’ computations based on JoGGs Decomposition Tool (World Bank 2010). 
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FIGURE 6- A1.  Aggregate Employment, Productivity, and Demographic 
Profi le of Growth in Nigeria, 2005–09
Source: Authors’ computations based on JoGGs Decomposition Tool (World Bank 2010). 
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FIGURE 6-A4.  Output per Worker by Sectors, 2010–14
Source: Authors’ computations based on JoGGs Decomposition Tool (World Bank 2010).
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FIGURE 6-A6.  Contribution of Each Sector to Change in Employment- to- 
Population Ratio, 2010–14
Source: Authors’ computations based on JoGGs Decomposition Tool (World Bank 2010).
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NOTES
1. Development Progress is a four-year research project embarked upon 
by the European Centre for Development Policy (ECDPM) to better under-
stand and measure in concrete terms what has worked in development and 
why. The countries covered include Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Ethiopia, India, 
Indonesia, Mauritius, Mongolia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, 
and Vietnam.
FIGURE 6- A7.  Contribution of Change in Employment- to- Population Ratio 
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FIGURE 6- A8.  Contribution of Change in Employment- to- Population Ratio 
to Change in GDP (Value Added) per Capita, by Sector, Nigeria, 2010–14
Source: Authors’ computations based on JoGGs Decomposition Tool (World Bank 2010).
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2. Employment and unemployment data are compiled by NISER from 
the erstwhile National Development Plan, 1980–84, the National Rolling 
Plans (1990–2003), NBS Statistical Fact Sheets, the database of the National 
Manpower Board, 1970–2005, and other publications.
3. The methodology followed the World Bank job generation and growth 
decomposition tool pro cess. Detailed methodology is available in the tool’s 
appendix.
4. Employment rate is defi ned by ILO mea sure as the population that “par-
ticipates” in the  labor market, and participation is defi ned as all  those looking 
for jobs or already employed. But in developing countries, the defi nition of 
participation is very blurry  because employment may be low due to agents 
that are seasonally unemployed. We, therefore, believe that, in the case of 
developing countries, a better mea sure of the  labor force is the working- age 
population rather than  those actively participating in the  labor market.
5. Components can remain constant by treating them in vari ous ways: by 
leaving them in the level observed in the initial year, or the start at the fi nal 
year, or one of them can stay in the level observed in the initial year and the 
other start at the level observed in the fi nal year. Choice of treatment depends 
on decomposition approaches but, as mentioned, the Shapley decomposi-
tion approach uses a weighted average of each pos si ble alternative and, there-
fore, eliminates residuals.
6. Output per worker in this paper may be referred to as productivity 
 under the assumption that it encompasses all three infl uences.
7. It should be noted that the challenges are inexhaustible and only a few 
selected ones are discussed in this study.
8. See www . visionofhumanity . org / #page / indexes / global - peace - index / 2014 
/ NGA / OVER.
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Demographic, Employment, and Wage Trends
Haroon Bhorat, Karmen Naidoo, Morné Oosthuizen, 
and Kavisha Pillay
A fter negative and slow growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
South Africa’s triumphant transition to a demo cratic and more inclusive 
society in 1994 saw the economy once again begin to grow steadily. This 
renewed growth was supported by strong macroeconomic management 
and effective institutions. Since then, the South African economy has 
grown at an annual real average of 3.19  percent. Accompanying this 
growth per for mance are signifi cant welfare gains seen in the rise of 
access to social ser vices, housing, and basic infrastructure, as well as a 
moderate reduction in extreme poverty (Bhorat and  others 2015b). One 
of the  factors preventing greater development and welfare improve-
ments is that economic growth has come with considerable variation.
In the fi ve years immediately  after democracy, growth averaged 
2.76  percent, rising to 3.17  percent in the following fi ve years ( table 7-1). 
The period of fastest economic growth was between 2004 and 2008, 
where real GDP expanded at an annualized average rate of almost 
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5  percent. This period of relatively fast growth was then abruptly inter-
rupted by the global fi nancial crisis, which caused the South African 
economy to enter a brief recession in 2009.
National output subsequently  rose to just over 3  percent in 2010, but 
has since weakened. Over the last fi ve years, therefore, GDP per capita 
has grown at an annual average of merely 0.56  percent. This weakening 
of the South African economy can ultimately be attributed to a combina-
tion of  factors, including slow global growth, industrial disputes, elec-
tricity shortages and concomitant price hikes, a lack of international 
competitiveness in manufacturing, and declining gold, platinum, and 
coal prices since 2012.
A brief analy sis of the sectoral composition at two points in time 
shows that four sectors are expanding relatively faster than overall GDP: 
transport, storage, and communication; fi nancial and business ser vices; 
construction; and  wholesale and retail trade.1 Transport, storage, and 
communication is now one and a half times the size it was in 1994, 
fi nancial and business ser vices have expanded by 42   percent over the 
period, and construction by 47  percent. The remaining fi ve sectors have 
all declined in their share of GDP.
The most marked change is that of the mining sector. From consti-
tuting up to 15.5   percent of GDP in 2014, it is now almost half that 
proportion, at 8.5  percent. In addition, agriculture and manufacturing 
have also declined considerably in their shares of GDP, by 22  percent 
and 10  percent, respectively. While the country has effectively transi-
tioned away from its earlier reliance on the mining sector, mining 
 TABLE 7-1.  Real GDP and GDP per Capita Annual Average Growth 
Rates, South Africa
 Percent
1994–98 1999–2003 2004–08 2009–13
GDP 2.76 3.17 4.92 1.91
(1.40) (0.73) (0.84) (2.03)
GDP per capita 0.50 1.09 3.55 0.56
(1.43) (0.78) (0.83) (2.00)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) (2015); authors’ calculations.
Note: Standard deviations shown in  parenthesis.
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remains an impor tant contributor to economic activity. Most impor tant, 
the sector generates more than half of the country’s foreign exchange 
revenue and its fi rms account for a quarter of the national stock ex-
change market capitalization (Chamber of Mines 2015). Thus, exports 
are heavi ly concentrated in natu ral resources, where gold and other 
mining products make up 44  percent of exports, a proportion similar 
to that of manufacturing (Industrial Development Corporation 2013).
Based on the sectoral composition of GDP, then, it is evident that 
South Africa has become a service- driven economy since 1994. The 
share of output contributed by  wholesale and retail trade, transport, 
and communication— and most visibly— fi nancial and business ser vices, 
shows increases over the fi rst two de cades of democracy in South Africa. 
The economy, it is fair to argue, has slipstreamed onto an economic 
development trajectory that is increasingly intensive in the provision of 
ser vices. What is most starkly evident in this deepening output from ser-
vices, however, is the stagnation in manufacturing. Hence, we fi nd that 
the manufacturing sector’s share of GDP has declined marginally since 
1994 in South Africa. Since trade became more liberalized in the early 
1990s, South Africa’s manufacturing sector has failed to compete in 
global manufacturing export markets. Increased import competition and 
the level and volatility of the real exchange rate have been shown to be 
impor tant  drivers of South Africa’s manufacturing decline (Rodrik 2006). 
No country to date has managed to transition out of a  middle- income 
to a high- income country status without the dynamism of a vibrant, 
 labor- intensive manufacturing industry. In the lexicon of post- apartheid 
South Africa, however, this notion of  labor- intensive manufacturing as a 
driver of growth and jobs in the country is strikingly absent.
South Africa is classifi ed as an upper middle-income country, with 
real GDP per capita currently at US$5,916, up from US$4,652 in 2000. 
The uneven and, at times, sluggish growth in average income levels, 
however, has meant a moderate decline in poverty, from 40  percent of 
the population in 1995, to 26  percent in 2013, using the World Bank’s 
$2- a- day poverty line. With a current population of almost 53 million, 
this equates to about 13.7 million  people living in poverty in South Af-
rica. At perhaps the more appropriate national poverty line, the poverty 
headcount ratio has increased from 31   percent in 1995 to a current 
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level of 53.8   percent.2 This headcount ratio is calculated using the 
upper bound level of a newly rebased national poverty line, but even at 
the national lower bound headcount poverty rate of 37  percent, poverty 
has undoubtedly remained high.
Thus, while extreme poverty has declined, the trends on the national 
poverty line are more worrying. South Africa’s inability to translate growth 
into reducing poverty is not surprising given the extremely unequal na-
ture of the society. With a Gini coeffi cient of 0.59, the exceptionally high 
level of income in equality is arguably the most impor tant  factor hin-
dering the poverty reducing power of economic growth.3 The exclusivity 
of South Africa’s growth path is further emphasized by an unemployment 
rate of 25  percent, and one that has averaged 23.7  percent over the last two 
de cades, with its lowest level at 17  percent in 1995.4 South Africa is clearly 
in a  labor market crisis, which in a low growth environment serves only 
to reinforce further the unsustainably high level of income in equality.
Therefore, despite the optimistic outlook for the South African 
economy as the country transitioned to democracy in 1994, economic 
growth over the last two de cades has been moderate. In addition, while 
the comprehensive social welfare system has succeeded in reducing 
inequalities in access to public ser vices and housing, poverty has re-
mained stagnant and in equality has remained exceptionally high— 
underpinned by one of the world’s consistently highest unemployment 
rates. Given this all too brief background to the economy’s growth rec-
ord and the structure of this growth trajectory, the remainder of this 
paper focuses on demographic and  labor market trends during the pe-
riod to understand better some of the  factor market under pinnings of 
South Africa’s economic per for mance.
ESTIMATING SOUTH AFRICA’S DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND
The South African  labor market has under gone considerable changes 
since the end of apartheid and the elimination of vari ous statutory restric-
tions on  labor market access and participation. The key feature of the 
latter half of the 1990s and the early 2000s was the rapid growth in the 
size of the  labor force, driven by increasing  labor force participation 
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rates— rather than a rapidly growing working- age population— particularly 
among rural African  women (Casale and Posel 2002). For the 1995 to 
2002 period, for example, growth in the working- age population aver-
aged 2.1  percent per annum, which was less than half the rate of growth 
of the  labor force (irrespective of the unemployment defi nition utilized) 
(Bhorat and Oosthuizen 2006, p. 145). As a result, although employment 
growth was able to keep pace with growth in the working- age population 
and, largely, with economic growth, it was unable to keep up with the 
growth in the  labor force. Unemployment, thus, moved rapidly higher, 
both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the  labor force.
This disconnect between employment growth and  labor force 
growth points to the importance of understanding the longer- term chal-
lenges and opportunities associated with demographic change. Projec-
tions from the United Nations Population statistics suggest that the 
share of the working- age population (WAP) in the total population in 
South Africa  will remain between 65  percent and 67  percent  until the 
year 2030. Given slowing population growth rates, this means that the 
working- age population is expected to increase gradually, from the cur-
rent 34.2 million to 36.5 million by 2030. South Africa is, therefore, quite 
some way along its demographic transition. In fact, the median age in 
South Africa has risen from eigh teen years to twenty- fi ve years over the 
last three de cades, and is estimated to rise to thirty- one over the next 
three de cades as the population continues to age (Oosthuizen 2014).
According to the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) framework, the 
shift from a high- fertility, high- mortality equilibrium to a low- fertility, 
low- mortality equilibrium— referred to as the demographic transition—
is associated with two potential dividends that can contribute  toward 
longer term economic growth and development (Mason and Lee 2007; 
NTA 2013). The fi rst demographic dividend is triggered by falling fer-
tility rates, having been preceded by falling mortality rates, particularly 
among  children. This pro cess helps to boost economic growth through 
lowering the extent of de pen dency on working- age adults.
Typically, de pen dency is mea sured in terms of de pen dency ratios, 
namely the ratio of eco nom ically inactive cohorts to eco nom ically 
active cohorts (for example, the total de pen dency ratio is the ratio of 
 children  under the age of fi fteen and adults aged sixty- fi ve years and 
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older to the working- age population). This one– zero switch between de-
pendence and nondependence, though, is not realistic, and is avoided 
within the NTA framework by calculating the support ratio. The support 
ratio mea sures the number of effective workers (a country’s population- 
weighted per capita  labor income profi le) relative to the number of 
effective consumers (the population- weighted per capita consumption 
profi le). A rise in the support ratio implies a relative increase in the num-
ber of effective workers and, therefore, a lower level of dependence.
Declining fertility leads to a reduction in the ratio of dependent 
 children relative to nondependent (that is, earning) adults and is the 
under lying driver of the demographic dividend— defi ned as the rate of 
change of the support ratio—as it drives the support ratio higher. This 
raised support ratio implies an increase in the number of effective 
workers relative to effective consumers and, thus, income per effective 
consumer rises, ceteris paribus. This, in turn, implies higher stan-
dards of living and an improved scope for  human capital investment. 
Upon this foundation, then, a second demographic dividend, achieved 
through capital deepening, can be realized if the benefi ts of the fi rst 
dividend are invested in  human, physical, and fi nancial capital.
For South Africa, the average fertility rate has already declined sig-
nifi cantly, from 6.4 births per  woman in the 1950s to 2.4 births in 2005–
10 (United Nations 2012). However, the high level of unemployment 
and the resulting low  labor income— particularly for young workers— 
has signifi cantly constrained the economy’s ability to reap the potential 
benefi ts of this demographic dividend. In addition to demographic 
change, both  labor income and consumption are impor tant  factors in-
fl uencing the rate of change of the support ratio and, therefore, the 
magnitude of the demographic  dividend.
Figure 7-1 shows that  labor income begins to rise at a  later age and 
is markedly lower among young  people in South Africa than in a range 
of other developed and developed countries. The interquartile ranges 
(IQR) of normalized  labor income and consumption profi les across a 
variety of other countries are plotted in the graph using NTA data.5 In 
addition, per capita  labor income is shown to fall signifi cantly and more 
steeply for older working- age adults in South Africa compared to the 
group of thirty- three other  countries.
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South Africa’s consumption pattern also differs signifi cantly from 
other countries. Consumption for  children and young adults in South 
Africa is positioned within the fi rst quartile of the IQR of the other 
countries, but rises to the top quartile for  those between the ages of 
thirty and sixty years. For older individuals in South Africa, consump-
tion declines quite strongly compared to other countries, where el derly 
consumption remains relatively stable. This decline in consumption 
among older cohorts in South Africa points to under lying weaknesses 
in the private and public institutions that should allocate resources to 
ensure that consumption among the el derly is maintained at a level 
that is comparable to that among prime working- age cohorts (Oosthui-
zen 2014). Fi nally, evaluating income and consumption together, South 
FIGURE 7-1.  Per Capita  Labor Income, Consumption and Lifecycle 
Defi cit, 2005
Source: Oosthuizen (2014) using National Transfer Accounts (2013) data.
Note: Values are expressed as ratios to average per capita  labor income at age 30–49. For a list of NTA 
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Africa’s lifecycle surplus period lasts thirty years, between the ages of 
thirty and fi fty- nine years, which is broadly typical of NTA countries, al-
beit slightly delayed.
Estimates of the fi rst demographic dividend for South Africa 
show that the country has passed through at least half of the period 
in which the fi rst demographic dividend is expected to be positive, and 
is now in the stage during which the magnitude of the dividend is fall-
ing. The magnitude of South Africa’s demographic dividend is in line 
with other  middle- income countries. Over the 2005–10 period, the an-
nual growth in the support ratio ranged between 0.15–0.40   percent, 
compared to an average of 0.40   percent for a group of twelve other 
upper middle-income countries for which  there are NTA estimates 
(Mason and Lee 2012, as quoted in Oosthuizen 2014).
The continuing weaknesses within the South African  labor market 
and the historical prob lems in the public provision of quality education 
to the broader population remain as two of the most signifi cant challenges 
to realizing some benefi t of the fi nal phase of the positive demographic 
dividend over the next thirty years. While the low level of employment 
and  labor income of young South Africans is critical to address, a 
greater positive impact on the demographic dividend would be achieved 
if South Africa’s consumption profi le  were similar to that of the median 
NTA country. As fi gure 7-1 suggests, this would imply lowering the level 
of consumption of prime age adults relative to peak  labor income to 
levels that are in line with international trends, while raising per capita 
consumption among the el derly. Under lying this fi nding is South 
 Africa’s relatively advanced point within the demographic transition. 
The youn gest cohorts within the working- age population are expected 
to stabilize in size and begin to contract, while older working- age 
cohorts— which would comprise a relatively large proportion of effec-
tive consumers, given their high per capita consumption— are ex-
pected to grow rapidly. This suggests that weak sharing mechanisms 
within South African society may have a negative impact on per capita 
income growth over time (Oosthuizen 2014). In some sense, this pro-
vides support for the argument that in equality can act as a brake on 
economic growth.
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STRUCTURE OF THE  LABOR MARKET AND 
GROWTH– EMPLOYMENT INTERACTIONS
The South African  labor market has received considerable analytical 
and research attention over the past fi fteen years and, as a result,  there 
are a large number of  labor market reviews covering the post- apartheid 
era (see, for example, Burger and Woolard 2005; Bhorat and Oosthui-
zen 2006; Branson 2006; Oosthuizen 2006; Yu 2008). Instead of a 
detailed review of the post- apartheid  labor market, this paper seeks to 
explore the par tic u lar trends relating to skills- biased  labor demand, as 
well as to highlight two new, more recent post- apartheid  labor market 
trends. The latter is displayed in the rise, fi rst, of temporary employ-
ment ser vices as a form of alternative employment and, second, in the 
sharp increase in the level of public sector employment.
The number of the employed in South Africa is currently just  under 15 
million individuals, rising from 12.4 million in 2004. This increase of 2.6 
million over the last de cade is equivalent to an average annualized growth 
rate of 2.3  percent, with the most rapid growth occurring between 2004 
and 2008, when the economy was growing at its fastest rate. Employment, 
thus, peaked at 14 million workers in the fi nal quarter of 2008. The effects 
of the global economic recession, however,  were felt heavi ly in South 
Africa, where the fi rst three quarters of 2009 saw an estimated 900,000 jobs 
lost, and by the end of 2010, the number of employed equaled 13.2 million 
(Oosthuizen 2011). Employment creation has since remained weak.
The slow pace of job creation in South Africa over the last de cade 
has meant the number of unemployed individuals has increased 
from 4.2 million in 2004 to a current level of 4.9 million by the nar-
row defi nition—an unemployment rate increase from 13   percent to 
24  percent. Since 1994, the number of unemployed has doubled. When 
using an expanded defi nition of unemployment, the current unemploy-
ment fi gure stands at 8.1 million, a 35  percent unemployment rate.6 The 
economic challenges then become clear:  labor intensive sectors have 
failed to grow at a rapid enough pace to absorb the rising levels of  labor 
force participation and the growing working- age population over time.
 Simple elasticities of employment to GDP growth are provided in 
 table 7-2. The estimates indicate that over the entire twenty- year period, 
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employment increased on average by 0.64  percent for  every 1  percent in 
GDP growth. The employment intensity of growth was clearly higher in 
the fi rst de cade  after democracy than the second. Against other compa-
rable economies, South Africa’s  simple output elasticity of total employ-
ment is by no means an outlier (Bhorat 2012). Following this,  there is no 
immediate evidence  here that South Africa’s economy has a weak  labor 
absorptive capacity (Bhorat 2012).
Furthermore, relative to a small subset of countries, Bhorat (2008) 
shows that South Africa’s  simple elasticity is relatively high. For exam-
ple, fast growing economies (such as India and Malaysia) experienced a 
more moderate employment response to the high growth during the 
2001–05 period; South Africa’s estimate then was 0.60, while Malaysia 
and India  were 0.47 and 0.25, respectively (Bhorat 2008). Of course, 
within South Africa’s high unemployment environment, consumption 
levels are likely to be less than optimal and  there may be lower incen-
tive for investment, which would work together to dampen economic 
growth. The wide- scale provision of social grants would partly serve to 
offset  these effects. Clearly,  there is a nontrivial two- way relationship 
between growth and employment. Arguably, though, any development 
plan for South Africa needs to place economic growth at its core, with 
a focus on growth in  labor- intensive sectors, for the benefi ts of growth 
and employment creation to be more equitably distributed.
Uneven Sectoral Shifts in Employment
 Table 7-3 shows that the South African economy has created about 2.5 
million jobs over the 2001–12 period, with signifi cant job losses in the 
primary sector. It is evident in the sectoral breakdown that the over-







1994 9,847 173,021.42 0.71 0.64 0.64
2004 12,342 234,667.86 . . .  . . .  . . .  
2013 14,983 313,465.97 . . .  . . .  . . .  
Source: DataFirst PALMS (1994, 2004); StatsSA Quarterly  Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 
(2013); World Bank WDI (2015); authors’  calculations.
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whelming majority of jobs in the other two sectors (84   percent) have 
emanated from the tertiary sector. This is completely consistent, of 
course, with our output share analy sis above.
Two additional sectoral shifts are crucial to note. First, job destruc-
tion in the primary sectors is very clear. Specifi cally, agriculture and 
mining together lost almost 72,000 jobs. One  factor contributing to de-
clines in agricultural employment over this period was the introduction 
of a minimum wage in March 2003 (Bhorat and  others 2012). The poor 
per for mance of the mining sector can be attributed to a range of  factors, 
 TABLE 7-3.  Employment Shifts by Industry, South Africa, 2001–12









(%ΔEi/%ΔE) 2001 2012 (2001–12)
Primary −719,232 –2.6 0.15 0.07 −0.28
 Agriculture −514,468 –2.7 0.1 0.04 −0.2
 Mining −204,764 –2.2 0.05 0.02 −0.08
Secondary 537,376 1.0 0.2 0.21 0.21
 Manufacturing 112,149 0.3 0.14 0.12 0.04
 Utilities 10,774 0.5 0.008 0.008 0.004
 Construction 414,453 2.5 0.05 0.07 0.16
Tertiary 2,720,821 1.6 0.63 0.71 1.08
 Trade 513,572 0.9 0.21 0.21 0.2
 Transport 288,364 2.1 0.04 0.06 0.11
 Financial 782,108 2.8 0.09 0.13 0.31
 CSPSc 1,041,524 2.1 0.17 0.22 0.42
 Private  house holds 95,253 0.4 0.09 0.08 0.04
Total 2,497,763 1 1 1 1
Source: Bhorat and  others (2014) using PALMS dataset (2012).
a. The ratio of the percentage change for each respective subsector and industry to the total 
overall  percent change in employment over the period (relative sectoral employment growth).
b. The ratio of the percentage change in the share of employment to the overall change in 
employment over the period (share of change in employment). This mea sure shows, within each 
broad sector, where the sources of employment growth are. For example, employment in the 
tertiary sector is 1.08 times (or 108  percent of) the level of employment in 2001, which is the sum 
of the changes for all the industries within this subsector. CSPS, then, is the greatest contributor 
to employment growth in the tertiary sector.
c. CSPS (community, social, and personal ser vices) is predominantly public sector  employment.
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including a strongly appreciating Rand in the mid-2000s, infrastruc-
tural constraints (such as rail transport), energy constraints, and the 
application of new mining laws in South Africa (Organ ization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2008). The recent 
widespread strike action in the mining sector in 2010 and 2011 exacer-
bated the prob lems.
Second, consistent with the lack of dynamism in manufacturing, 
employment levels in the sector have stagnated. Hence, it is instruc-
tive that the South African manufacturing sector has generated just 
over 110,000 jobs over an eleven- year period, yielding a relative em-
ployment growth rate of only 0.3  percent per annum. In contrast, the 
relative employment growth rates of the transport, fi nance, and com-
munity, social, and personal (CSP) ser vices sectors all exceed 2  percent 
per annum. Employment and growth generators in the South African 
economy since 2001 have been disproportionately located in the ser-
vices sectors.
In terms of the share of this change in employment since 2001, the 
last column in  table 7-3 provides a key insight into the scale of this eco-
nomic and employment shift. In par tic u lar, then, we see that the CSP 
sector and the fi nancial and business ser vices accounted for 73  percent 
of the total employment shift in this period. As a result, the fi nancial 
sector now accounts for 13.5  percent of employment, from 10  percent a 
de cade ago. The CSP result suggests, in the fi rst instance, that one of 
the biggest  drivers of job creation since 2004 has been the expansion 
of employment in the public sector, which makes up the majority of 
community, social, and personal ser vices. Hence, from contributing 
17  percent of employment in 2001, the broader industry now accounts for 
22.5  percent of employment, once again making it the largest industry 
by employment. Furthermore, public sector employment is the main 
driver of employment growth in the tertiary sector. This rising trend in 
public sector employment is an impor tant focus of this paper, and is 
discussed in more detail  later.
In essence, we observe impor tant and new characteristics relative 
to the early post- apartheid years: job destruction in the primary sectors, 
a manufacturing sector that has been in effec tive as a generator of 
large- scale jobs, and a tertiary sector that has stepped in to fi ll this vac-
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uum. Employment has, thus, disproportionately emanated from the 
tradable and nontradable ser vices sectors. We turn next to a relatively 
new phenomenon characterizing job creation in South Africa, the rise 
of temporary employment ser vices.
Rise of Temporary Employment Ser vices
In terms of the second largest sectoral contributor to the overall em-
ployment change, the fi nancial and business ser vices industry result is 
slightly more complex, given that this sector is not often a large genera-
tor of jobs. Disaggregating the sources of employment in the fi nancial 
sector reveals an in ter est ing pattern: employment growth in fi nancial 
ser vices is about growth in the business ser vice colloquially known as 
“ labor brokering” or, as it is known globally, temporary employment ser-
vices (TES) provision. This statistical hidden identity of the TES sector 
arises  because the  labor force survey data does not list TES as a separate 
sector, but  houses it within the fi nancial and business ser vices sector, 
classifying it as the subsector Business Ser vices Not Elsewhere Classi-
fi ed (NEC). TES employment essentially involves the practice of com-
panies providing, as a third- party employer, workers across vari ous oc-
cupations (such as cleaning, accounting, secretarial, security ser vices, 
and so on) to formal sector fi rms. The latter, then, do not directly hire 
 these workers. TES employment as a percentage of the fi nancial indus-
try employment increased rapidly in the post- apartheid period in South 
Africa from 26.64  percent in 1995 to 47.36  percent in 2014. As a propor-
tion of total employment, while remaining quite small, TES employ-
ment has nearly tripled, by increasing from 2.22  percent to 6.44  percent 
over the same period.7
To understand where employment is actually concentrated within 
the Business Activities Not Elsewhere Classifi ed (NEC) sector for the 
period 1999 to 2014, our analy sis shows that Protective Ser vices Work-
ers Not Elsewhere Classifi ed8 accounted for the relatively largest share 
of the employed, at between 43  percent and 47  percent.9 The second 
largest share, at 15  percent, was accounted for by commercial helpers 
and cleaners (as opposed to residential cleaners), highlighting the 
 increased use of contract cleaners over this time. By 2014, 6  percent of 
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 those employed in this subsector  were categorized as farmhands and 
laborers, compared to an almost negligible category in 1999 (only 131 
employed as farmhands and laborers). While this employment category 
remains relatively small, Bhorat and Mayet (2012) point out that the 
rapid growth in this type of employment classifi cation is refl ective of 
increased  labor broker recruitment in this area of work.
 There are two pos si ble explanations  here. One is that  these results 
suggest that the rapid expansion of employment related to protective 
and crime- prevention ser vices is a response to South Africa’s high 
crime rate. At another level,  these results provide some power ful evi-
dence of the rise of  labor- brokering agencies that have for some time 
been an impor tant topic of public debate in the country. In this debate, 
it is the burden of South Africa’s regulatory environment that is often 
thought to be a central  factor in the rise of TES employment. This form 
of employment, while not always offering lower direct costs of employ-
ment, often allow fi rms to circumvent the indirect costs of employment 
thought to reside in the economy’s  labor regulatory environment (Bhorat 
and van der Westhuizen 2013).
To assess  whether South Africa’s scores on a set of normalized em-
ployment protection legislation mea sures are indicative of an over- 
regulated or rigid  labor market, Bhorat and  others (2015a) use the 2013 
World Bank’s  Doing Business survey to provide a comparison of South 
Africa’s mea sures of  labor regulation against other regions of the world. 
As  table 7-4 indicates, low- income and high- income OECD countries 
exhibit the highest average scores of  labor market rigidity, nonwage 
 labor costs, and fi ring costs. Countries that lie between  these two extreme 
income categories exhibit two distinct patterns. First,  there is declining 
rigidity and fi ring costs as income level rises; and second, nonwage  labor 
costs rise with income level, as is expected.
South Africa’s rankings for the fi ring costs and nonwage  labor 
costs indices are both below its income category (upper  middle- income) 
means, and the global means. While South Africa’s diffi culty of fi ring 
and rigidity of hours indices are above the respective income category 
and global means, it is the diffi culty of hiring index that stands out as 
remarkably high. Therefore, as Bhorat and  others (2015a) highlight, 
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 labor market in terms of hiring and fi ring costs; however, the legislated 
procedural requirements on hiring workers introduces a degree of regu-
latory infl exibility. Benjamin and  others (2010) argue, however, that the 
World Bank’s  Doing Business survey does not mea sure the ineffi ciency 
of the  labor courts system, which potentially adds a very high cost to 
the fi ring of workers. Thus, it is arguably  these degrees of infl exibility 
that fi rms can overcome through employing workers through  labor bro-
kers or temporary employment ser vice providers.
 Human Capital and Skills- Biased  Labor Demand
The rising shares of tertiary sector employment have implications for 
the under lying occupational shifts as they relate to skills levels. This 
section looks more closely at South Africa’s educational profi le and 
the economy’s skills- biased growth trajectory to better understand the 
under lying implications for the  labor market.
Weaknesses in South Africa’s Educational System
One of the fundamentally destructive legacies of the apartheid govern-
ment’s reign was a highly unequal schooling system and a tertiary sys-
tem that was not accessible to  those with poor levels of schooling. While 
 there have been enormous strides in the last twenty years to increase 
access to schooling, the poor quality of schooling in South Africa re-
mains a critical challenge.
Enrollment in primary school in South Africa has reached almost 
100   percent, supported by a no- fee policy for  children from poor 
 house holds, fulfi lling the constitutionally enshrined right to basic edu-
cation for all  children. This is, no doubt, a positive development over 
time; however, the average quality of the schooling provided to all 
 these  children remains weak. Comparing the grade 6 standardized 
mathe matics and reading scores from SACMEQ III (Southern and 
Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality) for a 
number of African countries, South Africa’s average for both subjects 
fall below many other countries, such as Tanzania, Swaziland,  Kenya, 
Botswana, and Zimbabwe, as well as below the African mean scores 
(Presidency 2014).10 In addition, using TIMSS (2011) data for grade 8 
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students, we can compare the results of standardized mathe matics and 
science tests. The results show that South Africa does not compare fa-
vorably to comparator countries such as Turkey, Thailand, Botswana, 
and Chile, and is actually one of the worst performing countries. More 
than 50  percent of grade 8 pupils in South Africa score below 400 for 
mathe matics— the low international benchmark score— and a mere 
6  percent score above 550 (the high international benchmark score).11 
South African pupils perform equally poorly on the standardized sci-
ence test.
As such, South Africa’s education system is comprised of a very 
high primary school enrollment rate, a very low dropout rate before 
grade 6, and low- level learning for  those who do complete grade 6 
(Spaull and Taylor 2015). High levels of between- school in equality in 
learning outcomes have also shown to be strongly dependent on the 
socioeconomic differentials, where clearly the South African schooling 
system— and poorer schools, in particular— has not been able to over-
come inherited socioeconomic disadvantages (van der Berg 2006). 
Thus, for  every 100 pupils who start school in South Africa, fi fty make 
it to grade 12 (fi nal year of high school), forty  will pass, and only twelve 
 will qualify for university (Spaull 2013).  There is considerable educa-
tion research to suggest that learning defi cits are acquired early on, dur-
ing primary school, and grow each year  until they become insurmount-
able, leading to failure (and thus grade repetition), and eventual dropout 
during grades 10 to 12. Research using two waves of the National In-
come Dynamics Survey panel data confi rms the notion that grade 
repetition— a signal of learning defi cits—is a key determinant of school 
dropout even  after controlling for school quality and socioeconomic 
status (Branson and  others 2013). Given the signifi cantly positive re-
turns to higher education in the South African  labor market, it is not 
surprising that the extremely high levels of income in equality have 
persisted.
Clearly, the South African government has found it diffi cult to 
infl uence the quality of education over time, which is evident in the nu-
merous changes to the national curriculum. The outcomes- based cur-
riculum was introduced in 2005 and, due to implementation prob lems, 
was replaced by vari ous revisions between 2011 and 2014 (Presidency 
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2014). Some of the impor tant supply- side challenges to educational 
outcomes over the last two de cades have been related to the delivery of 
basic school materials (particularly textbooks), as well as the lack of es-
tablishing minimum standards for school infrastructure and teacher 
quality.
The country’s education crisis has had impor tant implications 
for the levels of  human capital available in the workforce.  There has 
been notable improvement. The proportions of  those in the workforce 
with no education, incomplete primary school education, or completed 
primary education as their highest educational attainment, have all de-
clined substantially since 1994.12 However, the current educational pro-
fi le of the employed shows that only 20  percent have post- secondary edu-
cation and 32  percent have a high school completion. Of the remaining 
half of the workforce, 70  percent have an incomplete secondary educa-
tion as their highest level of education. The South Africa workforce is, at 
best, a semi- skilled workforce.
More worrying, then, is that one- third of the unemployed also have 
a complete high school qualifi cation, a proportion that has risen from 
17.5  percent in 1994.  These are individuals who, though having a basic 
level of education, do not possess the skills in demand in the workplace 
or are other wise ill prepared for the work force. A further 48  percent of 
unemployed are  those who have dropped out of high school, most likely 
due to accumulated learning defi cits as a result of being educated in 
poorly resourced schools, with poor teacher quality and an inability to 
provide remedial classes to  those pupils who most need it. The returns 
to  these lower levels of education in the South African  labor market 
remain low, which has wide- reaching consequences for  future genera-
tions of  these unemployed individuals. This, in turn,  will likely serve to 
perpetuate high levels of in equality as  these individuals are excluded 
from the benefi ts of economic and employment growth, and perhaps 
also from accessing opportunities for self- employment.
Skills- Biased  Labor Demand
 Table 7-5 explores the interaction between occupational skills and sec-
toral changes for the 2001–12 period. A few key observations emerge. 
First, the primary sector lost more than half a million medium- skilled 
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jobs and  175,000 unskilled jobs over the period, with no signifi cant 
change in the number of high- skilled jobs. Over the period,  there was 
positive output growth in both agriculture and mining, which suggests, 
then, that an increase in the capital intensity of production resulted in 
the reduction of medium- skilled and unskilled  labor.
 TABLE 7-5.  Changes in Skills Shares by Sector, South Africa, 2001–12
 Percent  unless other wise specifi ed
Within sector shares Change over 2001–12
2001 2004 2007 2010 2012  Percent
Number of 
 jobs in 
category
Primary
High skilled 2.9 5.4 4.8 7.2 7.6 4.8 27,602
Medium 
 skilled
54.5 52.5 53.1 35.2 36.8 –17.7  –571,229*
Unskilled 42.6 42.1 42.1 57.6 55.5 12.9  –175,392*
Total 100 100 100 100 100  –719,232*
Secondary
High skilled 14.2 15.3 16.6 19 18.1 3.9  188,518*
Medium 
 skilled
69.8 64.7 63.6 64.2 61.5 –8.3 136,140
Unskilled 16 19.9 19.8 16.8 20.4 4.4 214,002*
Total 100 100 100 100 100 537,376*
Tertiary
High skilled 27.4 27.1 31.8 28.3 29.3 1.9 931,498*
Medium 
 skilled
41.8 41.5 39.8 42.6 42.6 0.8 1,214,349*
Unskilled 30.8 31.4 28.4 29.1 28.1 –2.7 576,288*
Total 100 100 100 100 100   2,720,821*
Source: Bhorat and  others (2014) based on StatsSA LFS (2001–07) and PALMS (DataFirst 
2014) data.
The primary sector includes agriculture and mining; the secondary sector includes manufactur-
ing, utilities, and construction; and the tertiary sector includes trade, transport, fi nancial ser vices, 
community ser vices, and private  house holds.
High- skilled workers include man ag ers and professionals; medium- skilled workers include clerks, 
ser vice and sales workers, skilled agricultural and fi shery workers, craft and trade workers, and 
operators and assemblers; and unskilled workers include elementary workers and domestic workers.
* denotes a signifi cant change at the 5  percent level based on a  simple t- test in STATA.
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Second, the secondary sector saw an increase of about half a million 
jobs over the period, predominantly in high- skilled and unskilled em-
ployment. Therefore, while the proportion of unskilled workers in the 
sector  rose signifi cantly, it remains low at 20   percent of employment. 
Medium- skilled workers continue to make up the large majority of em-
ployment in the secondary sector. Growth in employment was driven 
primarily by the construction sector, which was boosted by investment 
in infrastructure for the 2010 Football World Cup.
Fi nally, then, it is clear that the tertiary sector was the largest creator 
of jobs between 2001 and 2012, growing by 2.7 million workers. While 
employment grew signifi cantly across the skills spectrum, more than 
70  percent of the increase in jobs was associated with high- and medium- 
skilled employment. As a result, both the proportions of high- skilled and 
medium- skilled workers in the sector  rose, while the proportion of 
unskilled workers marginally declined. By 2012, high- skilled workers 
accounted for just  under 30   percent of tertiary sector workers, while 
medium- skilled and unskilled workers accounted for 42.6  percent— adding 
up to approximately three- quarters of the sector’s workforce. Interestingly, 
the major occupational group within the TES subsector is ser vice and 
sales workers— medium- skilled employees— which account for slightly 
less than half of overall TES employment. Therefore, TES employment 
growth has also been an impor tant contributor to the shifting skills shares 
seen in the  table.
Overall, both the secondary and tertiary sectors witnessed a rise in 
the proportion of high- skilled employment, along with a rise in the 
proportion of medium- skilled employment in the tertiary sector. At the 
same time, the primary and tertiary sectors saw declining proportions 
of unskilled  labor. It has earlier been shown that employment losses 
between 1994 and 2003  were likely due to skills- biased technological 
changes, though trade liberalization accounts for some of the change 
(Bhorat and Hodge 1999; Bhorat 2001; Dunne and Edwards 2006; 
Bhorat and  others 2014). This trend seems to have continued over the 
last de cade. In the context of a growing economy, it would suggest that 
fi rms are investing in capital and skills, causing the shift away from 
unskilled  labor. The results show that while unskilled employment 
 rose in both secondary and tertiary sectors, the proportion of unskilled 
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workers  rose only in the secondary sector. Both the primary and sec-
ondary sectors of the economy witnessed dramatically declining pro-
portions of medium- skilled workers.
To have employment disproportionately favoring the skilled is a 
huge long- run concern for an economy like South Africa’s, which has 
an excess supply of  labor that is greater than most other emerging mar-
kets in the world as well as serious challenges in improving access to 
and quality of secondary and higher education. It is clear that the trad-
able sectors have  adopted production techniques that are increasingly 
capital- intensive. Essentially, the mismatch between  labor demand and 
 labor supply goes to the heart of what is wrong with the structure of 
South Africa’s growth pattern.
ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN EMPLOYMENT
While the growth in TES employment is novel and involves regulatory 
avoidance, the rise of public sector employment has a much greater 
potential import for the  future trajectory of the economy’s employment 
path. This is the focus of the rest of the chapter.  Table 7-6 shows that 
the total number of public sector employment has increased from 2.16 
million in 2008 to 2.69 million at the end of 2014—an increase of more 
than half a million jobs in a six- year period. We further disaggregate 
public sector employment  here into government (national, provincial, 
and local) and state- owned enterprises (SOEs). Public sector employment 
is largely dominated by national, provincial, and local government, which 
has accounted for about 88  percent of public sector employment over 
the period.
Therefore, from constituting 14.5   percent of total employment at 
the beginning of 2008, the share of public sector employment has risen 
to 17.5  percent by the end of 2014— which is 1.2 times the 2008 share. 
The data also makes it clear that the growth in public sector employment 
is driven by employment in national, provincial, and local government 
structures, as opposed to employment in state- owned enterprises. The 
latter has maintained a stable share in overall employment since 2008. 
Evident in  table  7-6, the fastest period of public sector employment 
250 Bhorat, Naidoo, Oosthuizen, and Pillay 
growth was during 2009, immediately following the global fi nancial 
crises, during which South Africa experienced signifi cant job losses. 
This suggests that the state possibly acted as an unintended creator 
of jobs during a period of extreme  labor market distress. Public sec-
tor employment growth was also high in 2012,  after which employment 
stabilized.
For the more than half a million jobs created in the public sector 
over the 2008–14 period, fi gure 7-2 plots the contribution of each oc-
cupation  toward this change. Many of the occupations that are large 
contributors to public sector job growth fall  under the category of 
elementary occupations (unskilled workers): sweepers and related la-
borers, farmhands and laborers, helpers and cleaners, construction and 
maintenance laborers, and garbage collectors. The other major con-
tributors to public sector jobs creation are primarily within the ser vice 
and related workers category (medium- skilled workers): police and traf-
fi c offi cers, institution- and home- based care workers, other protective 
ser vices, prison guards, technikon teacher training, cooks, and child- 
care workers.13 Apart from jobs in  these two broad occupations, higher 
skilled jobs such as primary and secondary school teachers, fi nance and 
administrative man ag ers, and legislators have also contributed to public 
sector job  growth.
From this brief analy sis, it would seem that the government’s Ex-
panded Public Works Program (EPWP) is an impor tant driver of 
 TABLE 7-6.  Employment in the Public Sector, 2008–14, South Africa
Year Governmenta SOEs Total
Year- to- year 
change in share 





2008 Q4 1,903,027 254,920 2,157,947 n.a. 1.00
2009 Q4 1,912,965 265,561 2,178,526 6.79 1.07
2010 Q4 1,960,613 292,007 2,252,620 3.92 1.11
2011 Q4 2,104,959 281,393 2,386,352 2.72 1.14
2012 Q4 2,215,565 318,064 2,533,629 4.81 1.20
2013 Q4 2,328,769 319,749 2,648,518 0.00 1.20
2014 Q4 2,365,131 322,960 2,688,091 0.46 1.21
Source: StatsSA QLFS (2008–2014), authors’ calculations.
a. “Government” comprises national, provincial, and local  governments.
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public sector job creation. The EPWP was launched in 2004, and 
focuses on providing income relief through creating jobs for the un-
employed and unskilled that involve socially useful activities. The 
EPWP creates jobs through government- funded infrastructure proj-
ects, through its nonprofi t or ga ni za tion and community work pro-
gram, as well as through its public environment and culture programs. 
As such, much of the public sector job growth shown in fi gure 7-2 re-
lates to the construction industry, the protection and safety sector, 
public sanitation, and personal care industries. Apart from EPWP, 
this data provides some evidence of the South African government’s 
attempts to address the education crisis through increasing the number 
FIGURE 7-2.  Share of Change in Public Sector Jobs by Detailed Occupation, 
2008 Q1–2014 Q4
Source: StatsSA QLFS 2008Q1, StatsSA QLFS 2014Q4, authors’ calculations.
Note:  These occupations are the largest 42 public sector occupations, making up 80  percent of total 
employment in the public sector in 2014, and 97  percent of the change in the number of public sector 
jobs over the 2008–14  period.
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Share of change in public sector jobs (2008–14)
Other teaching associate professionals
Primary education teaching associate
Nursing and midwifery professionals
Library and filing clerks
Armed forces
Police inspectors and detectives
Medical practitioners and physicians
Accounting and bookkeeping clerks
Heavy truck and lorry drivers




Safety health and quality inspectors
Statistical finance clerks
Plumbers and pipe fitters
Directors and chief executives
Locomotive engine drivers
Transport clerks
Building and related electricians
Other personal care and related workers
Garbage collectors







Construction and maintenance laborers
Finance and administration managers
Nursing associate professionals
Home-based personal care workers
Helpers and cleaners
Other protective services workers
Farmhands and laborers
Institution-based personal care workers
Primary education teachers
Secondary education teachers
Police and traffic officers
Sweepers and related labourers
Other office clerks
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of primary and secondary school teachers within the public schooling 
 system.
 Table 7-7 clearly shows that  there are signifi cant differences between 
the average profi le of employees in the public and private sectors, across 
all the demographic indicators and occupational categories, and for both 
time periods. The average age of public sector workers is forty- one years 
old, compared to thirty- eight in the private sector. Public sector workers 
have a signifi cantly higher average educational level in both time peri-
ods, with this average rising faster in the public sector than the private. 
Females have greater repre sen ta tion in the public sector, making up 
52  percent of the respective workforce, compared to 44  percent in the 
private sector. From making up 72  percent and 66  percent of public and 
private sector employees in 2008, respectively, Africans now make up 
77  percent of public sector employment, with  little change in this pro-
portion in the private sector.  There have been no changes in the propor-
tion of Indian and Coloured14 workers in  either sector, and white work-
ers make up a smaller proportion of workers in both sectors now than 
they did in 2008. The public sector has clearly been able to transform its 
 labor force at a faster pace than the private sector, given the higher 
proportion of both  women and African workers in the sector— groups 
that have faced historical discrimination in the South African  labor 
market.
In terms of the skills profi le of each sector, the data shows that the 
public sector is more skills- intensive. Almost 45   percent of all public 
sector employees fall into the top three occupational categories, com-
pared to 26  percent of workers in the private sector. Both sectors, how-
ever, have a similar proportion of unskilled (elementary) workers, which 
indicates that private sector workers are concentrated in the medium- 
skilled occupations. Interestingly, the proportion of the two most skills- 
intensive occupations have not changed in the public sector between 
2008 and 2013, but the proportion of professionals in the private sector 
has increased by 25  percent— consistent with the skills- biased  labor de-
mand shifts discussed earlier. As shown in fi gure 7-2, growth in public 
sector jobs was driven by the medium- skilled occupation of ser vice 
workers, as well as in elementary occupations, where  these shares grew 
by 31  percent and 23  percent, respectively. Again, this may point to the 
 TABLE 7-7.  Mean Characteristics of Public and Private Sector Workers, 2008 
and 2013,a South Africa





 Percent Δ 
Public
 Percent Δ 
Private
Demographics
Age 1.10* 1.07* 0.51 2.63
Male 0.84* 0.86* –2.04 –3.45
Race
 African 1.09* 1.15* 6.94 1.52
 Colored 0.91 0.91* 0 0
 Indian/Asian 0.50* 0.50* 0 0
 White 0.83* 0.65* –26.67 –5.56
Years of school 1.07* 1.10* 4.12 1.04
Marriedb 1.15* 1.09* –4.92 0
Unionc 2.27* 3.18* 2.34 –26.91
Occupation:
  Legislators, se nior
  offi cials, and 
man ag ers
0.60* 0.60* 0 0
 Professionals 1.83* 1.57* 0 25
  Technical and
  associate 
professionals
4.13* 3.00* –18.18 10.48
 Clerks 1.25* 1.25* 0 0
  Ser vice, shop, and
 market workers
1.18* 1.31* 30.77 18.18
  Craft and related
 trades workers
0.36* 0.33* –20 –14.29
  Plant and machine
  operators, and 
assemblers
0.30* 0.30* 0 0
  Elementary
 occupation
0.76 0.94* 23.08 0
Source: StatsSA QLFS (2008, Quarter 4), StatsSA LMDS (2013), authors’ calculations.
a. Public sector includes all levels of government and state- owned enterprises (SOEs). Non- public 
sector excludes  those working in agriculture or the informal sector.
b. Married includes individuals who are married or have partners and live together.
c. Union data is from the 2007 QLFS: Q4.
* Indicates that the mean for the public and private sectors for each characteristic is signifi cantly 
dif fer ent at a 5  percent signifi cance  level.
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state being able to absorb excess unskilled and medium- skilled  labor at 
times of economic and  labor market distress.
Therefore, public sector workers are more educated, older, more 
skilled, and mostly African in comparison with the formal private sec-
tor. Furthermore, the data shows that the public sector is more gender 
equitable than the private sector.
Bargaining Power and the Wage Premium
Another feature of the public sector  labor market is the relatively higher 
rates of  unionization, which is often associated with a wage premium. 
Bhorat and  others (2015a) show that the proportion of the public sector’s 
formal workforce who are  union members—or the public sector’s  union 
density— rose from 55   percent in 1997 (834,000 workers) to almost 
70  percent in 2013 (1.4 million workers). The private sector  union den-
sity displays the opposite overall trend, declining from 36   percent in 
1997 (1.8 million workers) to 24  percent in 2013 (1.9 million workers), 
while the absolute number of private sector  unionized workers has re-
mained fairly constant.
Interestingly, as employment in the public sector has risen, so has 
membership of public sector trade  unions, to the extent that they now 
dominate  union membership in South Africa. Not only, then, do we 
witness a rise in public sector employment, but this data also makes it 
clear that this employment rise has been commensurate with the rise of 
public sector trade  unions in South Africa.
Power ful  labor  unions are often associated with creating a wage 
premium for their members, given their ability to mobilize industrial 
action and negotiate in  favor of their members during times of wage 
negotiations.  There is extensive lit er a ture on the  union wage gap in 
South Africa, but slightly fewer studies on the bargaining council pre-
mium.15 Taking account of this, Bhorat and  others (2012) use the 2005 
South African  Labor Force Survey data to investigate the  union and 
bargaining council wage premiums and correct for the endogeneity of 
 union status through a two- stage se lection model, controlling for fi rm- 
level and job characteristics. In their most richly specifi ed estimation,16 it 
is found that  union members outside of the bargaining council system 
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earned a premium of 7.04  percent and  those members of private and pub-
lic bargaining councils not belonging to  unions earned an 8.97  percent 
and 10.5  percent premium over nonunion workers outside of the bargain-
ing council system, respectively.17 The total estimated premium to  union 
workers within the public bargaining council stands at 22  percent.18 
Therefore,  there is evidence that belonging to  either  unions or bargaining 
councils is associated with statistically signifi cant wage premiums, and, 
furthermore, that  unions may negotiate at the plant level for additional 
gains for their members within the bargaining council system.
When comparing wage levels between the public and private sec-
tors, the data shows that both median and mean wages of the public 
sector are signifi cantly higher than that of the private sector (which is 
confi rmed by  simple t- tests). The real monthly wage of an average pub-
lic sector employee is R11,668 (US$1,209) compared to R7,822 (US$811) 
for an average private sector worker.19
Disaggregating the wage distributions by  unionization reveals a 
slightly dif fer ent picture (fi gure 7-3). For nonunionized workers, the av-
erage real monthly wage in the private sector is statistically signifi cantly 
larger than that of the public sector, by a margin of R952 (US$99). While 
small, this suggests that the public sector premium is negative, or at 
the least dis appears, for workers who do not belong to a  union. There-
fore, this provides some initial evidence that the public sector premium 
may be very closely tied to a public sector  union membership  premium.
Our analy sis confi rms that the 30  percent of public sector workers 
who are not  union members are, on average, distinctly (and statisti-
cally) dif fer ent from  those who are  unionized on a number of charac-
teristics. Unionized public sector workers are slightly older, more likely 
to be male, and have a higher average level of education than non-
unionized public sector employees. African employees make up almost 
80  percent of nonunion public sector employees, and Coloured workers 
a further 10  percent. Most impor tant, though, nonunionized public 
sector workers are concentrated in elementary occupations (30  percent), 
ser vice and sales occupations (16  percent), and technical and associate 
professional occupations (16  percent). While it remains uncertain, the 
nonunionized workers in the fi rst two occupational groups are likely to 
be  those employed  under the EPWP.
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Ultimately though,  these wage distributions suggest that, at least 
in terms of earnings, a dual  labor market may, indeed, be prevalent in 
the South African  labor market. Previous models of segmentation in 
the South African  labor market have commonly referred to the distinc-
tion between the employed and the unemployed, or more recently, the 
formal and informal sector (Hofmeyr 1998; Bhorat and Leibbrandt 
1999; Fields 2000; Devey and  others 2006; Valodia 2007) as the key 
identifying markers of this segmentation. We suggest a nuance to South 
Africa’s segmented  labor market  here. In par tic u lar, and on the initial 
evidence of  these bimodal wage distributions, it would appear that the 
distinction between public and private sector, in terms of earnings and 
FIGURE 7-3.  Wage Distributions for Public and Private (Non- Public) 
Formal Sector Employees, by Union Status, 2013
Source: StatsSA LMDS (2013), authors’ graph.
Note: Non- public sector excludes agriculture and the informal sector. A two- sample Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test of the equality of distributions confi rms that the distributions of  unionized workers’ wages 
by sector are signifi cantly dif fer ent from each other, as are the distributions of wages for non- unionized 
workers by each sector. Within the public sector, the wage distributions of  unionized workers are signifi cantly 
dif fer ent from nonunionized workers, and similarly for the private  sector.
Density
5 10 15
Log real monthly wage
Public & union Public & non-union
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employment, would seem to be a new form of segmentation that has 
evolved in the South African  labor market.
An Econometric Estimation
To investigate the public sector wage premium more rigorously, we esti-
mate a two- stage Heckman employment model correcting for se lection 
into the  labor market. In this re spect, then, the standard earnings func-
tion of the following form is  run:
yi =∝+β1Xi +δPSi + μUi +η(PSi ×Ui)+ γ TESi + ε i
Equation (1)
where yi represents each individual’s, i, log monthly real earnings, Xi is 
a vector of individual characteristics, PSi indicates  whether an individ-
ual is employed in the public sector or not, Ui indicates  whether an in-
dividual is a  union member or not, TESi is a dummy variable for  whether 
the individual is employed in the TES sector or not, and εi is a normally 
distributed error term. δ shows the wage premium for public sector work-
ers who do not belong to a  union, and coeffi cient μ provides the wage 
premium for  union members who are not employed in the public or TES 
sectors. The sum of coeffi cients (δ + η) yields the conditional estimate for 
the public sector premium of  unionized workers. In our richest estimation, 
we split the public sector dummy variable into two separate dummies for 
government employment and SOE  employment:
yi =∝+β1Xi +δGovi +τSOEi + μUi + z(Govi ×Ui)
+ y(SOEi ×Ui)+ γ TESi + ε i
Equation (2)
The results of the OLS earnings function are shown in  table 7-8. In 
specifi cations 1 and 3, we model the public sector as a  whole, while in 2 
and 4, we disaggregate it into government employment and SOE employ-
ment. Specifi cation 3 is differentiated from specifi cation 1 by interacting 
the public sector dummy with the  union dummy, and similarly for speci-
fi cation 4, government and SOE are interacted with the  union dummy.
In the fi rst two specifi cations, which merely control for  union 
membership, we fi nd no signifi cant wage premium for workers in the 
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public sector. The  union membership premium, however, is large 
and signifi cant at 37  percent.20 Given our earlier analy sis, however, it 
seems likely that the interaction between  union membership and public 
sector employment would reveal a more in ter est ing picture. The results 
of the interacted specifi cations show that, for nonunionized members, 
 TABLE 7-8.  Estimated Earnings Function, Corrected for Se lection Bias,c,f 
South Africa, 2013
Log of real 
monthly wagesa
Specifi cations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government level
Public sector d 0.0109  . . .  −0.205***  . . .  
(0.0162)  . . .  (0.0223)  . . .  
Government e  . . .  0.0194  . . .  −0.233***
 . . .  (0.0165)  . . .  (0.0230)
SOE  . . .  −0.0392  . . .  −0.0287
 . . .  (0.0393)  . . .  (0.0619)
Interaction with  union
Public*Union  . . .   . . .  0.393***  . . .  
 . . .   . . .  (0.0285)  . . .  
Government*Union  . . .   . . .   . . .  0.444***
 . . .   . . .   . . .  (0.0294)
SOE*Union  . . .   . . .   . . .  0.0558
 . . .   . . .   . . .  (0.0785)
Union 0.318*** 0.317*** 0.207*** 0.207***
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0162) (0.0162)
TES –0.108*** −0.108*** −0.111*** −0.110***
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209)
Lambda −0.180*** −0.179*** −0.165*** −0.162***
(0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0352) (0.0352)
Observationsb 52,475 52,475 52,475 52,475
R- squared 0.402 0.402 0.406 0.406
Source: StatsSA LMDS (2013), authors’ calculations.
a. Dependent variable is log of real monthly wages.
b. We exclude the agricultural sector and informal workers. Therefore, we only considered 
 those employed in the formal non- agricultural sectors, who are within the 15–65 age category.
c. We include the following controls: gender, age, race, education splines, province dummies, 
 whether the person lives in an urban or rural location, occupation dummies, and fi rm size.
d. The public sector is made up of both government and state- owned enterprises (SOEs), 
which are interrogated separately in specifi cations (2) and (4).
e. “Government” is comprised of national, provincial, and local governments.
f. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *  p < 0.1.
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 there is a wage penalty for working in the public sector, relative to the 
private sector, of 18.5  percent. In addition,  there is also a wage penalty as-
sociated with TES employment for nonunionized workers. For  unionized 
workers, however, the public sector wage premium is 20.7  percent.21 In 
par tic u lar, for government workers, the wage premium within the group 
of workers belonging to a  union is 23.5  percent, whereas  there is no sig-
nifi cant wage premium for employees of SOEs.
Therefore,  these initial results show that, when also controlling for 
TES employment,  there is no public sector wage premium. However, 
as a member of a  union, the premium is signifi cant and large. This 
result is certainly novel. Earlier estimates of the public sector wage pre-
mium are provided by Woolard (2002), who fi nds a premium of 
18  percent for public sector workers. Her results also show that the pre-
mium is higher for  women (21  percent) than for men, and particularly 
for African  women, who  were associated with a 36  percent premium. 
While  these results control for  union membership,  there is no interac-
tion of  union membership with public sector employment.
Given the rising membership of public sector  unions already shown, 
together with the growing po liti cal infl uence of  these  unions,  these re-
sults possibly allude to the role played by  unions in driving higher returns 
for their members in the post-2000 period. This pattern of wage returns 
potentially suggests segmentation between  unionized public sector work-
ers versus all other formal, nonagricultural workers.
A more nuanced analy sis of the public sector wage premium can be 
performed using quantile regressions, presented in  table 7-9. This analy sis 
is conducted to investigate  whether the results shown in  table  7-8 are 
purely mean effects (for example, driven only by a few specifi c occupations 
that, then, infl uence the mean wage premium), or  whether the premium 
exists across the income distribution. Recall that quantile regressions refer 
to the generalized case of the least absolute deviations estimator. While 
through ordinary least squared estimation, as per the above estimations, 
we derive a sample mean by minimizing the sum of squared residuals, the 
sample median can be derived through minimizing the sum of absolute 
residuals (Koenker and Bassett 1978; Koenker and Hallock 2001).
We estimate the returns to government and SOE employment using 
interacted variables, presented in  table 7-9. The coeffi cients of interest 
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who do not belong to a  union,  there are signifi cant wage penalties 
associated with government employment, across the wage distribution. 
This penalty is highest at the 25th percentile and decreases  toward the 
highest wage levels. The wage returns for nonunionized workers to SOE 
employment has a dif fer ent pattern.  There are small wage penalties below 
the median wage; however, this becomes positive and high at the 75th 
percentile.
For  unionized workers in the  labor market,  there are high and posi-
tive returns to government employment relative to  those  unionized 
workers in the non- TES private sector. The median wage premium is 
37  percent, which declines to 15  percent at the 90th percentile. Union-
ized employees at SOEs only experience positive wage premiums in 
the top quartile of the distribution, relative to non- TES private sector 
 unionized workers in this same  quartile.
FIGURE 7-4.  Estimated Public Sector Wage Premia across the Wage 
Distribution, 2013
Source: StatsSA LMDS (2013), authors’ calculations.
Coefficients (log units)
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Government (non-union) SOE (non-union)
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In summary, our results do not show any signifi cant average public 
sector premium using the latest data available. Instead, we fi nd average 
wage penalties to government employment at lower wage levels, and 
positive wage premiums at higher levels, while controlling for  union 
membership that is associated with positive wage premiums across the 
distribution. When isolating  unionized workers, we fi nd that  there are 
signifi cantly large wage premiums associated with government employ-
ment relative to  unionized workers in non- TES private sectors.
Therefore, we fi nd that a key new facet of the South African  labor 
market is an estimated wage wedge between  unionized public sector 
workers and other formal nonagricultural workers in the  labor market. 
In one conception, we could argue that the post-2000 period has gener-
ated a new  labor elite in the  labor market, namely the  unionized public 
sector employee.
FINAL REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENT MARKET TRENDS
South Africa’s economic growth over the past two de cades has been 
driven primarily by the ser vices sector; namely the fi nancial and busi-
ness ser vices sector, construction, and to some extent  wholesale and 
retail trade. Employment growth has been driven by ser vices sectors 
and, in par tic u lar, higher- skilled occupations. This is against a back-
drop of stark  human capital defi cits that are a result of elevated rates of 
high- school dropouts and low levels of learning for  those who do com-
plete high school. In combination,  these two  factors are arguably cen-
tral to the per sis tently high levels of unemployment and in equality.
The growth of the TES sector was shown to be a relatively new 
 labor market trend. Part of the growth in ser vices employment has been 
the rise in  labor brokers that source workers for the TES sector. On the 
surface, it seems to be related to South Africa’s stringent  labor market 
regulations, however, this needs deeper investigation.
This chapter has also shown that an impor tant trend in the South 
African  labor market has been the rising share of workers in the public 
sector, and in government in par tic u lar. Job creation in government 
over the last six years is concentrated in unskilled and medium- skilled 
 South Africa 263
occupations, and the data suggests that it may be linked to a government- 
led program to create jobs for the unemployed and the unskilled in 
activities relating to infrastructure building, public safety, and other 
community- based public ser vice jobs.
Overall, though, we see higher average wages in the public sector 
relative to the private sector. Estimations of the wage premiums for pub-
lic sector workers show that much of the difference in public– private 
wages has to do with  union membership. For  unionized workers in the 
South African  labor market, employment in government is associated 
with signifi cantly higher returns than private sector employment. We 
show, then, a key new form of segmentation in the South African  labor 
market, namely between the higher earning  unionized public sector 
worker and the rest of the  labor market.
Ordinarily such segmentation would be of general curiosity and 
academic interest. However, coupled with a sclerotic economy that is 
unable to generate large numbers of jobs in the private sector (most 
notably in manufacturing), or where its fi rms are actively engaged in 
avoiding direct employment, this result is particularly worrying. A long- 
run employment trajectory built on the public sector requires critical 
reassessment as part of a broader revitalizing of the economy’s growth 
and development strategy.
NOTES
1. Data from the South African Reserve Bank (2015).
2. The South African National Poverty Line is mea sured at the 
lower bound at US$3.50 a day and at the upper bound at US$5.43 a day 
(StatsSA 2015).  These poverty lines  were recently rebased by StatsSA so 
that they are refl ective of a current average basket of food and nonfood 
consumption items. The 2011 poverty headcount rate at the lower bound 
is 37  percent.
3.  There is a rich lit er a ture on the linkages between growth, poverty, and 
in equality, which includes Kanbur (2005); Kanbur and Squire (1999); Kak-
wani (1993); Datt and Ravallion (1992); Ravallion (1997, 2001). While this is 
an impor tant area in the macroeconomics of growth and development, it is 
not the focus of this chapter.
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4. World Development Indicators (World Bank 2015), using national 
estimates.
5. The IQR is the spread between the upper and lower quartiles of in-
come and consumption for all the NTA countries, at each age.
6. This defi nition includes  those who are unemployed and willing to 
work but have stopped searching for jobs, commonly referred to as discour-
aged workers.
7.  These are calculated using data from StatsSA October House hold 
Survey (OHS) 1996–99; StatsSA LFS September 2001–07; StatsSA QLFS 
Quarter 4 2008–13; and StatsSA QLFS Quarter 1 2014.
8. The category specifi cally includes security guards, security patrolmen, 
security patrolwomen, bodyguards, coastguards, beach guards, lifeguards, 
beach patrolmen, beach patrolwomen, traffi c wardens, game wardens, bird 
sanctuary wardens, wildlife wardens, taxi- guards, and traffi c coordinators.
9. StatsSA OHS 1999; StatsSA QLFS Quarter 1, 2014.
10. SACMEQ III was undertaken from 2005 to 2010, targeted all pupils 
in grade 6 level (at the fi rst week of the eighth month of the school year) who 
 were attending registered mainstream primary school. The desired target 
population defi nition for the proj ect was based on a grade- based description 
and not age- based description of pupils.
11. According to the TIMMS methodology, four points in the overall 
subject scales are identifi ed as international benchmarks: 400 is the low in-
ternational benchmark, 475 is the intermediate international benchmark, 
550 is the high international benchmark, and 625 is the advanced inter-
national benchmark.
12. Data analy sis is based on StatsSA LFS (1994 and 2004) and StatsSA 
QLFS (2013), but is not shown  here.
13. This relates to skill level 5 out of nine national skill level categories, 
where 9 is the least skilled category. See notes to  table 7-5 for an explanation 
of how occupations map into skill levels.
14. Racial analy sis in this chapter uses the country’s four main race 
groups as defi ned by South African authorities and in the lit er a ture on South 
African society: African, Coloured (mixed- race), Indian, and white.
15. “Bargaining councils can be established by one or more registered 
trade  unions and by one or more registered employer organ izations for a 
specifi c sector and area. Worker interests are, therefore, represented at bar-
gaining councils by the relevant trade  unions. Participation by  unions and 
employer organ izations in the system is voluntary, and the issues to be ne-
gotiated are left to the discretion of the parties. Wage formation within the 
bargaining council system is, thus, a voluntary exercise ongoing annually 
between employer organ izations and employees (represented by trade 
 unions). In many cases,  these councils have a long history of regularized 
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bargaining and engagement around worker issues” (Bhorat and  others 2012, 
p. 402).
16. Including dummy variables for  union status, private and public bargain-
ing council status, type of work, fi rm characteristics, and nonwage benefi ts.
17. With signifi cance at the 5  percent level.
18. This research suggests that institutional wage premiums in South 
Africa may be smaller than previously estimated, with most of the previous 
studies reporting a premium in excess of 20  percent— possibly overstated by 
not accounting for bargaining council coverage (Butcher and Rouse 2001; 
Armstrong and Steenkamp 2008; Miliea and  others 2013).
19. All Rand fi gures are converted to US$, using an average 2013 ex-
change rate of ZAR/US$: 9.65.
20. Calculated as e0.317−1.
21. Calculated as exp(−0.205+0.393)−1. The remaining wage premiums are 
calculated similarly.
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